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To my sunshine C.
Still I rise
Maya Angelou
Just like moons and like suns,
With the certainty of tides,
Just like hopes springing high,
Still I’ll rise.
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0.1 Introduction
This thesis contains three standalone chapters that fall under the broad banner
of development economics.
The first chapter contributes to the debate on the local impact of mineral
resources in developing countries. Precisely, I analyse the effect of the boom
in the world price of gold during the early 2000s on child labour and schooling
outcomes in Mali. While empirical studies document the positive impacts of
resource booms on real income (Hilson, 2009; Loayza and Rigolini, 2016), the
effect on other measures of human well-being, such as education, is less clear.
Given a boom in gold mining brings development to local communities in the
form of jobs, increased household income and improved infrastructure (Land,
2015), one would expect to observe an increase in school enrolment and a
decrease child labour rate (an income effect). This being said, the accessible
and profitable nature of gold mining, especially in small-scale mining could
constitute an employment source for young adults and children. This could
lead families to disregard their children’s education in pursuit of short-term
income and push them to work, leading to a lower level of education (a sub-
stitution effect). This chapter is devoted to examine which of these effects
dominate.
While large-scale mining (LSM) produces most of the gold in Mali, another
form of mining known as artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) coexists
alongside. I construct a rich, repeated cross-sectional dataset by combining
the geocoded mining location of every registered ASM and LSM site1 with
nationally representative household surveys and child labour surveys from the
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) collected in 2001 (before the gold price
increase) and 2012 (after the gold price increase).
The chapter’s main results suggest that the substitution effect of a boom
1This information was acquired from Infomine and the Direction Nationale de la Géologie
et des Mines (DNGM) in Mali.
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in the world price of gold dominates the income effect, with households pushing
their kids out of school to supplement their incomes.
Many rural Ethiopian households rely heavily on agriculture as their pri-
mary source of income. Since most crop production in Ethiopia is rain-fed, ru-
ral household revenue is extremely vulnerable to precipitation shocks (Ademe
et al., 2019). Moreover, given that both insurance markets and credit markets
are weakly developed, and climate change is forecasted to increase the variabil-
ity and intensity of these shocks2, understanding the labour market responses
of rural households to these shocks is of great importance to policy makers.
This is the subject of Chapter 2.
Using data from a large and nationally representative sample of rural
households, combined with monthly re-analysis precipitation data for the pe-
riod 1981-2014, I examine how precipitation shocks impact household par-
ticipation in labour activities.3 Particular emphasis is given to how time-
allocation responses vary across gender and how it changes according to the
current month. I find that all individuals increase their time allocation to
casual public work, largely consisting of participating in the government-run
Public Works programme that provides food, cash, or a mixture of both, in
return for work.
Additionally, I exploit the heterogeneous impact of precipitation on farm-
ing to examine the channels through which precipitation affect labour time al-
location4. To do this, I take advantage of the large scale irrigation investment
in dams that Ethiopia started in the 1960s as part of the government-owned
state farms programme (Awulachew, 2019). While dams are clearly beneficial
(they allow water to be stored for later use ultimately leading to less volatility
in income), calculating the magnitude of benefit is important for policy mak-
ers. To this end, I split the sample into rain-fed areas and areas with irrigated
2See for instance: Hulme et al. (2001); Desanker and Magadza (2001); Hulme et al. (2005)
3These labour activities include household agricultural activities, non-agricultural work
(self-employment or not), casual public work, (salaried) wage work, unpaid traineeships and
household chores.
4The strategy implemented mirrors that of Sarsons (2011); Maitra and Tagat (2019a);
Strobl and Strobl (2011); Blanc and Strobl (2014)
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systems and test whether the time allocation responses to precipitation shocks
differ by the areas in which households reside. I find almost no effects on
the time allocation to labour activities in districts with irrigation. My results
should help to inform policy makers on part of the true value of irrigation pro-
grams, thereby assisting in computing the shadow price of future large scale
irrigation systems.
The chapter makes three main contributions to the existing literature.
The first contribution lies in providing a deeper understanding of how gender
differences in the allocation of time come about in rural Ethiopia, giving more
insight into intra-household responses to weather shocks. Second, although
several studies provide evidence on the effect of precipitation shocks on house-
hold labour time allocation, studies that examine variations in precipitation in
each month during the growing season are still nascent. Considering monthly
variations in precipitation shocks enables me to analyse if and how a spe-
cific month of the growing season is essential in contributing to household
wellbeing.Third, I present evidence on the importance of major infrastructure
projects, such as irrigation dams, in protecting against weather shocks.
Finally, Chapter 3 analyses the household determinants of child mistreat-
ment in developing countries.5 Child mistreatment is of particular concern
for development, but what factors contribute to higher risks of physical and
emotional ill-treatment? How can these findings be used by policymakers?
Notwithstanding numerous media reports on child mistreatment incidents,
detailed analyses of the contributing risk and protective factors of child mis-
treatment from a nationally representative sample have been predominantly
limited to developed countries.6 This chapter sheds light on what household
characteristics are associated with child mistreatment in developing countries,
5According to the World Health Organization (WHO), child mistreatment includes all
forms of physical, sexual, emotional ill-treatment and neglect involving child labour and
exploitation (WHO, 2016).
6See for example Markowitz and Grossman (1998, 2000), Paxson and Waldfogel (1999,
2002, 2003), Brooks-Gunn and Duncan (1997) and McLoyd (1998).
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using the Ivory Coast as its point of study. To do this, I use the first na-
tionally representative Ivorian household survey that includes a component of
discipline methods applied by caregivers to their children. While the paper is
descriptive, the correlative evidence on the household characteristics of child
mistreatment should help decision-makers identify households at high risk of
child mistreatment and enable them to tailor strategies targeted at prevention.
The structure of the thesis is as described in this introduction. Chapter 1
assesses the local impact of the boom in gold world price in the 2000s on child
labour and schooling decisions in Mali, Chapter 2 addresses rural Ethiopian
households’ responses to precipitation shocks, and Chapter 3 examines the
household characteristics associated with child abuse in Ivory Coast. Most of
the Tables and Figures relevant to each Chapter are included in the main body
of the Thesis, but additional Tables and Results are included in the Appendix,
with a section for each Chapter.
Chapter 1
Gold boom, Child Labour and
Schooling: Evidence from Mali
1.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that mineral resources can impact local commu-
nities both positively and negatively. In the presence of weak institutions,
mineral resources could lead to violent conflicts and crime by increasing the
rents from appropriating that resource (Axbard et al., 2019). Other negative
spillovers through an effect on pollution, comprise the loss of agricultural pro-
ductivity and hence reductions in the living standards of farmers in the vicinity
of mines (Aragón and Rud, 2016). At the same time, an influential body of
the literature discusses that mineral resources may be a blessing rather than a
curse for developing countries. Positive impacts could arise from a fiscal chan-
nel in which the revenue windfall generated by the mineral resources enables
governments to support higher public spending and improve the provision of
public goods such as roads, electricity and schools (Aragón and Rud, 2013).
Be that as it may, researchers argue that most of the positive impacts are
found through a market channel. They explain that mineral resource booms
can be thought of as local employment development boosts and thus increase
local income (Aragón and Rud (2013); Land (2015); Kotsadam and Tolonen
(2016); Loayza and Rigolini (2016); Thomas (2010)). Indeed, by employing
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local workers and purchasing local goods and services, a mining boom should
raise nominal wages, increase non-mine employment opportunities and im-
prove local welfare and thus reduce poverty (Land, 2017). While this predicts
a possible positive impact of resource booms on real income, the effect on other
measures of human well-being, such as education is less clear. If one thinks of
mining as bringing development to local communities such as jobs, increased
household income or better infrastructure, we could observe an increase in
school enrolment and a decreased child labour rate (income effect). This being
said, the accessible and profitable nature of artisanal and small-scale mining
in the vicinity of large scale mines could constitute an employment source
for young adults and children. This could in turn lead families to disregard
their children’s education and to incite them to work, leading to a lower level
of education (substitution effect). This paper contributes to the debate by
analysing the impact of the boom in international gold prices on child labour
and schooling outcomes in Mali.
I argue that Mali is a compelling case, as over the past twenty years,
the country has seen its potential in gold mining increase. Today, gold is the
country’s leading export resource before cotton and cattle with a total export
volume of 2 billion US dollars in 2018, making the country Africa’s third-
largest exporter of gold behind South Africa and Ghana. While large-scale
mining (LSM) produces most of the country’s gold, another form of mining
known as Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM), exists alongside. Although
the production quantities of ASM are lesser1, they are a significant source of
livelihood in Mali and there is still little evidence on the effect of this type of
mining on child outcomes.
I implement the model proposed by Bazillier and Girard (2020), a
difference-in-difference estimation, in which the treatment comes from vari-
ations in the global gold price and the distance to gold mines. I assume that
gold price is exogenous (Mali is a price taker in the global market for gold)
1ASM accounts for approximately 10% of the total gold production as of 2011 (U.S.
Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook).
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and induce a time variation in gains from mining. I define the location of ASM
and LSM sites by using GPS data on the location of registered small-scale and
artisanal mines and large-scale mines, respectively. I construct a dataset that
is a repeated cross-section by combining mining data with nationwide repre-
sentative household surveys and child labour surveys from the Demographic
and Health Survey (DHS) collected in 2001 (before the gold price increase)
and 2012 (after the gold price increase).
The measure of gold price boom shows that child labour is pro-cyclical.
That is, the gold price boom increases child labour in the vicinity of registered
(legal) ASM. As in Kruger (2007) and Santos (2014), school attendance and
school attainment is counter-cyclical. The estimates imply that a one percent
increase in the price of gold increases the employment of children by 0.06%, in
the vicinity of mines. Similarly, the probability of performing domestic chores
increases by 0.03% for every one percent increase in the price of gold. As in
Bazillier and Girard (2020), the results show that large-scale mines have no
effect in my model.Furthermore, household characteristics, such as the presence
of sisters for boys and the years of education of the head mitigate the impact
of the gold boom. Ultimately, the main results suggests that the substitution
effect dominates. As the price of gold rises, both child and adult labour become
more profitable in the mining sector or any sector that is linked to the mining
sector.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, the analysis uses satel-
lite imagery and detailed geographic information that allows to measure both
LSM and ASM at a high-spatial resolution. I reduce the knowledge gap on
the local impact of ASM as previous studies focus mainly on large-scale min-
ing (Aragón and Rud (2016); Ahlerup et al. (2019); Kotsadam and Tolonen
(2016); Axbard et al. (2019)). The increasing role of ASM in developing coun-
tries show that these operations must be taken into account in order to fully
understand the local impacts of resource extraction. Second, I contribute to
the literature on the cyclicality of child labour and human capital decisions
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by providing novel evidence on how these decisions may be affected by transi-
tory positive shocks. Not much empirical evidence exists of the consequences
of commodity booms on human capital and child labour decisions, especially
using Malian data. Third, I contribute to the literature on the resource curse
that documents a negative relationship between natural resources and educa-
tion attainment (Gylfason, 2001).
The content of the rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section
1.2 gives a brief background on the gold boom in Mali, the educational sys-
tem, the impact of gold mining on schooling and child labour, Section 1.3
introduces the data and Section 1.4 presents the empirical strategy. Section
1.5 presents the results. Section 1.6 studies factors that mitigate the effects.
Section 1.7 discusses the substitution effect as the key mechanism and tests
alternative mechanisms through which gold mining could affect children out-
comes and Section 1.8 is devoted to some robustness checks. Finally, Section
1.9 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 The gold boom in Mali
Mali has a long tradition in gold mining. However, gold production and exports
have recently increased for two reasons: the introduction of a commercial
mining code as part of the liberalisation process in the 1990s, and the upward
trend of world prices, both of which have made production more profitable.
Indeed, since the dramatic increase in the world price of gold in early 2000s,
gold became Mali’s largest export product, surpassing cotton: it represented
around 400million FCFA of the exports in 2001 (the starting year of this study)
and increased to around 900million FCFA in 2012 (the final year of the study)
(Thomas, 2010). The price of gold increased by a factor of 6 between 2001
and 2012, from USD$271.19 an ounce to USD$1668.86 an ounce (see Figure
1.2). The mining sector is an important source of revenue for the government,
which holds an equity position in all exploration activities with no financial
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Figure 1.1: Location of Large-scale Gold mining sites, before 2013
Table 1.1: Gold production in Mali (1997-2012) (tons).
1997 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
16.4 23.7 51.3 63.7 51.6 41.6 49.1 58.4 52.8 48.7 49.7 46.0 40.0 45.0
Source: Direction nationale de la géologie et des mines (DNGM), «Rapports de
levées d’or des sociétés d’exploitation minière» and U.S. Geological Services,The
Mineral Industries of Mali and Niger 2010-12.
contribution on their part. Mines also contribute to local development by
engaging in community activities and building infrastructure, such as schools,
hospitals, and roads, providing access to previously remote locations.
In terms of level, total gold production amounted to 16.4 tons in 1997,
reached a high of 63.7 tons in 2002 and amounted to 45 tons in 2012 (Table 1.1).
Although there has been increase in the employment in the large scale mining
(LSM) sector, the job creation has been modest due to the capital-intensive
and high-skilled nature of the sector.
1.2.2 Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM)
While most of Mali’s gold is produced by Large-Scale Mining (LSM), another
form of subsistence mining operation more labour intensive, known as Artisanal
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of International Gold Price (1990-2013)
and Small-Scale Mining (ASM), coexist in the country. ASM produces about
4 tons per year. ASM miners are not always officially employed by a mining
company but rather work independently, using their own resources. They often
combine mining with other activities such as agriculture and livestock breeding
or informal activities in services and craftwork (Hilson, 2016). In Mali, ASM
is found especially near large-scale mines, where residual lower grade ores are
often left out by these big companies and further mined by artisanal miners.
ASM may also be carried out in abandoned mining areas, tailing dams, or
downstream areas.
ASM has strong linkages and spillovers with the local economy. For every
one person working directly in ASM, up to five additional people are indi-
rectly supported by work in associated industries and activities2 (Bannock,
2005). These include more concentrated local commercial activities in the
form of businesses such as taxi drivers, mineral traders, buyers and refiners,
shops, bars, food stalls and restaurants, local markets, equipment suppliers
and farming inputs. This multiplier effect often results in the local economies
2Data on ASM employment multipliers in developing countries are not available, the
respective values are estimated for the U.S.A. and provide an indication.
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of entire towns and communities being built around, and dependent on, the
sector as their main source of livelihood.
The size of the sector fluctuates with the gold price and other employ-
ment opportunities. It is estimated that approximately 400,000 people are
directly employed in ASM and 2.4 million people depend on it in some in-
direct way (Hilson, 2012). Given the importance of the sector, the Malian
government attempts to regulate ASM by providing authorisations and per-
mits to ASM operations. These artisanal mining authorisations are granted to
Malian nationals and the exploitation license gives, within limits of a perime-
ter, an exclusive right of prospection, research, exploitation, treatment and
marketing of gold. In return, local authorities receive payments of duties and
taxes. ASM’s operations can be performed by individual miners as well as by
cooperative companies.
This study provides estimates of the impact of artisanal and small-scale
mining by using data on the ASM permits published by the Minister of Mines
of Mali. This enables me to account for the presence of both a large-scale mine
and ASM and estimate their effects on local communities. However, given the
high level of informality of ASM, the sector remains difficult to regulate and
very often is carried out illegally. This makes it difficult to give an accurate
estimate of each location and involved parties of ASM and hence could imply
that my estimate of ASM sites could be underreported.
1.2.3 Schooling in Mali
There are three types of education in Mali: Community schools that rely
mainly on village communities and NGOs, private schools and public schools
that depend on the state. All public schooling in Mali is provided free of charge
and legislated as compulsory for children between 7 and 16 years old. The
system comprises of six years of primary education directly followed by another
six years of secondary schooling (Hilson, 2012). Empirical evidence has shown
that Mali’s education system is subject to high rates of delay in schooling of
children and girls in particular. This is explained by high ancillary education
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costs, including transportation, purchases of writing supplies and uniforms,
which represent a major financial sacrifice in a country where more than half
of the population lives in poverty (UNDP, 2012). Often families choose to send
only one or two of their children to school, the choice is then more often on
boys, accentuating the gender gap (Hilson, 2012). The educational system is
hindered by a lack of resources (infrastructure, textbooks and staff), overloaded
classes and frequent dropouts (Hough, 1989). Another shortcoming of the
system is the inequity of access to primary and secondary education for rural
and urban populations, due to a concentration of schools in urban areas. All of
which leads to school attendance rates that do not exceed 25% in some regions
of the country (Diané Baba, 2015).
1.2.4 Literature review: Impact of a gold mining boom
on child labour and schooling
The model in Basu and Van (1998) assumes that children’s leisure is a luxury
good, which poor households can only afford if income rises. Therefore, one
channel through which a gold mining boom could impact education, could
be through an increase in household income. Mining employment, especially
in ASM, could represent a significant and higher source of income relative to
farming activities for poverty-driven population and rural communities, who
usually suffer from limited job opportunities (Hilson, 2009). These increased
revenues could allow families to afford education costs.
Another channel that could lead to higher levels of education is an increase
in public spending, provided that local institutions are healthy (Land, 2015).
The revenues the mining sector contributed to local institutions could serve to
improve the supply and the quality of public goods and services such as elec-
tricity provision, water source, roads and schools, and thus improve education
outcomes. Guarcello et al. (2004) showed that access to electricity and wa-
ter source could reduce the value of children’s time in non-schooling activities.
Children become less needed to assume the responsibility of water collection or
no longer are required to help cover the cost of buying water (Guarcello et al.,
1.2. Background 26
2004). An improved source of energy for lighting could also influence the time
children need for collecting wood. Furthermore, the construction of schools
creates access for children to attend classes and hence raise school attendance
(Kondylis and Manacorda, 2012).
However, another strand of the literature documents that child labour
and income shocks behave in a pro-cyclical manner. That is, by increasing
the opportunity cost of education, higher income gains influence parents to
send their children to work for subsistence rather than going to school. Beegle
et al. (2006) discovered that a transitory shock in crop prices in Tanzania is
associated with a 30% increase in child labour. In this same line, Kruger (2007)
shows how the education of poor and middle-income children is negatively
impacted in the periods of economic growth in coffee-producing regions of
Brazil. Cogneau and Jedwab (2012) examine this mechanism, focusing on
cocoa prices in Ivory Coast and indicate that positive price shocks increase
child labour incidence.
In the context of natural resources, Santos (2014) shows the repercussions
of a gold boom on child labour and school attendance in Colombia. According
to that paper, a one standard deviation increase in the gold mining boom
reduces school attainment by 0.07 standard deviations. Zabsonré et al. (2018)
find similar effects of gold extraction on schooling and child labour using the
approach in Loayza and Rigolini (2016) for the case of Burkina Faso. Using
166 countries, Gylfason (2001) finds a negative relationship between natural
resource wealth and school enrollment.
The spillovers arising from the gold mining boom, particularly in the con-
text of weak local institutions, could negatively affect education by increasing
rent-seeking opportunities (Land, 2017). This may in turn generate higher cor-
ruption and conflict. An increase in conflict intensity could lead to a drop in
household consumption and thus increase the participation of children in work
activities since households may want to use child labour to insure against the
decreased consumption (Kofol and Ciarli, 2017). Education may also be ad-
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versely affected if families are displaced due to higher conflict intensity (Smith
et al., 2003).
Furthermore, gold mining activity could be detrimental for children’s
schooling if the rise in local labour demand and increased nominal wages from
a gold mining boom attract workers from other cities. This increased popula-
tion could cause congestion in public services, such as education (Land, 2017).
Loayza and Rigolini (2016) argue that the type of people that gold mining at-
tracts could also affect education’s outcome. If gold mining induces migration
from more skilled workers, thus increasing the share of more educated work-
ers in mining areas, the outcomes on education could only reflect changes in
the composition of the population rather than real improvements in economic
welfare.
1.3 Data
I construct a repeated cross-sectional data set using various sources. These
include (i) child labour data from two rounds of the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) of Mali; (ii) two rounds of nationwide representative household
surveys; (iii) geocoded Mining data on LSM and ASM sites from Infomine and
the Direction Nationale de la Géologie et des Mines (DNGM) in Mali.
1.3.1 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
First I use micro data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS),
which uses household questionnaires to collect comprehensive information on
children’s activities in Mali, that are suitable for this analysis. An important
benefit of the DHS is that the groups of households taking part in the surveys,
identified as clusters, are georeferenced. In other words, they are associated
to a ground system of geographic coordinates, which allows me to calculate
a proxy for the distance between households and gold mines and assign them
to treatment or the comparison groups3. This study makes use of two rounds
3In order to ensure respondent confidentiality, the DHS follows displacement procedures
in which it randomly displaces the GPS latitude/longitude positions for its surveys. The
spatial coordinates for urban locations are displaced by 0-2 km. Rural locations as well as
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for which this information is available, 2001 and 2012. To the best of my
knowledge, this study is the first to construct such an extensive dataset and
exploit the geocoded child labour data, in the context of Mali.
For the purpose of this study, I define the age of a child to be between
7 and 14 years. This coincides with the starting age of school in Mali and
will not mislead the results on school enrolment. Economic participation is a
dummy that takes the value of one if in the week preceding the survey, the child
worked for someone outside the household (paid or not), worked for a household
business (paid or not) or worked on the farm. Domestic participation equals
one if the child performed domestic chores such as cleaning the house and
preparing meals, over the past week. Domestic participation is included for
two reasons. First, child labour is not restricted to economic activities. Second,
in rural areas it may be difficult to distinguish between time spent on household
chore activities and time spent preparing subsistence food crops.
Attended school is defined as one if the child attended school a week prior
to the survey. Akin to Santos (2014), school attainment takes the value of
one if the child has attained the school grade she should be in, given a normal
progression in school. School lag is a dummy that is equal to one if the child is
three or more grades below her expected grade. School attainment and school
lag are used as proxies for educational achievement, although it is recognised
that such measures cannot fully reflect school performance. Since the surveys
represent a point in time, they cannot account for the cumulative effect of child
labour on attainment over time.
1.3.2 National Household Surveys
One limitation of the DHS data is that they do not collect information on eco-
nomic measures of poverty, such as income or expenditure. I complement the
analysis with nationwide representative household surveys. In the follow-up of
policies to fight against poverty, the government of Mali initiated the conduct-
ing of a series of surveys, aimed at collecting a wide range of socioeconomic
an additional 1% randomly selected clusters are displaced up to 5 km.
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indicators needed to monitor and evaluate improvement in households’ living
conditions. More specifically, the EMEP (Enquete Malienne d’Evaluation de
la Pauvrete) conducted in 2001 and the EMOP (Enquete Modulaire et Per-
manente Aupres des Menages) in 2012, were designed to update the indicators
of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework (GPRSP) in line
with those of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The information
collected includes household expenditure, which has been argued in the lit-
erature to be a good indicator of household welfare as opposed to income,
because of its stability (Grimm and Gräb, 2011). The assumption being that
higher consumption expenditure per head of household, increases the house-
hold’s ability to satisfy its vital needs. Also, Brewer and O’Dea (2012) argue
that income in household surveys is usually under-reported for households with
low resources. To obtain a real measure of expenditure per capita, the nominal
values are deflated using an indicator of household poverty status.
1.3.3 Gold Mining Data
The Mining data come from several sources. Infomine, provided a dataset
containing the geocoded location of Mali’s main large-scale gold mines from
1990 to 2012. Information on their production levels comes from the Direction
Nationale de la Géologie et des Mines (DNGM) of Mali and the US Geological
Survey (USGS). Regarding Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM), I obtain
the location of registered artisanal and small-scale mines by the Ministry of
Mine of Mali. Though the list they provide is the best data to date on ASM,
it does not include every place where ASM is taking place. This could cause
a potential attenuation bias in the results. The dataset I construct consists of
7 large-scale gold mines and 13 ASM sites across the country.
1.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics for the main variables of interest.
It computes the means and standard deviations and includes the figures for
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the sample area4 and households with full observations. I observe that 60%
of children are not enrolled in a schooling program and 39% participate in
economic activities. Mali is known to have one of the highest fertility rates in
the world, looking at the data, the average household size is 9 members and
the average number of children (aged 7-14) in a household is 5. The children in
the DHS sample are on average 10 years old and have 1.30 years of education.
With regards to access to facilities, around 19% of households have access
to drinking water and 13% have access to electricity. The average distance
to a LSM site is 88 km and 90 km to an ASM site. In terms of household
consumption, expenditure per capita per district is on average 36382 CFA,
which is approximately 60 USD5.
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Economic Participation (%) 39.41 0.49 10374
Economic Hours (per week) 8.10 19.47 10374
Domestic Participation (%) 61.33 0.49 10374
Domestic Hours (per week) 10.81 16.20 10374
Attended School (%) 40.31 0.49 10374
School Lag (%) 12.74 0.33 10374
School Attainment (%) 74.97 0.43 10374
Real expend. per capita 36381.67 14303.56 10374
Education (years) 1.30 2.72 10374
Age 10.25 2.30 10374
Male (%) 50.59 0.50 10374
Male (Head) 90.96 0.29 10374
Age (Head) 49.62 12.32 10367
Literate Head (%) 38.28 1.05 10329
Rural (%) 85.67 0.35 10374
Electricity (%) 13.04 0.34 10374
Access to Water (%) 18.55 0.39 10374
Household size 8.82 3.80 10374
Number of Kids (7-14) 5.43 2.82 10374
Distance to LSM Site (km) 88.28 54.46 10374
Distance to ASM Site (km) 90.07 54.80 10374
Mining Deforestation (Ha) 0.24 0.57 10374
4I restrict the sample to the three regions in which I identify gold mines, Kayes, Koulikoro
and Sikasso.
5The CFA Franc has a fixed exchange rate with the euro (656 CFA Francs= 1 euro).
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1.4 Empirical Model
The aim of the paper is to evaluate the effect of gold mining on child labour
and schooling. To identify the effect of mining, two sources of variations are
exploited: the boom in the international price of gold, which provides with
a time varying treatment, and the household’s distance to gold mines, which
serves as a heterogeneous exposure to the mining spillovers. This identification
strategy is thus a difference-in-difference based on spatial and time variations.6
This section explains how this strategy enables me to identify the effect of
artisanal and small-scale and large-scale mining.
I identify the locations of artisanal deposits by using the census of artisanal
mines registered at the Ministry of Mines. In my baseline specification, I
use a 10-kilometre buffer to distinguish treated and non-treated households (I
present alternative distance definitions in my robustness checks). With regards
to large-scale mines, I also exploit difference in time and spatial variations.
Similarly to ASM, the spatial source of variation is the household distance
to a gold deposit, as a source of heterogeneous exposure to a potential mine.
Here, I use a 20-kilometre buffer to divide treated and untreated households.7
The boom in the international price of gold provides a time-varying treatment.
More specifically, I define Pt as the log of gold price. The rationale is that gold
price should affect areas with high potential for gold mining more as it is the
main driver of mining activities and directly defines the expected benefits of
the miners. When the price of gold increases, a substitution effect in which
households may favour shifting, diversifying activities or increasing their labour
supply to gain from new income opportunities, may take place.
6The strategy mirrors that of Bazillier and Girard (2020) and is based on a household
and individual level approach. Unlike this study, the main outcomes of focus in Bazillier
are consumption patterns, they author show that the gold boom generates an increase in
consumption for households located close to artisanal mines. However, they also briefly look
at human capital outcomes and find that the gold boom in Burkina Faso has not affected
health and education, either for artisanal or for industrial mining.
7The literature uses several distance definitions. I choose this threshold taking into
account that LSM sites are bigger than ASM and the demand shock is prone to be less
concentrated. Nonetheless, I use alternative distance definitions in robustness checks.
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Due to the repeated cross-sectional nature of the dataset, the identifica-
tion strategy is a difference-in-difference based on spatial and temporal varia-
tions. I focus on the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and nationwide
representative household surveys to combine geocoded household enumeration
areas with the location of large-scale and small-scale and artisanal mine sites
to construct the treatment group. In the baseline specification, children are
assigned to the treatment if their household enumeration area is within 10km
of an ASM site and/or 20km of a LSM site. The main assumption of the
difference-in-difference is the parallel trend. In other words, I assume that the
evolution in children outcome indicators far and close to these mines, from the
baseline to the post-treatment period, would have been similar for all units of
observation in the absence of the increase in gold mining activities.
I estimate the following specification to evaluate the effect of LSM and
ASM on children outcome:
Yidt = β0 +β1ASM aread +β2Pricet +β3(Pricet×ASM aread)
+β4(Pricet×LSM aread)
+β5(LSM aread) +φXit +αd + εidt (1.1)
where Yidt is the outcome variable of child i in district d in year t. This outcome
variable depending on the regression corresponds to either local employment
or an outcome of interest for children. ASM aread is a variable measuring the
treatment and is equal to 1 if household is located within 10 km of an ASM
site and 0 otherwise. LSM area˙d is equal to 1 if the household lives within
20 km of a large-scale mine, 0 otherwise. I include an interaction between the
gold price and the large-scale mine dummy since a high gold price translates to
more profit for mines. The first coefficient of interest, β3, shows the impact of
the change in the gold price on child labour and schooling of children who live
within 10 km of an ASM gold mining site. The second coefficient of interest,
β4 estimates the impact of the change in the gold price for children who live
within 20 km of an LSM site. Specification (1.1) is estimated using a pooled
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cross section of two years, 2001 and 2012. One year is the pre-treatment
year and the other one is the post-treatment year. I include, αd, district
dummies to control for any district fixed effects and a vector of household and
individual characteristics, Xit. These include age, sex and literacy of the child,
household head, and parents, the number of household members and a dummy
for household living in rural areas. I also add a dummy on whether the mother
and father of the child have worked in the past twelve months, electricity and
water supply.
Table 1.2 gives details on the full set of control variables. The regression
is estimated using sample weights and the standard errors are clustered at
the district level to account for serial correlation at this level. The empirical
methodology is illustrated in figure 1.3. The concentric circles around mining
sites are catchment areas for the treatment group and the clusters outside the
catchment area are the comparison group. Note that all mines are located
in three regions: Sikasso, Koulikoro and Kayes. In the empirical section, the
sample is restricted to these regions.
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Figure 1.3: Location of Mines and DHS Clusters
1.5 Results
Table 1.3 reports the results of estimating equation (1.1) by OLS. All specifi-
cations include individual and household controls as well as time and district
fixed effects. Column (1) uses economic participation as the dependent vari-
able. The artisanal gold boom variable, measured by the interaction of the
international gold price and area within 10 km of an artisanal sites is positive
and significant at the 5% level. Table 1.2 shows that a one percent increase
in the gold price increases the employment of children in the vicinity of mines
by 0.06%. Similarly, the probability of performing domestic chores increases
with the measure of artisanal mining. In fact a one percent increase in the
gold price increases domestic chores by 0.03%. The results of the gold boom
on school enrollment are insignificant (column 3) for children aged 7 to 14
years old. However, columns 4 and 5 show that the mining expansion has a
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significant negative and larger effect on children’s academic performance. The
mining expansion is correlated with less school attainment. A one percent in-
crease in the gold price decreases children’s school attainment (the probability
that a child has attained the school grade she should be in, given a normal
progression in school) by 0.03%. Similarly a one percent increase in the price
of gold increases the school lag (the probability that a child is three or more
grades below her expected grade) by 0.04%. The coefficients for school lag and
the school attainment are larger and more statistically significant than current
school attendance. This could be because both of these variables reflect the
cumulative effect of a child not going to school over the last few years. This
is likely to have adverse effects on welfare given the positive and permanent
effect of years of education on wages.
The impact of the mining activity on child labour and education may
be non-uniform, in the sense that the gender of children may influence the
allocation of child labour activities differently. This is especially likely in a
developing country like Mali where men and women usually participate in
different economic activities (Bhat,2010)8. To further examine this, I estimate
the regressions by separating the results by children’s gender. Table A.1 in
Appendix A presents the results. I observe that the ASM activity impacts
on the extensive margin of male child labour. The adverse impact on school
attainment and school lag is driven exclusively by female children. There is a
substitution in the participation in domestic chores to economic work for males,
induced by the increase in gold price. This also translates in the number of
hours of labour as shown in Table A.2. The different experiences of girls and
boys highlight the importance of integrating gender concerns into child labour
research and policies.
8Usually, when women are employed, they tend to occupy functions that are related to
their domestic role such as nursing, cooking, teaching, cleaning, providing clerical support,
etc.
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Table 1.3: Gold Boom effect on Child Labour and Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic Domestic Not School School
Work Chores attending Attainment Lag
Price 0.138∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ 0.0015 0.0553∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0144) (0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0045)
Price× ASM Area 0.0587∗ 0.0278∗ -0.0257 -0.0287∗∗ 0.0379∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0211) (0.0274) (0.0106) (0.0088)
Price× LSM Area -0.0916 0.0607 0.0116 0.0176 -0.00162
(0.0635) (0.0321) (0.0210) (0.0167) (0.0133)
ASM Area -0.444∗∗ 0.151 0.205 0.159∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.134) (0.155) (0.0673) (0.0546)
LSM Area 0.677 -0.378 -0.0958 -0.114 0.0205
(0.430) (0.215) (0.129) (0.105) (0.0816)
Male 0.0413∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.0372∗∗∗ -0.00118 -0.00702
(0.0172) (0.0155) (0.0077) (0.0069) (0.0060)
Age 0.156∗∗∗ 0.0845∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.00046 -0.0815∗∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0250) (0.0182) (0.0208) (0.0188)
Age2 -0.0055∗∗∗ -0.00278∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0019 0.0064∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Rural 0.112∗∗∗ 0.0420 0.0491∗∗ -0.0259 0.00485
(0.0329) (0.0373) (0.0161) (0.0180) (0.0159)
Electricity -0.0770∗∗ -0.0182 -0.0389∗∗ 0.0377∗ -0.0271
(0.0276) (0.0271) (0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0142)
Water -0.0680∗∗ -0.0282 0.0075 -0.00545 -0.0083
(0.0252) (0.0294) (0.0124) (0.0148) (0.0100)
Household size -0.0140∗∗ -0.0136∗∗ -0.00372 -0.00188 0.0018
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0019)
N 10374 10374 10374 10374 10374
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at district level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001. All regressions include district and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls, which include:
individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset, size, access to water and electricity; as
well as an indicator of the household area.
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1.6 What factors mitigate the negative effects
of the Gold Boom?
Do households spread the labour across children?
Larger families may facilitate schooling, at least for some children. If the
utility of the household increases with education, then it might be the case
that households mitigate the impact on education by sharing the work duty
and responsibility across children. There may be a sort of specialisation in
the household, whereby some children work, while their siblings don’t and are
permitted to attend school and concentrate on studying. This section tests this
assumption, according to which households may want to spread the burden of
labour across children.
To explore this, I first look at the sibling composition in a given house-
hold and interact the treatment variables with a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the child has no siblings and 0 otherwise. One issue with this,
however, is that the number of people in a household is endogenous and can
therefore not imply causation. To overcome this issue of endogeneity, I in-
teract the treatment variables with being the eldest child, as the birth order
is considered to be random. Indeed, older children may have felt the burden
of child labour more since at a point in time, when they were young, there
were no other children in the household available to work to help supplement
family income. Also, one could believe that the presence of younger siblings
could increase the demand for childcare and hence impose a burden on school
enrolment. In addition to birth order, the sibling gender composition may also
be important. For example, parents may be more altruistic toward a gender,
usually sons relative to daughters, in traditional societies, thus creating differ-
ences in household resource allocation, including in education. I examine this
by interacting the treatment variables with having a sister.
Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5 in Appendix A report the results. Even though
the signs of the treatment effects tend to support the argument that chil-
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dren with no siblings and eldest children have a lower probability of attending
schooling, the results are insignificant. However, Table A.5 shows that with
regards to the gender of their siblings, boys with a sister are expected to be
less involved in household chores. If boys have a sister, the household tasks
are distributed among their sisters’ helping hands. The results also show that
having a sister is beneficial to boys educational attainment as they see their
educational attainment increase by 14%. Having a sister has no significant
effect on girls. This points to higher investments in sons and hence favours the
hypothesis according to which households spread the burden of labour across
children in the vicinity of mines.
Do the years of education of the head of household matter?
Households in which the head has a higher education level than the sample
average may be more likely to recognise the value of education and to send the
children to school. Moreover, they are also more likely to have higher incomes,
which would give them the means to afford education for the children in their
household. Table A.6 in Appendix A indeed shows that increased educational
level of the household head is linked to increased school attendance rates of
children. While the effect of the measure of surging world price of gold in ASM
area on not attending was insignificant, it is now negative and significant at
5% for the head with more than the average years of education. I estimate the
probability not to attend school to decreases by 9% for the households in which
the head has a higher education level. The number of years of education of the
head may thus capture preferences for education (or a measure of income).
1.7 Mechanism: The Substitution effect
In line with previous studies such as Mej́ıa (2020), Ahlerup et al. (2019),
Zabsonré et al. (2018) and Santos (2014), the results reported above show that
the surge in the international price of gold generates a positive effect on child
labour and a negative effect on educational attainment. As a consequence,
this might have influenced the prices and costs available when parents decide
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to invest in their children.
As the price of gold rises, both child and adult labour could become more
profitable in the mining sector or any sector that is linked to the mining sector.
Under the assumption of imperfect local labour markets, child and adult op-
portunity costs may differ in households near mines compared to other house-
holds. Households near mines may give up leisure and increase their labour
supply because work has now a higher reward. As a consequence, a price-
induced increase in child labour could be indirectly detrimental for schooling
outcomes; similarly, a price-induced decrease in adult leisure could reduce time
for child care in households located in the vicinity of mines. In other words,
the surge in the international price of gold could generate an economic boom
in places suitable for producing gold, resulting in substitution effects that may
be non-negligible in this setting.
To test this assumption, I regress household-unit level general non-
employment, expenditure per capita and head of household employment
against the measures of gold boom. The non-employment measures use in-
formation of all individuals recorded in the survey. Results are reported in
Table 1.4. As the survey does not provide the hours worked by adults, I focus
solely on the labour participation. The results show that the measure of mining
activity is associated with an increased economic activity at the survey level,
within 10km of an ASM site. In terms of magnitude, a one percent increase in
the price of gold decreases non-employment by 0.008%. Column (3) is in line
with these results as it shows that as gold prices increase, the probability that
the head of household works is higher for households located within 10km of
artisanal and small-scale mines than households located further away.
The results also show that a one percent increase in the gold price increases
the households’ expenditures by 0.20% for households living within 10km of
a registered artisanal and small-scale mine. However, the negative sign in
front of ASM area shows that these areas have a higher probability of non-
employment and are poorer compared to other areas far away. The increase
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in international gold prices thus generates more economic opportunities and
higher standard of living in ASM area. The results show no significant effect
of LSM on the outcomes.
Table 1.4: Gold Boom effect on the share of non-employed Head and Expenditure
per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Share of Household Ln
Not working Not working Head Expenditure
(All) (10-35) working per capita
Price 0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ -0.0655∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0181) (0.0004)
Price × ASM Area -0.0083∗∗ -0.0078∗∗ 0.0589∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.00281) (0.00276) (0.0155) (0.0120)
Price × LSM Area -0.0223 -0.0214 -0.0325 0.0272
(0.0176) (0.0179) (0.0437) (0.0390)
ASM Area 0.0521∗∗ 0.0488∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -1.281∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0166) (0.0807) (0.0911)
LSM Area 0.128 0.123 0.207 -0.236
(0.100) (0.102) (0.255) (0.271)
N 15678 12643 10374 10374
R2 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.23
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clus-
tered at district level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All regressions
include district and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ con-
trols, which include: individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and
gender, literacy, asset, size, access to water and electricity; as well as an
indicator of the household area. The non-employment measure uses infor-
mation of all individuals recorded in the household survey (children and
adults).
1.7.1 Alternative mechanisms
In this section, I investigate three alternative mechanisms through which gold
mining could affect children outcomes and assess to what extent they can ex-
plain the baseline findings. The first set of results focuses on public investment,
such as the provision of schools and other public goods that can potentially
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affect children. Secondly, I look at returns to education. I finally assess the
effect on endogenous migration.
1.7.1.1 An alternative channel: Provision of Public goods
The gold mining activity can be considered as a source of fiscal revenue for
local communities (Aragón and Rud, 2013) and may have an effect on schooling
attainment if the government is able to support higher public spending such as
school provision, in mining districts. However, the local authorities may believe
that children in mining areas have more and easier employment opportunities
in mining sector and are thus less in need of an education. Likewise mining
operations could affect local water endowments and cause severe deterioration
that would increase the value of children’s time in non-schooling activities and
thus increase the child labour rate. Parents may find optimal for their children
to spend more time on household chores (e.g. fetching water, food, cooking,
etc.) obliging them to allocate less time to other activities such as schooling.
I explore the importance of this transmission channel by relating the pres-
ence of gold mines to the provision of public goods. If governments provide less
public goods to districts with mines, we should observe a negative correlation
between gold mining activity and public goods provision. One way of testing
this channel is to control for the presence of schools in the vicinity of mines.
However, the DHS does not provide such data. To find this information I use
a map from the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX) that points the location
of each school facilities across the country. I check for the presence of a school
within easy walking distance (2 kilometres, see Figure 1.4) of the household in
the year of the survey. I also control for the presence of electricity and access
to a water source, which are good proxies for public infrastructure especially in
developing countries, where the government usually acts as the sole provider
of these services. Table 1.5 shows no evidence that children in the proximity
of mines have less schools and electricity grid. In fact, they have better access
to drinking water sources and could thus spend less time fetching water. This
result is similar to Sanoh and Massaoly (2015) who highlight that Malian gold
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mining communes made significant progress in water provision from the period
1998 to 2009. Columns (4) to (8) control for the presence of public goods by
adding schools as covariates. The inclusion of this variable does not impact the
probability of school attendance and increases the overall probability of child
labour participation. In line with Ahlerup et al. (2019), this suggests that
the effect of gold mines on children outcome cannot be explained by under
investment in schools from local authorities.










Table 1.5: Effects of Mining on Public goods
Public goods Control for Schools
Elec Water. School Economic Domestic Not attend. School Attain. School Lag
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Price 0.0878∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ -0.0215 0.425∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗ 0.0092 0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0694
(0.0203) (0.0192) (0.0418) (0.0324) (0.0322) (0.0026) (0.0132) (0.0067)
Price × ASM Area -0.104 0.049∗∗∗ -0.247 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗ -0.0239 0.00141 0.0438∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0849) (0.193) (0.0353) (0.0308) (0.0282) (0.0155) (0.0100)
Price × Ind. Area -0.0678 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.297∗ -0.0104 -0.0377 0.0109 0.0477 -0.0159
(0.0360) (0.0532) (0.145) (0.0691) (0.0403) (0.0202) (0.0216) (0.0146)
ASM area 0.485∗∗ 0.331 2.054 -0.447∗∗∗ 0.172∗ 0.192 -0.454 0.356∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.479) (1.108) (0.228) (0.196) (0.160) (0.0970) (0.0628)
Ind. Area 0.431 0.563 -1.777 0.152 -0.249 -0.0913 -0.309∗ 0.113
(0.230) (0.304) (0.959) (0.463) (0.261) (0.124) (0.135) (0.0901)
School 0.0126 0.0395 0.00451 0.0138 -0.0101
(0.0299) (0.0251) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.00767)
N 10101 10101 10101 10101 10101 10095 10101 10101
R2 0.26 0.34 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.45 0.45 0.41
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All regressions include year and district
fixed effects and control for household head’s education, age, gender and dummies indicating her industry of occupation and
type of job. Also access to water and electricity, the size of household and an indicator for rural household. Gold Production
is measured in tonnes.
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1.7.1.2 An alternative channel: Returns to education
In this section, I consider the possibility that the relative returns to education
influence child labour and schooling decisions. While estimating returns of
schooling poses a challenge as many households are engaged in farming with
wages that are not directly observed, Edmonds (2008) proposes to study be-
haviours that rely on the return to education instead of directly measuring the
return. Following this strategy, I first compare the differences in per capita
expenditure between skilled and unskilled workers by estimating the baseline
regression by household head’s education level. I define educated head as the
ones showing literacy level, i.e., they are able to read and write. The idea be-
hind this is to check whether the resource boom is biased towards low-educated
head relative to higher-educated head. In which case, it could decrease the
returns to education and hence increase the demand for child labour and in-
fluence the schooling outcomes in the vicinity of mines. The results, displayed
in columns (5) and (6) in Table 1.6, show that the increase in real expenditure
is positive and statistically significant for both educated and non educated
head of households. However, the effect is doubled for more educated head
of households. Greater expenditure for the more educated represent higher
productivity and hence, an increasing return to education.
Second, I examine changes in adult employment by education status and
distinguish heterogeneous effects on head of households employed in four main
sectors (Agriculture, Mining, Sales, and Services) in the four regions that rep-
resent approximately 75% of the labour force. Columns (1) to (4) in Table
1.6 display the results using the whole sample and restricting it to agricul-
tural, mining, sales and services workers. Results show that the ASM measure
of mining activity leads to an increase in per capita expenditure among the
workers in each of these industries. These results are consistent with a local
employment shift created by the mining activity and inducing positive direct
effects in the mining industry and indirect effects in agriculture and in other
non-traditional sectors such as services and sales.
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Table 1.6: Effects of Mining on Expenditure by Head Industry and Literacy
Ln (real expenditure)
By industry By education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price -0.552∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗ -0.506∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0172)
Price × ASM Area 0.0658∗ 0.186∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0448)
Price × LSM -0.0126∗ -0.0203 -0.00973 -0.0203 -0.0156 -0.143∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0357) (0.0364) (0.0357) (0.0345) (0.0489)
ASM Area -0.461∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗ -1.513∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.0750) (0.0793) (0.0750) (0.0750) (0.306)
LSM Area -0.0808 0.0750 0.00960 0.0750 0.0549 0.873∗∗
(0.224) (0.227) (0.231) (0.227) (0.213) (0.298)
Sample Agric. Mining Services Sales Educated Non Educated
N 4490 4490 4490 4490 4490 4490
R2 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.33
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
district level. ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. All regressions include district
and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls, which include:
individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset,
size, access to water and electricity; as well as an indicator of the household
area.
1.7.1.3 An alternative channel: Endogenous Migration
An interesting outcome in Mali is the differential population growth in mining
compared with non-mining areas. In the two most recent population censuses,
Sanoh and Massaoly (2015) noticed that the population in mining communes
grew almost double than the national growth rate at around 6% between 1998
and 2009. Mining communes grew on average 5.7 percent annually, compared
with 3.5 percent for neighboring communes and other communes within the
same district (See Appendix A Figures A.1 and A.2). While the validity of the
results on the evolution of children outcome depends on the assumption that
the gold Boom had distinctive impacts across mining and non-mining areas,
this is not necessarily true as wage differentials often induce population flows
within a country. One potentially important channel is that the mining activity
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may attract individuals from other regions who are in search of employment.
The migrant population may have lower standards of living and a higher child
labour rate among children. That is, gold mining districts may have a higher
share of less fortunate and less educated inhabitants, who choose to send their
children to work more than the natives. Not because inhabitants opt to acquire
less education but because poorer and less educated individuals are more likely
to migrate into gold mining districts.
I have no information where the migrant population moved from, and
I cannot tell whether they have migrated to the area (to benefit from the
employment boom) or whether they were part of a relocation program due to
the mining.
Ahlerup et al. (2019) explore this issue by matching respondents’ self-
described ethnic group to data on the native homelands of African ethnicities
according to Murdock (1959). The idea is that respondents who belong to one
of the native groups of the district are less likely to have migrated due to the
presence of mines while respondents with a non-native ethnicity are more likely
to have done so. Thus, by focusing on whether a respondent belongs to the
native ethnic group they rule out, to some extent, this alternative interpreta-
tion. However, I recognise that at a country-level study this method does not
rule out endogenous migration as it fails to identify that relatively unfortunate
natives migrate within the country from non-mining to mining districts.
Aragón and Rud (2013) explore this issue by evaluating whether the min-
ing activity has led to changes on observable characteristics of the labour force
in mining and non-mining areas. They focus on different measures of human
capital such as years of education, an indicator of having completed primary
school, and an indicator of the worker being a male between 20 and 40 years
old. Relying on this strategy, Table 1.7 shows the results of a test on significant
differences in observable characteristics between adult male and female in the
sample. In all cases, the baseline regression (1) is estimated with year and dis-
trict fixed effects as the only control variables. I find that the estimates are not
1.8. Robustness checks 47
significant, i.e. that the mining activity has not induced any significant change
in observable characteristics. These results are in line with Land (2017) and
reinforce the argument that the findings have not been driven by migration of
more educated households to mining areas, or different trends based on some
observable characteristics.
Table 1.7: Changes on Adult labour force and Household characteristics
Women Men Household
Age Literate Years of Age Literate Years of Household Number of
Education Education size Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Price -0.0917 -0.000327 0.00221 0.401 -0.0117 0.0258 -0.141 -0.133
(0.0760) (0.00301) (0.0272) (0.324) (0.00940) (0.240) (0.103) (0.0803)
Price× ASM Area 0.0973 0.0780 0.172 -3.346 0.0903 0.213 -0.284 -0.146
(0.177) (0.0199) (0.184) (0.926) (0.0432) (0.305) (0.254) (0.167)
Price× LSM Area -0.893 0.00468 0.0577 -2.552 -0.0600 0.0887 -0.849 -0.633
(0.418) (0.0122) (0.128) (1.040) (0.0600) (0.527) (0.477) (0.370)
ASM Area -0.721 -0.482∗∗∗ -1.078 23.59∗∗∗ -0.596∗ -1.666 2.218 1.211
(1.315) (0.112) (1.049) (6.069) (0.247) (2.270) (1.617) (1.056)
LSM Area 5.121 -0.0643 -0.923 17.29∗ 0.287 -1.186 5.955 4.512
(2.883) (0.0808) (0.807) (7.360) (0.392) (3.634) (3.198) (2.583)
8492 10296 7462 8195 10296 4580 10296 10296
R2 0.005 0.008 0.028 0.022 0.035 0.037 0.040 0.026
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
district level. ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. All regressions include district
and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls, which include:
individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset,




The baseline results are confirmed when using alternative vicinity definitions.
Table 1.8 replicates the reduced form estimates with buffers ranging from 10 to
50 km. The economic activity and domestic chores participation are significant
with all buffers. Regarding educational outcomes, schooling attainment is
significant and negative from 10 to 40 km and fails to reject the null with 50 km
buffers. School lag is significant with all buffers. In Figure 1.5(a), I show that
the positive impact of artisanal mine on the non-employment share remains
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significant up to 50 kilometres away from the artisanal mines. The figure shows
the coefficient estimates of the impact of a one percent variation of the gold
price on the share of non-employment of households located near an artisanal
and small-scale mine, according to the distance between the household and the
mine. The impact decreases with the distance and the results tend to suggest
that the footprint of each artisanal mine extends up to 50 kilometres as the
coefficient remains positive and significant up to this distance buffer. Figure
1.8 displays the estimated coefficients for different distance intervals of living







Table 1.8: Effect of Artisanal Gold Boom on Children outcome: Buffer Sensibility
Distance Buffer
(10km) (20km) (30km) (40km) (50km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable : Price × ASM Area
Economic Participation 0.0587∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0163) (0.0149) (0.0227) (0.0227)
Domestic Chores 0.0278∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.0211) (0.0166) (0.0188) (0.0207) (0 .0231)
Not attending -0.0278 -0.00297 -0.00066 0.0016 0.0045
(0.0274) (0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0086)
School Attainment -0.0287∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0475∗∗∗ -0.0433∗∗∗ -0.0399∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0074) (0.0082) (0.0090) (0.0102)
School Lag 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0144∗ 0.0130
(0.0088) (0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0071) (0.0076)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at district level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001. All regressions include district and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls, which include:
individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset, size, access to water and electricity; as well as
an indicator of the household area.
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(a) Artisanal Mining impact on the share of non-
employment
(b) LSM impact on the share of non-employment
(c) Artisanal Mining impact on expenditures (d) LSM impact on expenditures
(e) Artisanal Mining impact on the head employ-
ment
(f) LSM impact on the head employment
Figure 1.5: Mining impact by distance to the mines
1.8.2 An alternative measure: Mining Deforestation
In the spirit of Mej́ıa (2020), I use deforestation in the vicinity of gold mines
as an alternative measure of gold mining intensity9.
Table 1.9 presents the results of the interaction between international
gold prices and mining deforestation. In terms of labour, only the effect on
9I obtain annual deforestation data from Hansen et al. (2013), which examines global
Landsat data at a 30-meter spatial resolution to characterise forest extent, loss, and gain
from 2000 to 2016. Gold mining is one of the main causes of deforestation in Mali (Thomas
and Samassekou, 2003), as it affects forests through vegetation removal from mining areas,
settlements, and roads. Deforestation in mining areas is thus a good proxy for mining
activity and also has the advantage to capture both legal and illegal mining (Mej́ıa (2020),
Günther (2018), Andersson et al. (2015)).
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children’s economic participation remains positive and statistically significant,
yet smaller than in the main results. Using this alternative measure, I find no
evidence of a mining impact on school attendance, however column (4) shows
a small effect on the child’s performance at school. The probability that the
child has attained the school grade given her age and a normal progression falls
with the measure of mining intensity. This tends to suggest that the increased
gold price increases the opportunity costs of children’s time and thus increases
the demand for child labour (substitution effect). In line with prior results I
find no effect of LSM on children.
Table 1.9: Gold Boom effect on Children: Mining Intensity estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic Domestic Not School School
Work Chores attending Attainment Lag
Price × Mining Deforestation 0.0214∗ 0.0103 0.003 -0.00027∗ -0.0004
(0.032) (0.023) (0.015) (0.037) (0.031)
N 10101 10101 10101 10095 10101
R2 0.28 0.09 0.24 0.465 0.212
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clus-
tered at district level. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. Each coefficient
corresponds to a separate instrumental variable regression, controlling for
district and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls,
which include: individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and gen-
der, literacy, asset, size, access to water and electricity; as well as an in-
dicator of the household area. The independent variable the interaction
between prices of gold and mining deforestation in the 10 km vicinity of
gold mines.
1.8.3 Pre-trend Shocks
In this section, I take advantage of the 1995 DHS which is data available before
the boom in gold prices in 2002. While, this year’s survey does not collect data
on child labour it includes information on children’s school attendance. I make
use of this information and check for pre-existing trends in schooling outcomes.
To do that I replace the gold measure in equation (1.1) with an interaction
between the initial gold measures in 2001 and time dummies. The results are
presented in Table 1.10. The interaction between the gold variable and the
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survey year 1995 is insignificant for all regressions. This tend to suggest that
there are no pre-tend shocks for household in the vicinity of mines relative to
households further away, and this is true for all of the schooling outcomes.





ASM Area ×1995 0.0312 -0.0756 0.0115
(0.098) (0.113) (0.0341)
Indus. Area ×1995 0.190 0.155 0.562
(0.0794) (0.0550) (0.139)
ASM Area ×2012 0.0518∗∗∗ -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.0130
(0.140) (0.127) (0.0621)
Indus. Area ×2012 -0.0238 -0.0225 0.0253
(0.0946) (0.0628) (0.0512)
1995 -0.173 -0.116 -0.752
(0.0374) (0.0306) (0.0262)
2012 -0.198∗∗∗ -0.0339 0.0141
(0.0342) (0.0247) (0.0162)
N 10101 10101 10095
R2 0.154 0.086 0.247
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clus-
tered at district level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All regressions
include district and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ con-
trols, which include: individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and
gender, literacy, asset, size, access to water and electricity; as well as an
indicator of the household area.
1.9 Conclusion
Gold mining plays an important role in some developing countries as it is a
large source of income for governments and households. However, to date
there is mixed evidence on the overall impact of mining on local populations.
I contribute to this literature by estimating the local impact of increasing
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international gold prices on child labour and schooling, in a context where
both large-scale and artisanal and small scale mining coexist. Particularly, I
estimate the effect on children’s economic, domestic participation and school
attendance and attainment using a difference-in-differences approach. I use ge-
ographic information systems (GIS) to estimate the location of legal artisanal
and large-scale gold mines and define a local measure of exposure to the gold
boom, as the interaction between mining areas and international gold prices.
I then combine this information to household and child labour data, from the
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). I find that the gold price expansion
rises the probability that children work. This is quantifiable as a one percent
increase in the price of gold increases child economic participation by 0.06%.
Similarly, the probability of performing domestic chores increases by 0.03% for
every one percent increase in the gold price. I find no evidence of a mining
impact on school attendance, however, the probability that the child has at-
tained the school grade given her age and a normal progression falls during the
gold boom in proximity to artisanal mines. A one percent increase in the gold
price reduces school attainment by 0.0287% in areas which are within 10km
to listed artisanal mines.
Furthermore, I investigate potential mechanisms through which gold min-
ing could affect children outcomes and assess to what extent they can explain
the baseline findings. While the results are not driven by under-investment in
schools nor endogenous migration, they capture an actual substitution effect.
The results show that the measure of mining activity is associated with in-
creased economic activity at the survey level, within 10km of an ASM site. A
one percent increase in the price of gold decreases non-employment by 0.008%
in the vicinity of artisanal mines. Nevertheless, one limitation of this study
is that, I am unable to observe impacts on the intensive margin of schooling.
The reason is that there is no detailed data available on educational histories
for Mali. One avenue for future research in this area would be to address
such data limitations. Collecting survey data on how parents allocate the time
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children spend in all activities, i.e. schooling and labour may lead to further
important insights.
Chapter 2
The Impact of Precipitation
Shocks on Allocation of Time in
Rural Ethiopia
2.1 Introduction
Rural households in Ethiopia rely heavily on agriculture as their primary source
of income. This implies that households’ agricultural production and revenue
are vulnerable to considerable variability given that crop production is rain-
fed (Ademe et al., 2019). Moreover, only a few have access to irrigation and
insurance and credit markets are weakly developed. Therefore, households
have fewer options to cope with shocks, and as a result, this creates a potential
effect on poverty and hence household welfare. Given that a growing body
of evidence predicts climate change to increase the variability, intensity and
uncertainty of precipitation shocks1, understanding how households respond
to precipitation shocks has become an important issue.
Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) show that in developing countries, consump-
tion fluctuations are smaller than income fluctuations. They show that house-
holds can, to some extent, protect themselves against observed variation in
incomes. The literature documents two main mechanisms through which this
1See for instance: Hulme et al. (2001); Desanker and Magadza (2001); Hulme et al.
(2005).
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occurs. There are ex-ante risk coping strategies, whereby households use in-
come smoothing strategies in order to protect themselves against possible fu-
ture income shock. This is often accomplished by choosing conservative pro-
duction, crop diversification or engaging in precautionary savings (Kochar,
1999; Ito and Kurosaki, 2009; Rose, 2001). Post shock behavioural responses
tend to mitigate impacts of the shock. These include borrowing from formal
and informal sources (Wickramasinghe and Fernando, 2017), drawing down
accumulated savings, and adjusting labour supply (Rose, 2001; Trinh et al.,
2020).
I use survey data from Ethiopia to examine the effect of precipitation
shocks on the participation in labour activities, by gender and activity. Pre-
cisely, I study how adult males and females allocate their time between var-
ious labour activities when confronted by positive or negative precipitation
shocks. These activities include agricultural activities, non-agricultural work
(self-employment or not), casual public works, (salaried) wage work, unpaid
traineeships and household chores. I merge individual-level data on time allo-
cation to different labour activities, with re-analysis precipitation data. This
allows me to observe and measure the effects of agricultural productivity shocks
on the time allocation into various activities.
Additionally, I take advantage of the heterogeneity of the impact of precip-
itation on agriculture to examine and understand the channels through which
precipitation shocks impact time allocation decisions. To do this, I implement
the strategy in Maitra and Tagat (2019a) and make use of the large scale irri-
gation investment that started in the 1970s as part of the government-owned
state farms. This project mainly consisted of the construction of dams and
reservoirs (Awulachew, 2019). Strobl and Strobl (2011) and Blanc and Strobl
(2014) find that dams do not help agricultural production in upstream dis-
tricts, leaving farmers and households in upstream areas of rain-fed districts
more vulnerable to adverse effects arising from precipitation variation. I argue
that the impact of precipitation shocks should hence differ by whether the
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district is rain-fed or has an irrigation system in place. I show that house-
holds and farmers in the dam-fed districts, should benefit from a more stable
agricultural production and hence less volatile incomes.
I find that both women and men use different time allocation of labour
strategies in response to exogenous precipitation shocks. The results also indi-
cate the importance of the Public Works2 (PW) programme, in rural Ethiopia.
Rural households use PW as insurance against agricultural (productivity)
shocks. A precipitation shock in February, which corresponds to the begin-
ning of the Belg season and the planting stage for major crops and cereals,
is associated with approximately a 20 percentage point increase in the time
devoted to casual public works by men and women. The results show a declin-
ing time allocation to attending education institutions (unpaid traineeships) by
men and women in response to precipitation shocks. This possibly affects their
chances for human capital accumulation, which in turn, could have potential
negative long-run consequences for their welfare. Because variations in labour
allocations in response to precipitation shocks are usually short-run responses,
there could be long-run implications of not attending education institutions.
Furthermore, I find that precipitation shortages result in females increas-
ing their time allocation to casual public works. Males in contrast, respond to
negative precipitation shocks by increasing their time in regular wage/salary
work. The evidence shows that in districts with irrigation, the are no effects of
extreme weather shocks on the time allocated to the different labour activities
for both gender, suggesting that precipitation shocks are more prone to cause
variations in rain-fed districts.
The interest in how agricultural productivity shocks, measured by precip-
2The Public Works (PW) programme in Ethiopia provides food, cash or a mixture of
both, in return for work. It is mostly dominated by the Productive Safety Net Program
(PSNP) which acts as a programme of employer-of-last-resort in rural Ethiopia (Hirvonen
and Hoddinott, 2020). PSNP operates across widespread geographies and rural communities
to provide payments to households that can contribute to build infrastructure and public
goods. The programme’s goal is to assure food consumption, and simultaneously to protect
and develop assets along with services, to households that are both chronically food insecure
and poor and often affected by shocks.
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itation shocks impact households in Ethiopia, has grown in recent years. Evan
and Pankhurst (1994) noted that women’s activities are a prevalent coping
mechanism for poor households, in response to precipitation shocks. These
activities included making local products, collecting firewood and dung or
handicrafts. Woldenhanna and Oskam (2001) provide some regional evidence
that in Tigray region (northern Ethiopia), households diversify into non-farm
activities. Especially, wealthier families may enter higher return activities,
whereas poorer household members seek wage labour. Porter (2012) finds
evidence that households are diverting their efforts towards relatively higher
return activities with the intention to smooth income and consumption in the
face of shocks. Using village-level panel, Colmer (2013) estimates the impacts
of climate variability on time spent in child labour activities as well as par-
ticipation in education and labour activities. He finds that increased climate
variability is associated with increases in the time spent on farming activities
and decreases in the number of hours spent on domestic chores.
The contribution of this Chapter is three-fold. First, although several
studies provide evidence on the effect of precipitation shocks on household
labour time allocation, studies that examine monthly variations in precipita-
tion during the growing season are still nascent. Considering monthly vari-
ations in precipitation shocks enables me to analyse if and how a specific
month of the growing season is essential in contributing to household wellbe-
ing. Knowledge and evidence on the exact timing of the adjustments in time
allocation are imperative for effective policy-making to help households insure
against such shocks. This chapter’s second contribution lies in providing a
deeper understanding of how gender differences in the allocation of time come
about in rural Ethiopia, giving more insight into intra-household responses
to weather shocks. Third, I present evidence on the importance of major in-
frastructure projects, such as irrigation dams, in protecting against weather
shocks, ex-ante.
The rest of the Chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 is devoted to the data
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and provides a summary of the main variables used in the analysis. Section
2.3 outlines the empirical strategy used to examine the effect of positive and
negative precipitation shocks on the allocation of labour in different household
activities. Section 2.4 presents the results and section 2.5 investigates heteroge-
neous impacts of precipitation shocks and the implication of irrigation systems.
Lastly, Section 2.6 closes with a discussion on policy recommendation and a
conclusion.
2.2 Data
I use data from multiple sources for the analysis. These include (i) data from
two rounds of the employment schedule of Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey
(ESS), (ii) the agricultural module of the ESS, which provides information on
crop production at the woreda (district) level, (iii) monthly historical precipi-
tation at the district level from Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation
with Station data (CHIRPS), (iv) data on water resources and irrigation devel-
opment in Ethiopia from Awlachew et al. (2007) and, (v) the Geo-referenced
Database on Dams from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
2.2.1 Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS)
I obtain data on time use in various labour activities from the Ethiopia So-
cioeconomic Survey (ESS). The ESS is a joint project between the Central
Statistics Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) and the World Bank Living Standards
Measurement Study-Integrated Surveys. The ESS collects household and panel
data in rural and urban areas on a variety of household and community level
characteristics also related to agricultural activities. While the first wave im-
plemented in 2011-12 covered only rural and small-town areas, the second wave
in 2013-14 added individuals from large town areas. The existing panel data
(2011/12-2013/14) is only for rural and small towns.
The ESS collects data on labour, and more importantly, it provides data
on time allocation to different activities at the individual level. The survey pro-
vides data on household members time use for a reference week. For each of the
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past seven days, defined as the reference week, household members report the
number of hours spent in various labour activities. These activities comprise
agricultural activities, non-agricultural work (self-employment or not), casual
public works, (salaried) wage work and unpaid traineeship and any other work.
I aggregate over activities, over the past seven days, to get a measure of time
allocation and use the reference week’s date to match time allocation to dif-
ferent activities to precipitation (productivity) shocks by month.
The data also include a multitude of household and individual characteris-
tics. More precisely, the age, gender, literacy, religion, rural/urban residence,
household size and monthly per capita household expenditure. It also in-
cludes livestock ownership which refers to the number of livestock units. In
Ethiopian pastoral communities, livestock ownership serves a good proxy for
wealth. Oxen ownership, household size and the number of dependent indi-
vidual per household serve as indicators of draught animal and human labour
availability, respectively. I restrict the analysis to men and women of working
age (aged 15-65) and living in rural areas of Ethiopia. The two rounds of the
survey took place from September to April.3 Figure 2.1 shows that for the two
rounds, there is enough variation in the number of households surveyed in each
month. The data contains information on the woreda4 (district) of residence.
I use this data on time-use to calculate the total number of hours each
individual allocated to different labour activities during the past week. I first
classify these into three groups: total hours worked (which is the sum of house-
hold agricultural activities), non-agricultural work (self-employment or not),
casual public works, (salaried) wage work and unpaid traineeships and any
other work; domestic chores (hours worked in attending domestic chores); and
total hours attending educational institutions. Table 2.1 presents the aver-
age of the number of hours spent in the different activities in the reference
week, for both genders. The descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 show consider-
3The data collection covers the belg crop season, which receives rainfall from February
to April.
4It is the third recognized administrative division of Ethiopia, a district-level government.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of Households Surveyed per months and per rounds
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Average Number of hours in Different Activities
Female Male
Mean SD Mean SD DIFF
Total Hours 29.53 2.61 40.30 2.39 -10.77***
Household chores 1.49 0.27 0.43 0.09 1.06***
Unpaid traineeship 4.21 3.82 7.94 4.52 -3.73***
Agriculture work 10.56 5.38 16.63 4.90 -6.07***
Non agriculture work 10.03 3.75 4.63 2.52 5.42***
Casual Public work 1.56 0.66 3.32 0.81 -1.76***
Work for wage/salary 1.65 1.71 7.34 1.62 -5.69***
Sample 8028 11888
Notes:Authors’ calculations using ESS data, round 1 and 2. Total hours
worked excludes collecting water, wood and childcare. Significance of dif-
ference by gender computed using a t-test. Significance * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
able gender differences in allocating time to different labour activities. Male
adults spend on average approximately 11 hours total hours (40.30 vs 29.53),
they spend more time in agriculture (16.63 vs 10.56) as well as in work for
wage/salary (7.34 vs 1.65) and in unpaid traineeships (7.94 vs 4.21). In con-
trast, female adults spend more doing household chores (1.49 vs 0.43) and
doing non-agricultural work (10.03 vs 4.63).
The data also show differences in allocating time to the different labour
activities over the different survey months. Figure 2.2 displays the mean num-
ber of hours worked by adult males and females in different labour activities by
month, for the period of the survey. Regardless of the month of the survey, male
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adults allocate more time in agricultural, wage/salary, casual/public works
and unpaid traineeship. In comparison, women spend more time on house-
hold chores and other non-agricultural work. Both males and females allocate
more time to agricultural work during the months of September to December.
Conversely, in these months they spend less time in unpaid traineeships. The
time allocation in wage/salary work and casual public works is relatively sta-
ble through the year, with a decrease in December for wage/salary work and
a peak in February for casual pubic works.
In Table 2.2 I show the averages and standard deviations of the main
set of individual and household characteristics for the full sample (columns 1
and 2) and separately for men (columns 3 and 4) and women (columns 5 and
6). The mean age of the individuals in the sample is 28.76 years, with females
being a little older (32.69 years old). 44.86% of the sample are Orthodox, more
than 30% are Muslims, and around 20% are protestants. Around 36% of the
households use fertilizers, while 16% have access to credit. 24% of households
have both crops and livestock. The mean household size is 5.87, with an
annual per capita consumption of ETB. 4115.98.5 I use these individual and
household characteristics as further controls in the regressions.
2.2.2 Precipitation Data and the Definition of Precipi-
tation Shocks
The study makes use of monthly precipitation data from the Climate Hazards
Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS). Spanning 50◦ S-
50◦ N (and all longitudes), this re-analysis precipitation dataset, was collected
from 1981 to near-present and incorporates 0.05◦ resolution satellite imagery
with on-site station data to generate a gridded precipitation time series for
trend analysis.6 The advantage of satellite-based data is better spatial coverage
5As of April 2021, the current exchange rate of EUR to Ethiopian Birr is 1 EUR =
49.2944 ETB.
6According to the European Centre for Medium-range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF),
“Reanalysis data provide the most complete picture currently possible of past weather and
climate. They are a blend of observations with past short-range weather forecasts rerun with




Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 28.76 13.94 26.10 13.80 32.69 13.18
Can read and write(%) 54.17 0.50 69.20 0.46 32.72 0.47
Household size 5.87 2.38 6.01 2.29 5.73 2.46
Per capita Consumption 4115.98 4641.20 4127.49 4806.47 4104.85 4476.25
Religion
Orthodox(%) 44.86 0.50 47.91 0.50 40.62 0.49
Protestant(%) 20.77 0.41 19.35 0.40 22.73 0.42
Muslim(%) 31.62 0.47 30.15 0.46 33.66 0.47
Farm type
Crop(%) 3.40 0.18 2.68 0.16 3.90 0.19
Livestock(%) 2.68 0.16 2.55 0.16 2.77 0.16
Both(%) 24.27 0.43 11.92 0.32 32.60 0.47
Fertilizer(%) 36.17 0.37 30.27 0.46 44.97 0.50
Access to credit (%) 16.38 0.48 13.75 0.34 20.28 0.40
of weather data compared with weather stations, especially for developing
countries such as Ethiopia where sometimes few weather stations operate. A
specific strength of this dataset compared to existing precipitation databases
is its high resolution, since the 0.05◦ resolution is a unique threshold (Katsanos
et al., 2016).
In order to match precipitation to the woreda in which a household lives, I
use the closest point on the grid to the centre of the woreda. I then assign each
level of precipitation to the woreda in the given month and year. This method
allows me to match precipitation data to 235 woredas across the country for
33 years. All households living in a woreda are assigned the woreda level
precipitation. One could argue that aggregating precipitation this way implies
that shocks in any one part of the woreda affect outcomes in a different part
of the same woreda. However, the woreda is the smallest administrative unit
in Ethiopia, for which I can carry out this analysis7.
are sometimes referred to as ’maps without gaps’”
7I also check for serial correlation of precipitation: if negative shocks a particular year
are correlated with negative shocks the following year, it becomes tricky to determine the
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Figure 2.3 shows considerable variations in median precipitation for the
period 1981-2014, over the months. When I combine all woredas, the highest
monthly median precipitation is more than 500 mm in July and approximately
50 mm in December. The line inside of the rectangle in Figure 2.3 represents
the median, and the rectangle itself represents the interquartile (75th-25th)
range.
I calculate the precipitation shock for each woreda and each month in the
following way. First, I compute the mean (µkm) and the standard deviation
(σkm) in precipitation for each woreda (k) and each month (m) over the 30
years before the date of the survey. I then compute a standardized measure of
precipitation zkmy = (Rkmy−µkm)/σkm 8, where Rkmy is the precipitation in
woreda k in month m in year y. Mirroring McKee et al. (1993), I define woreda
k in month m in year y to experience a precipitation shock if zkmy < −1 or
zkmy > 1. The precipitation shock is considered a positive shock if zkmy > 1
and a negative shock if zkmy < −1. These precipitation shocks are not to
be taken in an absolute sense, as I do not compare woredas that are prone
to higher average precipitation versus those that are prone to lower average
precipitation. They are high or low-precipitation for each woreda for each
month, relative to the historical average for that woreda in that month.
Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of woredas in each month and for each
survey round that experience a negative precipitation shock or positive precip-
itation shock. Figure 2.4 also shows, that in any given month, up to 80% of
woredas might be affected by positive or negative shocks. Figure 2.5 present
the histograms of the distribution of deviations (z) from mean historical precip-
itation in the sample, by year. There are more negative shocks than positive.
Negative shocks are of a much greater magnitude in the second round, con-
firming the worrying trend of climate change predictions.
extent to which the analysis is picking up the impacts of a single shock or several years of
precipitation shocks. I find no significant evidence of serial correlation across years.
8This standardized measure of precipitation deviation is widely used in the literature and
is recognized to be the best method of calculating regional averages for precipitation as it
allows weighting the standardized anomalies (Jones and Hulme, 1996).
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Figure 2.3: Median and Interquartile Range of Precipitation 1981-2014, by month
Figure 2.4: Proportion of woredas (districts) with Positive and Negative Precipi-


























Figure 2.5: Distribution of deviations from average historical precipitation by Sur-
vey Year
2.2.3 Precipitation Shocks and Agricultural Productiv-
ity
Agriculture is the source of livelihood to a vast number of Ethiopian rural
households. It is also the basis of the national economy, with small-scale
subsistence farming being predominant. This sector employs more than 80%
of the labour force and accounts for 45% of the GDP and 85% of export
revenue (Di Falco et al., 2012). Ethiopian agriculture depends heavily on
natural precipitation, with irrigation agriculture accounting for only 5% of the
country’s total cultivated land (Asrat and Anteneh, 2019). Hence, the amount
and temporal distribution of precipitation during the crop season are critical to
crop yields and can explain differences in agricultural productivity in Ethiopia.
To examine this relationship, I construct a panel covering monthly crop
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production data from 167 Ethiopian woredas over the periods 2011-2014. This
panel uses a subset of the 235 districts for which I have monthly precipitation
data. The data on crop production comes from the agricultural module of
ESS. I use data on total production (quantity in kilos) and area (in thousands
of hectares)9 under cultivation for maize and sorghum, the two main crops
produced in Ethiopia.
ykt = β0 +β1ξkt + θk +µt + εkt (2.1)
ykt denotes the outcome of interest in woreda k in year t. I start by observing
the impact of precipitation shock in woreda k in year t (ξkt) on area cultivated
and on the total production of maize and sorghum. I reiterate the analysis
outlined in Section 2.2.2 at the year level such that ξkt = 1 if woreda k faced
any precipitation shock in year t.
β1 shows the impact of the precipitation shock ξkt in woreda k in year t.
I also add controls for woreda θk and year fixed effects µt. The woreda fixed
effects control for time-invariant characteristics (for example soil types and
socio-economic characteristics that vary across woredas) and the year fixed
effects allow me to examine whether the relationships change over time. Table
2.3 displays the results.
In columns 1 and 2, I find that a precipitation shock significantly increases
the area cultivated and total production of both maize and sorghum. I also
separate precipitation shocks into positive and negative precipitation shocks
and estimate the following equation:
ykt = β0 +β1ξ+kt +β2ξ
−
kt + θk +µt + εkt (2.2)
where ξ+kt and ξ
−
kt are binary variables equal to 1 if woreda k in year t faced a
positive precipitation shock (i.e. flood) and experienced a negative precipita-
tion shock (i.e. drought) respectively. This enables me to isolate both effect
9Some observations are expressed in “Timad”, I use the FAO standard conversion for the
“Timad”, treating them as 1/4 of an acre, which is about 0.405 hectare.
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of positive and negative precipitation shocks.
The results are displayed in columns 5-8 in Table 2.3. Positive and nega-
tive precipitation shocks affect area cultivated and production of both maize
and sorghum differently. While a negative precipitation shock reduces the area
cultivated and total production of maize and sorghum, a positive shock, has
an increasing effect. These results show the importance of studying both pos-
itive and negative precipitation shocks as they have different effects on crop
production.
2.2.4 Irrigation Systems in Ethiopia: Dams
To examine and understand the channels through which precipitation affects
labour time allocation, I use the heterogeneous impact of precipitation on
farming. To do this, I take advantage of the irrigation investment that Ethiopia
started in the 1960s as part of the government-owned state farms. This project
mainly consisted of the construction of dams and reservoirs (Awulachew, 2019).
Often constructed as large artificial dams, with a wall across the river valley,
the dams channel the collected water to downstream woredas, through a chain
of irrigation canals. These woredas in which the dams are situated are classified
as irrigation-fed woredas.
Dams make it possible to store water for later use and hence protect from
precipitation shortages. Protecting against precipitation shortages is particu-
larly important for regions where water varies considerably during the wet and
dry seasons. Dams also allow keeping surplus runoff that would typically flow
back to the ocean without being used. By enabling control over the flow of
water in dam-fed areas, dams ensure agricultural production against variations
arising from precipitation shocks. Households and farmers in the dam-fed ar-
eas should benefit from a more stable agricultural production and hence less
volatile incomes. Typically, dams do not benefit agricultural production in
upstream areas, leaving farmers and households in upstream areas of rain-fed
areas more vulnerable to adverse effects arising from precipitation variations
(Strobl and Strobl (2011); Blanc and Strobl (2014)). This suggests that time
2.2. Data 70
Figure 2.6: Irrigation development in Ethiopia: Woredas with and without Irriga-
tion
allocation responses to precipitation shocks should differ by whether the area
is rain-fed or has an irrigation system in place.
To identify rain-fed or irrigation-fed areas, I use data on water resources
and irrigation development in Ethiopia from Awlachew et al. (2007), the Geo-
referenced Database on Dams from the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) as well as the Global Georeferenced Database of Dams (GOODD) from
Mulligan et al. (2020). This dataset I constructed provides valuable informa-
tion on location, height, reservoir capacity, surface area, the primary purpose
and the upstream catchment areas of dams. All this information makes it pos-
sible to identify the downstream (dam-fed) and upstream (rain-fed) woredas.
Figure 2.6 shows the woredas with (light blue) and without (dark blue)
irrigation systems. There are two potential limitations to this data. First,
classifying an entire woreda as being rain-fed or irrigation-fed is debatable.
Even if an entire woreda is classified as irrigated, it is unclear whether the
entire woreda benefits from irrigation. Unfortunately, the woreda is the low-
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est administrative level at which this study can be conducted. The second
limitation results from the potential endogeneity in the placing of irrigation
systems. Blanc and Strobl (2014) discuss that the construction of dams essen-
tially depends on how wealthy local authorities are and that dam construction
is as such correlated with the local authorities’ wealth. Nevertheless, in this
study, I am effectively studying differences in dam construction across woredas,
and this should decrease the bias resulting from the correlation between state
wealth and dam construction.
Nonetheless, different characteristics other than local authorities’ wealth
could influence the construction of irrigation systems. The geographical topol-
ogy may play an essential role in determining the possibility of dam construc-
tion in a woreda. Blanc and Strobl (2014) and Duflo and Pande (2007) report
that the river length, the elevation of the district, and the river’s gradient are
important determinants of the building of dams in a district. They show that
river gradients between 1.5-3% or more than 6% favour the building of dams;
however, gradients less than 1.5% or between 3-6% do not. In line with Blanc
and Strobl (2014) and Duflo and Pande (2007), I predict the number of dams
in a woreda using the geographical topology of the woreda and estimate the
following first stage regression:
D̂drt=α1 +
∑5
g=2α2g(RGgd × D̄rt) +
∑4
g=2α3g(Egd × D̄rt) +
∑5
g=2α4g(Ggd ×
D̄rt) +α5(Xd× D̄rt) +λd +µrt + εdrt (2.3)
D̂drt is the number of dams built in woreda d, region r and in year t. RGgd
represents the fraction of river area within a woreda d that has gradient level
g; Egd denotes the fraction of a woreda that has gradient level g. I divide the
woredas into five gradient areas (less than 1.5%, 1.5-3%, 3-6%, 6-10% and over
10%) and four elevation groups (in meters) - 0-250, 250-500, 500-1000 and over
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1000. Xd is a vector of controls including woreda area and river length, and
district and region-year fixed effects. Lastly, D̄rt is the number of dams built
in region r until year t. This equation enables me to predict the number of
dams D̂drt, and to create a binary variable “irrigated”, which is equal to 1 if
the downstream woreda contains at least one dam (D̂drt > 0). Woredas with
“irrigated” equal to 0 are classified as rain-fed and I estimate the regression
separately for the irrigated and rain-fed woredas.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
I use a two-period agricultural production model developed by Rose (2001).10
In this model period 1 represents the planting stage, period 2 is the harvesting
stage and households make labour decisions in both periods. This is illustrated
in Figure 2.7. There is a random variable ξ (such as precipitation) that affects
agricultural production and that is realised at the onset of period 2. In period
1, households know the average over time and the variability of the distribution
of ξ but not its realisation. In period 2, households now know the realisation
of ξ and can tailor their time allocation decisions accordingly. Depending
on precipitation affects labour time allocation decisions in period 2 (when
precipitations deviate from their long-run average), incomes are impacted. If
households indeed use the labour market to protect against these shocks, one
could expect to see an impact on time allocation to different labour activities.
Figure 2.7: Two-period Framework, Rose (2001).
To estimate the effect of a precipitation shock on the decision to engage in
10This model is also used in Silwal (2016) and Colmer (2013). While Rose (2001) looks at
ex-ante and ex-post effects, I only consider ex-post labour time allocation decisions in this
analysis.
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the different labour activities for household members, I consider the following
regression11:
Sihdmt = α0 +α1ξdt +α2Xihdmt + θd +µt +ρm + εihdmt (2.4)
Sihkmt represents the supply of labour of individual i, in household h, in
woreda d, on month m and in year t. The measure of Sihdmt includes the
time allocated (in terms of number of hours of work) in the past seven days,
by the individual in different labour activities (agricultural activities, non-
agricultural work (self-employment or not), casual public works, (salaried)
wage work and unpaid traineeship) and domestic chores. ξdt is defined in
Section 2.2.3. α1 shows the impact of occurring precipitation shocks on labour
allocation decision. θd, ρm and µt represent a set of woredas, month and
year fixed effects respectively. Last, I include, Xihdmt a vector of individual
and household characteristics (see Table 2.2) and εihdmt is the disturbance
term. The standard errors are clustered at the woreda level. To account for
the difference between positive and negative productivity shocks (precipitation
shocks), I further estimate a second specification which allows me to distinguish
the effect of positive and negative shocks and examine whether these have
symmetric impacts on time allocation to the different labour activities. The
estimated equation is given by:
Sihdmt = α0 +α1ξ+dt +α2ξ
−
dt +α3Xihdmt + θd +µt +ρm + εihdmt (2.5)
The other variables remain unchanged.





Table 2.3: Effect of Precipitation Shocks on Area Cultivated and Total Production of Maize and Sorghum
Maize Sorghum Maize Sorghum
Total Cultivated Total Cultivated Total Cultivated Total Cultivated
Production Area Production Area Production Area Production Area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Precipitation Shock (ξ) 0.212∗∗∗ 0.00701∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗
(3.625) (0.833) (22.87) (6.592)
Positive Shock (ξ+) 1.476∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗ 8.930∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗
(16.30) (3.710) (144.8) (42.45)
Negative Shock (ξ−) -1.933∗∗∗ -0.0273∗∗∗ -4.609∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(16.18) (3.456) (195.0) (57.16)
2012 0.0084∗∗ 0.0003 0.119 0.00273 -1.674∗ -5.7514∗∗ 3.6113 -4.9914
(4.645) (1.039) (27.07) (7.619) (4.642) (1.038) (26.27) (7.369)
2013 0.0140 0.00048∗∗∗ 0.0470 0.0011∗ 0.0399 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0859 0.00053
(4.649) (1.040) (26.39) (7.407) (4.662) (1.043) (26.30) (7.378)
2014 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.00081 0.0973 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0415 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.107 0.00067
(4.674) (1.043) (26.81) (7.543) (4.663) (1.042) (26.32) (7.383)
Average in Normal Year 85.47 2.30 161.33 6.35 85.47 2.30 161.33 6.35
N 3836 4352 3364 3676 3836 4352 3364 3676
R2 0.353 0.038 0.137 0.100 0.353 0.038 0.137 0.100
OLS regression results given by estimating equation (2.1) : Estimating equation is given by equation (2).
The regressions include year and district fixed effects. Area cultivated is in hectares and total production is in kilos.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: Major Crop Calendar






The green areas represent the planting stage, harvesting stage is in yellow.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nation
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) account for occurring precipitation (productiv-
ity) shocks only. However taking into account the agricultural production, the
households may tailor their time allocation in month m in response to precip-
itation shocks in preceding months. For example, consider the production of
maize and sorghum (see Table 2.4). Planting of these crops is during the pe-
riod Februray-April and harvesting is during the months October-December.
Hence, a precipitation shock in June is as prone to impact output, as is a pre-
cipitation shock in September. To take into consideration this possible lagged
effect, I extend equations (2.4) and (2.5) and estimate the following regressions:
Sihdmt = α0 +
k∑
j=0
α1jξm−j,dt +α2Xihdmt + θd +µt +ρm + εihdmt (2.6)
and










m−j,dt +α3Xihdmt +θd +µt +ρm + εihdmt
(2.7)
Here, k stands for the number of lags. Therefore in equation (2.6), α1j
shows the effect of precipitation shock j months preceding to the month of
survey. When j=0 (month of the survey) equation (2.6) is the occurring effect
2.3. Empirical Strategy 76
of precipitation shocks measured in equation (2.4). Similarly, equation (2.7) is
a broader version of equation (2.5). I estimate two variants of equation (2.6)
and (2.7) for two lag durations: k=2 and k=4.
Another important source of variation relates to the exact timing of pre-
cipitation. shocksThis is essential as the cropping patterns, the amount of
precipitation needed for each crop differ across the country, and precipitation
shocks occur throughout several months (See Figure 2.3). Furthermore, evi-
dence suggests that shocks early in the growing season can have a devastating
impact as all the sown crops may suffer irreparable damage, resulting in signif-
icant economic losses for farmers. Indeed by the beginning of the Belg season,
which follows the long dry season of Begl, the soil moisture is practically zero.
Bewket (2009) shows that the event of adequate rainfall in the early peri-
ods of the Belg season is critical for main crops such as maize and sorghum
production. Hence, precipitation shocks at different times of the growing sea-
son are likely to have different household incomes implications. As a result,
households could react to precipitation shocks differently depending on which
month the shock occurs. To account for this variation in precipitation shocks
over months, I create interactions of the precipitation shock with the month
of the survey (i.e. the month of the reference week) and estimate the following
equation:








+θd +µt +ρm + εihdmtit +αd + εidt (2.8)
γm is a binary variable, equal to 1 if month = m and 0 otherwise. α0 +α1m
captures the time allocation in a normal month m, α0 +α1m+α2 +α3m gives
time allocation in a month m that experiences a precipitation shock α2 +α3m
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the change in time allocation in month m that experiences a shock relative
to a normal month. I further examine the effects of positive and negative
precipitation shocks by month, separately, and determine:







α3m(ξmdt ∗γm) +α4ξ−mdt +λXihdmt
+θd +µt +ρm + εihdmt (2.9)
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Effect of Precipitation Shocks on Consumption
Since precipitation shocks can negatively affect agricultural productivity, if
households are unable to insure against this risk in returns, they may see their
consumption decrease. I use equation (2.4) to investigate this and assess the
effect of precipitation shocks on household expenditure. However in this case,
the dependent variable is monthly per capita expenditure yhdmt of household
h in woreda d, in month m in year t. I include household characteristics such
as average age, average literacy, religion, dependency ratio and household size,
as well as woreda (θd), month (ρm) and year (µt) fixed-effects. I conduct this
analysis at the household level with the standard errors clustered at the same
level. Table 2.5 presents the results.
Column (1) shows that there is a negative relationship between precipita-
tion shocks and monthly per capita consumption expenditure. The magnitude
of the decline in per capita household consumption is a low Birr.30, which rep-
resents 0.73% of the mean per capita household consumption for the estimating
sample of households. However, this result is not statistically significant and
also holds when I include lagged values of precipitation shocks to the estima-
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Table 2.5: Impact of Precipitation Shocks on Household Monthly Per Capita Con-
sumption
Per capita Consumption
Precipitation Shock Positive and Negative Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Lag (4 months) 12.32
(33.60)
Positive Shock (ξ+) 13.78 17.28
(43.85) (87.92)
Negative Shock (ξ−) -61.69 -16.70
(38.61) (89.78)
Positive lag (2 months) 32.86
(111.1)
Negative lag (2 months) 26.99
(109.2)
Positive lag (4 months) -43.67
(86.03)
Negative lag (4 months) -88.07
(79.89)
Mean normal Precipitation (month) N 78502 78494 78502 78494
R2 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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tion in column (2). This finding is similar to Lertamphainont and Sparrow
(2016). Columns (3) and (4) present the effects of positive and negative pre-
cipitation shocks, respectively. Neither a positive nor a negative precipitation
shock has a statistically significant impact on per capita household consump-
tion. The fact that precipitation does not have any statistical significance is
consistent with the ability of households to smooth their consumption in the
event of shocks to income. One possible hypothesis is that households do this
via adjustments to their labour supply. I test this in the next section.
2.4.2 Effect of Precipitation Shocks on Labour Alloca-
tion
Table 2.6 shows the regression results fusing equations (4) and (5), by gen-
der. Panels A and B display the effect for female and male, respectively. The
bottom row in each panel shows the average number of hours in the survey
week allocated to the different labour activities. Females increase time al-
location to casual public works by 2.9% (as a percentage of the number of
hours worked in a “normal” month) but reduce time in unpaid traineeships.
The women in the sample are aged 15-60, so essentially a precipitation shock
reduces the amount of time in higher education, potentially harming human
capital accumulation. Males respond to precipitation shocks by reducing the
time allocation to household chores (collecting water and firewood), and by
also significantly increasing their time allocation to casual public works. The
effects are large, particularly for the time spent in casual public works. Rela-
tive to the average number of hours worked in the corresponding activity in a
“normal” month, males decrease their time allocation to household chores by
1.7% and increase their time allocation to casual wage work by 1.2%.
An important question is to what extent do men and women respond
differently to precipitation shocks. I find that, both men and women increase
their time allocation to casual public works following a precipitation shock
and the there is no evidence of any gender difference12. The results show
12To test this, I use the test developed by Paternoster et al. (1998) and used in Maitra
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that attending educational institutions differ by gender (p-value = 0.023): the
reduction in time allocated to unpaid traineeships in response to a precipitation
shock is significantly greater for female than for male.
Do positive or negative precipitation shocks have differential impacts on
households responses? Table 2.6 displays the effect of too much rain (ξ+ )
or too little rain (ξ−) on time allocation in different labour activities. Men
and women react to a negative precipitation shock by decreasing their time
allocation to unpaid traineeships and there is significant gender difference in
the effect of such a shock on time allocation to unpaid traineeships. There is
no statistically significant effect on time allocation to unpaid traineeships in
response to a positive precipitation shock. Moreover, the results suggest that
men (but not women) react to negative precipitation shocks by increasing their
time in regular wage/salary work and the difference is statistically significant,
p-value = 0.012. The effect is rather small at 2.5% of the average in a “normal”
month. Furthermore panel B shows that any deviation from the average (i.e.,
both positive and negative) leads to a reduction in time allocated to unpaid
traineeships for men. The gender difference is statistically significant for both
types of shock (p-value of difference = 0.008).
and Tagat (2019b). Take regressions on two different subsamples (i.e. male and female).
For the same explanatory variable (i.e. precipitation), β1 and β2 express the estimated
coefficients from the two subsamples, let SE(β1) and SE(β2) be the standard errors. The
z-test for the difference between the two coefficients of regression is given by the following






Table 2.6: Effect of Precipitation Shocks on Time Allocation to Labour Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Work for wage Unpaid
chores work work work Salary Traineeship
PANEL A: WOMEN
Precipitation Shock> (ξ) -0.0234 -0.156 -0.0604 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0244 -0.0254∗
(0.0180) (0.136) (0.116) (0.0343) (0.0417) (0.0645)
Positive Shock⊥ (ξ+) -0.00681 0.165 0.214 0.0264 -0.0873 -0.233
(0.0412) (0.305) (0.282) (0.0793) (0.0944) (0.153)
Negative Shock⊥ (ξ−) -0.0136 -0.00355 0.00039 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0419 -0.0836∗∗∗
(0.0378) (0.258) (0.221) (0.0643) (0.0738) (0.132)
Average hours in Regular Month 1.33 9.48 11.35 0.56 0.52 1.95
N 38714 38654 38558 38858 38870 38870
PANEL B: MEN
Precipitation Shock> (ξ) -0.00498∗ 0.0669 -0.0494∗ 0.00987∗∗ 0.0406 0.0553
(0.00758) (0.146) (0.116) (0.0518) (0.0609) (0.0721)
Positive Shock⊥ (ξ+) 0.00729 -0.159 0.108 0.0145 -0.141 -0.476∗∗
(0.0176) (0.340) (0.270) (0.124) (0.144) (0.168)
Negative Shock⊥ (ξ−) -0.0180 0.0239 0.0796 0.000506 0.0177∗∗ -0.0655∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.285) (0.225) (0.100) (0.122) (0.149)
Average hours in Regular Month 0.30 21.11 6.34 0.83 1.61 2.68
N 38936 39656 39188 39608 39596 39644
The results are estimated by OLS. >: Estimating equation using equation (2.5). ⊥: Estimating equation using equation (2.4).Regressions control for a set of
individual and household characteristics (see 2.2) and month, survey year and district fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the woreda level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.4.3 Effect of Precipitation Shock by Shock Severity
The severity of the precipitation shock may play an important role. In the
sense that a precipitation shock, z, equal to one will not have the same effect
as a precipitation shock, z equal to three. Hence, to have a stronger reference
group and to examine the magnitudes of shocks on a comparative basis, Table
B.1 in the Appendix takes into account the severity of the precipitation shocks.
I show the impacts of 0.5 standard deviations wide bins, with the bin set by
z ∈ (−1,1) as the reference category (see Figure 2.5). The effect is separated
by gender. Panel A in Table B.1 displays the results on time allocation for
women, while Panel B those for men. The effects observed in Table 2.6 are
mostly determined by medium and extreme intensity shocks. For women, a
very severe precipitation shortage (z < −1.5) reduces the time allocated to
attend an unpaid traineeships and casual public work. For men on the other
hand, a very severe precipitation shortage (with z < −2.5) reduces the time
spent in unpaid traineeships as well as time spent in casual public works.
There is evidence of significant gender differences in time spent attending
unpaid traineeships (significant decline for women relative to men, p-value
= 0.00). A (medium intensity) surplus of precipitation (z > 1.5) is associated
with an increase in the time spent in unpaid traineeships for women. However,
a severe positive precipitation shock (z > 2.5), decreases the time spent in in
household chores and unpaid traineeships by women. On the other hand, a
severe positive precipitation shock decreases the time spent in non-agricultural
work, work for wage/salary and unpaid traineeships for men. I find evidence
of gender difference in the effect of severe positive shocks on time allocation





Table 2.7: Effect of Lagged Precipitation Shock on Time Allocation to Labour Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Work for wage Unpaid
chores work work work Salary Traineeship
PANEL A: WOMEN
Precipitation Shock (ξ) -0.00946 -0.425∗ 0.185 0.0189∗ -0.159 -0.0520∗
(0.0213) (0.172) (0.141) (0.0484) (0.0636) (0.0340)
Lag (2months) -0.0317 0.304 -0.328 0.112∗ 0.227∗∗ -0.0716
(0.0259) (0.204) (0.194) (0.0519) (0.0870) (0.0991)
Lag (4months) 0.0185 0.0524 0.120 -0.0403 -0.0574 -0.0698
(0.0225) (0.164) (0.163) (0.0409) (0.0526) (0.0826)
Mean hours in Regular Month 1.33 9.48 11.35 0.56 0.52 1.95
N 38714 38654 38558 38858 38870 38870
R2 0.180 0.317 0.569 0.114 0.164 0.397
PANEL B: MEN
Precipitation Shock (ξ) -0.00955 -0.150 -0.020∗∗ 0.0161∗∗ -0.0580 -0.0219
(0.00989) (0.199) (0.146) (0.0659) (0.0683) (0.0980)
Lag (2months) 0.0141∗ -0.152 0.0651 0.0451 0.0469 0.0113
(0.0127) (0.252) (0.181) (0.0739) (0.0842) (0.106)
Lag (4months) -0.00341 0.380 0.132 -0.0376 0.0231 -0.0458
(0.0111) (0.198) (0.158) (0.0568) (0.0763) (0.0813)
Mean hours in Regular Month 0.30 21.11 6.34 0.83 1.61 2.68
N 38936 39656 39188 39608 39596 39644
R2 0.155 0.410 0.310 0.113 0.170 0.331
The results are estimated by OLS.Estimating equation using equation (2.6).Regressions control for a set of individual and household characteristics (see 2.2)
and month, survey year and district fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the woreda level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.4.4 Effect of Lagged Precipitation Shock on Time Al-
location
Table 2.7 shows the results using equation (2.7) including 2-month lagged
monthly precipitation shocks. I display the results for women in Panel A
while the results for men are presented in Panel B. For women, an occurring
precipitation shock significantly reduces the time allocation to unpaid trainee-
ships and agricultural work, and significantly increases the time allocation to
casual public works. The two-month lagged precipitation shock has a consis-
tent and statistically significant effect on time allocation into increases casual
public works and work for a salary/wage. For men, an occurring precipitation
shock increases time allocated to casual public works, but significantly reduces
the time spent non-agricultural work. The lagged effects are however weak
and the only effect is that a 2-month lagged precipitation increases the time
allocated to household chores.
Additionally, the evidence shows gender based responses to precipitation
shocks to time allocated to particular activities. Indeed, a two-month lagged
precipitation shock leads to a significantly greater change in time spent in ca-
sual public work (p-value = 0.000) and work for wage/salary (p-value =0.001)
for women relative to men. Furthermore, and in line with the results given
in Table (2.6), an occurring precipitation shock leads to a significantly higher
change in time spent in to casual public works by women relative to men,
(p-value = 0.003). Finally, a four-month lagged precipitation shock is not
statistically significant.
When the effects of precipitation shortage and precipitation surplus and
their lagged effects are separated (see Table 2.8), I find that an occurring neg-
ative shock (precipitation shortage) significantly increases the time allocation
by women to casual public works. Note that a 2-month lagged precipitation
shortage significantly decreases allocation of time to casual public works. For
men, a 4-month lagged negative precipitation shock reduces the time allo-
cated to unpaid traineeship. Change in time allocated casual public works
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in response to a two-month precipitation shortage lag is significantly greater
for women compared to men (p-value = 0.002). A four-month lagged nega-
tive precipitation shock has a significantly greater effect on time allocated to





Table 2.8: Effect of Lagged Precipitation Shock on Time Allocation to Labour Activities: 2 months and 4 months lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Work for wage Unpaid
chores work work work Salary Traineeship
PANEL A: WOMEN
Positive Shock (ξ+) -0.0331 -0.00191 0.197 -0.0715 0.0341 0.225
(0.0543) (0.420) (0.380) (0.119) (0.126) (0.241)
Negative Shock (ξ−) -0.0739 0.400 -0.0914 0.134∗ 0.225 -0.0629
(0.0668) (0.427) (0.363) (0.111) (0.153) (0.225)
Positive Precipitation Shock Lag (2months) 0.0104 -0.251 -0.255 0.0473 0.0523 -0.483
(0.0700) (0.535) (0.498) (0.136) (0.153) (0.301)
Negative Precipitation Shock Lag (2months) 0.146 -0.405 0.589 -0.202∗∗ -0.322 -0.0904
(0.0803) (0.529) (0.486) (0.143) (0.191) (0.296)
Positive Precipitation Shock Lag (4months) -0.0275 0.173 0.181 0.0400 -0.168 -0.103
(0.0549) (0.400) (0.379) (0.0951) (0.102) (0.221)
Negative Precipitation Shock Lag (4months) -0.0542 0.152 -0.463 0.0975 0.0937 0.113
(0.0579) (0.400) (0.371) (0.117) (0.130) (0.240)
Mean hours in Regular Month 1.33 9.48 11.35 0.56 0.52 1.95
N 38714 38654 38558 38858 38870 38870
R2 0.180 0.317 0.569 0.114 0.164 0.398
PANEL B: MEN
Positive Shock (ξ+) -0.0390 -0.565 -0.168 0.0780∗∗ -0.177 -0.113
(0.0246) (0.469) (0.387) (0.133) (0.175) (0.228)
Negative Shock (ξ−) 0.0234 -0.281 0.148 -0.0525 0.0143 0.0355
(0.0248) (0.498) (0.384) (0.176) (0.206) (0.263)
The results are estimated by OLS.Estimating equation using equation (2.7).Regressions control for a set of individual and household characteristics (see 2.2)





Effect of Lagged Precipitation Shock on Time Allocation to Labour Activities: 2 months and 4 months lags II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Work for wage Unpaid
chores work work work Salary Traineeship
PANEL A: MEN
Positive Precipitation Shock Lag (2months) 0.0492 0.0194 -0.0102 -0.181 -0.156 0.102
(0.0335) (0.629) (0.516) (0.180) (0.255) (0.300)
Negative Precipitation Shock Lag (2months) -0.0492 0.971 -0.0549 0.00985 -0.0952 0.393
(0.0409) (0.629) (0.498) (0.228) (0.278) (0.318)
Positive Precipitation Shock Lag (4months) -0.00587 0.647 0.269 0.103 0.312 -0.484
(0.0268) (0.496) (0.403) (0.155) (0.223) (0.240)
Negative Precipitation Shock Lag (4months) 0.00991 -0.799 0.0415 0.0698 0.0559 -0.644∗∗
(0.0374) (0.481) (0.392) (0.181) (0.231) (0.236)
Mean hours in Regular Month 0.30 21.11 6.34 0.83 1.61 2.68
N 38936 39656 39188 39608 39596 39644
R2 0.155 0.410 0.310 0.113 0.170 0.332
The results are estimated by OLS.Estimating equation using equation (2.7).Regressions control for a set of individual and household characteristics (see 2.2)
and month, survey year and district fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the woreda level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.4.5 Interactions of Precipitation shocks with Survey
Month
In this section, I consider the variation in precipitation shocks over the season
months. Figure 2.8 presents the impacts for October to April. This period
represents the belg season, which is the crucial period for crop grain agricul-
ture in Ethiopia. Every point on Figure 2.8 shows the additional impact on
time allocation to a particular activity in a month marked by a precipitation
shock, compared to a normal month13 and the corresponding 95% confidence
intervals. The most considerable impact in adjustment to time allocation is
to casual public works and unpaid traineeships. For both men and women,
a precipitation shock in February, the beginning of the belg season, signifi-
cantly increases the time devoted to casual/part-time labour. The effects are
large at approximately 20 percentage points. The estimated impact on time
allocation to unpaid traineeship activities is also quite large. For men, a pre-
cipitation shock in February is associated with a 9% percentage point decline
in time allocation to unpaid traineeship and a 11% percentage point decline
for women.
A precipitation shock in March is also associated with reduced time al-
location to wage/salary work and household chores for men. On the other
hand, for women, a precipitation shock in October increases the time spent on
household chores.
Figure B.1 in the Appendix separates the effects of positive and nega-
tive precipitation shocks on time allocation to the different labour activities.
A positive rainfall shock in February leads to a positive and statistically sig-
nificant increase in the time allocated to casual/part-time activities, for men
and women. For women, a negative rainfall shock in February is associated
with a large and statistically significant increase in casual public works and
household chores and a substantial reduction in time allocation to an unpaid
traineeship. A negative precipitation shock in February creates a considerable
13This is captured by α1m+α3m in equation (2.8).
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reorganisation in the time spent in various activities, especially for women.
Figure 2.8: Effect of any Precipitation Shock by Sex, Activity and Survey Month
Note: Regression specifications are given by equation (2.8). Coefficient estimates
and 95% C.I of the difference estimate α2 +α3m presented. The regressions includes
controls for a set of individual and household characteristics(religion, marital status,
household size and monthly per capita household expenditure) and is restricted to
individuals aged 15-60. Regressions also control for district and year dummies.
Precipitation shocks are defined in Section 2.2.2. The reference month is October.
The results show slightly smaller effects for men. A precipitation shortage
in February reduces time allocation to an unpaid traineeship and increases in
allocated time to casual public works.
These results indicate the importance of casual public work, which is
dominated by PSNP work, in rural Ethiopia. PSNP acts as a programme of
employer-of-last-resort in rural Ethiopia (Hirvonen and Hoddinott, 2020). Fig-
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ure 2.4 shows that February is an important month in the Ethiopian cropping
calendar. It includes the planting season for major crops and cereals, which is
dominated by rural smallholder farmers. Hirvonen and Hoddinott (2020) sug-
gests that demand for work under PSNP and casual public work is the highest
in the months of mid-January to mid-June. This is in line with the average
time allocation by men and women in PSNP and casual public work across
months in Figure 2.2. The results reveal that rural households use casual
public work (or PSNP work) as insurance against agricultural (productivity)
shocks.
2.5 Heterogeneous Impacts of Precipitation
Shocks
2.5.1 Rainfed vs Irrigated Woredas
In this section, I follow the strategy in Sarsons (2011) and introduce systems
of irrigation (i.e. the building of dams) to assess heterogeneous impacts of
precipitation shocks on time allocation to the different labour activities. For
this purpose, I split the sample into rain fed woredas and woredas with irrigated
systems and run separate regressions for these two type of woredas.
Table 2.9 presents the responses on time allocation to the different labour
activities to precipitation shocks. This regression results use the specification
given by equation (2.4) separately for the woredas with irrigated system and
the rain fed woredas. Each column corresponds to a different regression.
The results suggest that, the negative effect of precipitation shock on
time allocated to unpaid traineeships consistently observed and reported in
Tables 2.6-B.1, seem to be determined by the response in rain fed districts.
An agricultural productivity shock in rain fed district leads to a significant
decrease in the time spent engaging in unpaid traineeships by women. This
leads to a considerable negative effect on human capital accumulation. These
effects are not observed in districts that have irrigated systems. Moreover,
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Table 2.9: Heterogeneous effects: Rain fed vs Irrigated woredas (Precipitation
shocks)
Rainfed Irrigated
Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household chores -0.0198 -0.00152 -0.0224 0.00480
(0.00596) (0.0154) (0.0194) (0.00987)
Agricultural work -0.196∗ 0.0180 0.108 0.0971
(0.0944) (0.110) (0.168) (0.179)
Non Agriculture work 0.0153 -0.0388 -0.0483 -0.0435
(0.0870) (0.0884) (0.144) (0.136)
Casual Public work -0.0145 -0.0182 0.000950 0.0462
(0.0251) (0.0306) (0.0561) (0.0809)
Work for wage/Salary -0.0101 -0.0124 0.00779 0.0272
(0.0313) (0.0361) (0.0473) (0.0828)
Unpaid Traineeship -0.0183∗ -0.0756 -0.122 0.0674
(0.0233) (0.0438) (0.135) (0.109)
Coefficient estimate of Precipitation shock (ξ) from OLS regressions. Sepa-
rate regressions for rainfed and irrigated woredas and each row displays the
results from a distinct regression.Regressions control for a set of individual
and household characteristics (see 2.2) and month, survey year and district
fixed effects.Standard errors clustered at the woreda level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
a precipitation shock in a rain fed district leads to an increase in the time
spent in household chores. Table 2.10 reports the regression results for men
and women in rain fed districts versus districts with irrigated systems, using
equation (2.5). In line with previous results, most of the variation on time
allocation to different labour activities is driven by rain-fed districts. This is
observed for both men and women. In response to both a positive and negative
precipitation shock, males and females in rain fed districts decrease their time
allocation to unpaid traineeships, leading to adverse impacts on human capital
accumulation. In turn, in response to negative precipitation shocks, females









Table 2.10: Heterogeneous effects: Rainfed vs Irrigated districts (Positive and Negative Precipitation Shocks)
Negative Precipitation Shock (ξ−) Positive Precipitation Shock (ξ+)
Rainfed Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Household chores 0.00217 -0.00789 0.0234 -0.0188 -0.0530 0.00207 -0.0201 -0.00384
(0.0495) (0.0185) (0.0453) (0.0233) (0.0349) (0.0139) (0.0484) (0.0263)
Agricultural work 0.411 0.0390 -0.269 -0.274 -0.117 -0.0252 -0.0213 -0.0618
(0.266) (0.314) (0.376) (0.386) (0.221) (0.274) (0.440) (0.492)
Non Agriculture work 0.0450 0.196 0.0745 0.0852 0.176 0.0413 0.0352 -0.0259
(0.226) (0.238) (0.312) (0.302) (0.235) (0.234) (0.418) (0.363)
Casual Public work 0.0190∗∗ -0.00637 0.00927 -0.0297 -0.0599 -0.108 -0.0369 0.0132
(0.0868) (0.122) (0.101) (0.174) (0.0676) (0.0866) (0.147) (0.254)
Work for wage/Salary 0.0380 0.0575 0.0445 -0.0173 0.0167 0.00153 -0.00559 0.0883
(0.0648) (0.0967) (0.0975) (0.152) (0.0660) (0.0846) (0.151) (0.225)
Unpaid Traineeship 0.0282 0.184 0.158 -0.246 -0.0451∗∗ -0.109∗∗ -0.567 -0.758
(0.0688) (0.131) (0.270) (0.237) (0.0569) (0.113) (0.377) (0.289)
Positive and negative Precipitation shocks as defined in Section 2.2.2. Separate regressions for rainfed and irrigated woredas
and each row displays the results from a distinct regression. Regressions control for a set of individual and household
characteristics (see 2.2) and month, survey year and district fixed effects.Standard errors clustered at the woreda level in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.5.2 Rainfed vs Irrigated woredas, by Severity of Shock
Table B.4 in Appendix B looks at the impact of precipitation shocks by the
severity of shocks. The effects for women (Panel A) are strongest when z > 1.5.
In a rainfed district, a strong positive precipitation shock reduces the time
allocated to household chores, casual public works and unpaid traineeships.
However, a strong positive precipitation shock is associated with an increase
in time allocated to wage/salary work. For males in a rainfed district, a shock
with −2.5 < z < −1, leads to a reduction in unpaid traineeships. However,
most of the effect is found for z > 1.5 and is associated with a reduction in time
allocated to agricultural activities, casual public works, wage/salary work and
unpaid traineeships. On the other hand, a mild to severe positive precipitation
shock is associated with an increase in time allocated to other non-agricultural
work. In districts with irrigation, there are no effects of extreme weather
shocks on the time allocated to different labour activities for both gender,
suggesting that precipitation shocks are more prone to cause variations in
rain-fed districts.
2.6 Conclusion
Female and male adults use different time allocation of labour strategies in re-
sponse to exogenous precipitation shocks. Generally, I find that precipitation
shortages result in females increasing their time allocation to casual public
works and reducing time in unpaid traineeships. Males in contrast, respond to
negative precipitation shocks by increasing their time in regular wage/salary
work. A positive precipitation shock leads to both males and females reduc-
ing the time allocated to unpaid traineeships. These responses to precipitation
shocks may be intended to insure household units against changes in consump-
tion or incomes.
There are several key insights that I feature. To begin with, families do
adjust their labour allocations across different labour activities as a response
to precipitation shocks. Secondly, a month-to-month analysis of precipitation
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shocks is crucial given that, in farming family units, labour allocation responses
seem to differ by the the month of the shock. Failing to consider these monthly
variations, increases the risk of missing out on crucial circumstantial keystones
of household labour time allocation decisions. Lastly, infrastructure shows
improving impacts on agricultural productivity shocks. The heterogeneous
consequences of precipitation shocks in rainfed districts, as opposed to districts
with irrigated systems, and specifically the negative consequences on human
capital in rainfed districts, have far-achieving costs. Evidently, the right system
of irrigation (i.e. dams) enables a significant contribution into protecting rural
incomes in the event of adverse shocks.
I find evidence of declining time allocation to attending education insti-
tutions by men and women in response to precipitation shocks. This possibly
affects their chances for human capital accumulation, which in turn, could have
potential negative long-run consequences for their welfare. Because variations
in labour allocations in response to precipitation shocks are usually short-run
responses, there could be long-run implications of not attending educational
institutions. An avenue for policy would be to increase the incentives of in-
dividuals enrolled in education institutions to remain in school in the event
of adverse weather shocks. This could be done through monetary transfers to
help ensure that education is not significantly affected by the household expe-
riencing a precipitation shock. The monetary transfer could provide short-run
liquidity for consumption smoothing, and could also help to guarantee educa-
tion progress.
In terms of policy implementation, the timing in this context is very impor-
tant. Mainly, weather shocks in February/March lead to the most significant
changes in household labour allocations for both men and women. This is be-
cause Ethiopian agriculture is mostly rain-fed and that the production is more
prone to be impacted by adverse precipitation shocks, eventually causing men
and women to change their labour activities as a response. The availability
of labour under Casual Public Works (PW) during this time is key to allow-
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ing households insure against weather shocks, especially in rain-fed districts.
Woredas authorities should be ready to arrange and channel support into mak-
ing extra work available during this period to help protect households against
shocks effectively.
Ultimately, suitable infrastructure may play an important role. Indeed,
systems of irrigation such as dams store water during times of precipitation
shortage and enable to protect against surplus rain by impounding water in
reservoirs. By regulating the water flow, dams thus protect agricultural pro-
duction in the dam-fed irrigation districts against fluctuations stemming from
precipitation shocks. As a result, the agricultural production in the dam-fed
irrigation districts should be more stable, and incomes of households should
be less volatile.
The variability in precipitation that is more and more related to climate
change indicates that new risk mitigation strategies may be needed to face
the current climate regime. Therefore, it is necessary to establish empirically
whether government interventions can help households adapt to increased risks
due to climatic change. Notably, government interventions must be many-sided
to account for the various means households use to respond to agricultural
productivity shocks. Government policies that encourage individuals to con-
tinue in school/college or remain in the labour market are of vital importance.
Lastly, it is imperative to invest in the right infrastructure that can act as an
ex-ante insurance mechanism. Government policies, appropriately established,







Child mistreatment is a documented public health and social problem that
raises an important challenge to development. According to the World Health
Organization (WHO), child mistreatment includes all forms of physical, sexual,
emotional ill-treatment and neglect involving child labour and exploitation
(WHO, 2016). Previous research has found mistreated children face long-term
negative health and developmental consequences (Norman et al., 2012), and
encounter immune and nervous system problems (Harris et al., 2014), as well
behavioral issues such as substance abuse, drinking and criminal activities
(Gilbert et al., 2009). Maltreated children are also vulnerable to depressive
disorders (Coates and Messman-Moore, 2014), and intimate partner violence
in adulthood (Afifi et al., 2017).
Ivory Coast is a West African country highly dependent on its agriculture.
It is also the largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans in the world. A
number of qualitative studies in limited geographical areas show that children
in Ivory Coast are at high risk for violence at home, in the community, and
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schools (Merrill et al., 2020; Blay-Tofey and Lee, 2015). According to these
studies, there is a widespread and accepted nature of violence against children,
making child mistreatment a particular concern for the country. According
to UNICEF, among children aged 2-14 years, 87% of them are victims of
emotional violence and 21% victims of severe corporal punishment.
However, due to data limitations, up to date, no studies have been con-
ducted with the required rigour and methodology to generate nationally repre-
sentative data on the true burden and prevalence of violence against children
and its risk factors in Ivory Coast.
Kwnoledge on the factors that contribute to higher risks of physical and
emotional ill-treatment is of great interest for policymaking. This chapter
sheds light on the household characteristics that drive different forms of child
mistreatment including child abuse in Ivory Coast. To do this, the chapter
uses the first Ivorian nationally representative household survey that includes
a component of discipline methods applied by caregivers to their children and
hazardous forms of child labour. While the paper is descriptive, the correlative
evidence on the household characteristics of child mistreatment should help
decision-makers identify households at high risk of child mistreatment and
enable prevention.
The empirical results reveal that household wealth is an important protec-
tive factor against child abuse in Ivory Coast. Children with higher economic
status are less likely to experience emotional abuse than children from poorer
households. Females in particular have a higher risk of experiencing extreme
physical abuse. I also observe a higher risk of child mistreatment among chil-
dren living in rural areas. Moreover, the results confirm the fact that children
who are not living with their biological parents, referred to as independent
children, receive a more unfavourable treatment. In particular, I find evidence
that independent children have higher risks of experiencing emotional and mild
physical abuse.
The content of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides a
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literature review on child abuse and neglect. Section 3.3 is dedicated to the
data. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present the methodology and the results, respec-
tively. Section 3.6 is devoted to robustness checks of the main results and
finally section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
In this section I review what is known about the determinants of child mis-
treatment including child abuse and exploitative child labour, drawing on theo-
retical and empirical studies and I discuss how this study relates to the current
literature.
3.2.1 Child Abuse
Notwithstanding numerous media reports incidents on child mistreatment, de-
tailed analyses of the contributing risk and protective factors of child emotional
and physical abuse from a nationwide representative sample, in developing
countries are rare.
To date, the economic literature lists very few studies of child abuse and
those that exist focus mainly on developed countries. Markowitz and Grossman
(1998) and Markowitz and Grossman (2000) use American data on physical
violence in families, along with data on drug and alcohol prices and taxes to
examine the relationship between the demand for alcohol and intra-household
violence rate toward children. The authors find that both the probability
and the amount of violence committed depend on the price of alcohol and
illegal drugs, and the parent, child and household characteristics. They argue
that there exists a significant negative relationship between alcohol prices and
parental physical violence toward children, especially with regards to violence
committed by mothers. These papers do not address the more extensive links
between socioeconomic factors, economic policies, and child mistreatment.
In contrast, Paxson and Waldfogel (1999, 2002, 2003) provide more in-
sight into these relationships by using state-level panel data to study long-
term relationships between parental and household characteristics (including
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the presence or absence of fathers), state-level socioeconomic variables, as well
as state-level measures of child mistreatment. They observe a positive rela-
tionship between poverty and child abuse.
Brooks-Gunn and Duncan (1997) argue that poverty or large changes
in income may influence the likelihood that parents will engage in abuse or
neglect over and above the influence of a family’s overall level and source(s)
of income. In particular, decreases in income may lead to a deterioration
of the home environment or quality of parental care, and to an increase in
parental stress. Additionally, families experiencing persistently low income
may be at greater risk to engage in harsher, more punitive, and less responsive
parenting, and provide lower quality home environments than their higher-
income counterparts or those experiencing only brief or episodic periods of
low income, as the adverse effects of low income may accumulate over time
(McLoyd, 1998).
The family structure is also an essential factor to consider. Paxson and
Waldfogel (2003) report a positive relationship between child abuse and fa-
thers’ absence in single-parent families with working mothers. However, their
study only uses macro data such that their finding can, therefore, not be tested
at the household level. Moreover, non-biological parents may have fewer incen-
tives than biological parents to invest in children. In fact, research argues that
the disutility received from child mistreatment may vary by decision-makers.
One direct consequence is that when decision-makers do not think about the
adverse effects of child mistreatment on child development, child mistreatment
rates rise.
3.2.2 Exploitative Child Labour
Most of the empirical evidence on child mistreatment from developing coun-
tries focuses on exploitative child labour. For example, Bhalotra (2002), mea-
sures parental altruism using the consumption ratio of tobacco and child-
specific products such as clothing and footwear in rural Pakistan and finds
that parental altruism relates to lower rates of child labour. Edmonds and
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Figure 3.1: Definitions of Child Labour, Hazardous and Worst Forms of Child
Labour, by ILO.
Shrestha (2012) and Kamei (2018) study children without parental care and
present a detailed analysis of the relationship between child labour and chil-
dren living without their biological parents. In their research, they define a
child living away from his biological parents as an “Independent child”.
Edmonds (2010) finds that children employed as porters and rag pickers
display a high incidence of paternal’s disability and less ownership of farmland.
DeGraff et al. (2014) and Kamei (2018) have both studied household charac-
teristics of children working in hazardous environments using large-scale rep-
resentative data sets. DeGraff et al. (2014) investigates the children in several
hazardous industries using Brazilian data, while Kamei (2018) uses Nepalese
data. In line with Edmonds (2010), the authors predict that the absence of
parents increases the transition into hazardous forms of child labour, but their
estimation results fail to find any statistically significant effect of household
productive asset, such as land and livestock.
The above point is interesting because Bhalotra and Heady (2003), observe
that households with higher wealth indices (measured by household character-
istics such as household materials, sanitation level or ownership of assets) are
responsible for more child labour. They argue that wealth assets, including
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agricultural land or livestock, raise the household labour demand for child
labour. In a similar way, Cockburn and Dostie (2007) find more child labour
from households with more livestock or cropland in Ethiopia. Edmonds (2010)
finds a greater number of rag pickers and porters, jobs classified as worst forms
of labour, from households who do not own land in Nepal. Hence, while crop-
land and livestock ownership raises child labour, children may be shielded from
entering hazardous labour because productive household assets provide safer
working environments for children.
3.2.3 How this study relates to the current literature
Previous research on child abuse hence omits several essential questions related
to the relationship between poverty, household characteristics and child abuse.
This paper offers empirical evidence to identify better the household character-
istics that drive the selection into child abuse in a context of extreme poverty.
The identification of those households that are at high risk of child mistreat-
ment may hold implications for the establishment of preventive policies, and
for ensuring that such policies are put in place early. In the spirit of Edmonds
and Shrestha (2012), and Kamei (2018), I classify independent children and
consider children living with close relatives from independent children living
with “other relatives”. Children who migrated to the household of close rela-
tives may be exposed to fewer agency issues than children living with distant
relatives. This is because distant relatives have weaker interfamilial relation-
ships than closer relatives.
3.3 Data
I use data from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) from Ivory
Coast, a household survey that focuses on the health and welfare of women and
children in developing countries, following the Millennium Development Goals
and other international mother and child health goals. With the technical and
financial support of UNICEF, the government of Ivory Coast carries out this
survey every three to five years. The fifth round of data collection (MICS5)
3.3. Data 102
was conducted in 2016 and includes a household questionnaire, a questionnaire
for women aged 15 to 49, and a questionnaire for primary caregivers of chil-
dren under five. The unit of analysis that guided the data collection is the
household member and particularly individuals five years of age and over. The
survey covers many aspects of welfare, including education, child labour, child
discipline, mortality and health. This data is the first nationally representative
survey that includes a module on child discipline1. Section 3.3.1 describes the
module in more detail.
3.3.1 Child Discipline Module: Data and Descriptive
Statistics
The child discipline module of MICS5 contains questions concerning discipline
practices applied by primary caregivers to their children in the month before
the survey. The child discipline module is based on questions from the Murray
A Straus Parent-Child Conflict Tactics Scale, a questionnaire for measuring
domestic abuse, including domestic violence against children2.3 For this study,
I create a binary outcome variable: “child abuse” if the child experiences any
form of abuse. That is, I classify those respondents who responded “Yes” to
any of the questions as practicing child abuse and those who answered “No” to
all questions as “no abuse”. Later in the study I create three binary outcomes
that specify each type of abuse experienced: (i) emotional abuse, (ii) mild and
(iii) extreme physical abuse (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of individuals’ and households’
characteristics by whether the child experienced any form of abuse or not4.
Column 1 shows that 33% of children experience some form of abuse.
UNICEF calculates the household wealth score variable through a prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA). It is a composite index composed of many
1Section 3.6.2 in the robustness checks uses data from the child labour module and
provides an analysis on hazardous child labour, which is another focus in child development.
2The module was applied to children aged between 2 and 14 years, and only one child is
randomly chosen if more than one child is in this age group.
3I am only using this information for children aged 6 to 14 years.
4I present the definitions of the variables used in Table C.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.1: Child discipline module’s questions regarding psychological and physical
abuse
Emotional Abuse
Screamed, shouted at him/her?
Called him/her stupid, lazy or another name
Mild Physical Abuse
Shook him/her?
Spanked, hit or slapped him/her on the bottom with bare hand?
Hit or slapped him/her on the hand, arm or leg?
Extreme Physical Abuse
Hit or slapped him/her on the face, head or ears?
Hit him/her on the bottom or elsewhere on the body with a hard
object like a belt?
Beat him/her up with a device (repeatedly hit as hard as possible)?
observable household characteristics such as household materials, sanitation
level or asset ownership. It is calculated separately for urban and rural areas
to avoid any urban bias. Compared with other income measures, the asset
index is regarded as better information to capture the long-term household
wealth level, particularly in developing countries. It represents a more perma-
nent status, is more easily measured (with only a single respondent needed in
most cases) and needs fewer questions than either consumption expenditures
or income (Macro, 2004).
From the descriptive statistics, we observe that the household wealth score
is highly related to child abuse status. The mean differences between the child
abuse and no child abuse, in columns 4 shows that the wealth level is higher for
non-abused children. This suggests that poverty not only result but also causes
child abuse. Table C.2 in the appendix shows that out of 2774 independent
children, 2274 (82 per cent) experience abuse compared to 2444 (or 21 per cent)
non independent children (out of 11573)5 Figure 3.2 shows that approximately
19 per cent of children are independent children who live away from their
5A 2×2 contingency table analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the variable Abuse
(Yes, No) was associated with the variable Independent (Yes, No). The analysis yielded a
Pearson chi-square (1, N = 14347) = 3754.92, which is greater than the critical value of














Figure 3.2: Independent Children: Parental Situation.
biological parents. Among them, 96 per cent still have both parents alive, the
remaining reports that either one or both parents are deceased. For those 96
per cent, the majority (85 per cent) report that both parents are still in Ivory
Coast but live in a different household. This suggests that these children have
left the households where they were born. The remaining 15 per cent report
that one of their parents are either abroad or somewhere else in Ivory Coast.
Since MICS5 does not provide with information on the original households for
independent children, in this study I consider children to be integrated into
their destination household once they have migrated. This assumption seems
well founded, as the majority of independent children reside in the household
of a relative.
Figure 3.3 gives details on the relationship of independent children to the
household head. Among independent children, around 41 per cent are the
grandson/daughter of the household head. Around 9 per cent of the children
reported the absence of their father and 32 percent the absence of their mother.
In 7 per cent of the cases, the father is still alive whereas he is deceased in 2 per
cent of the cases. Mothers are alive in 28 per cent of the cases and deceased
in 4 per cent of the cases.Table C.3 in the appendix shows that the percentage
of a deceased father is slightly greater among physically abused children (7%)
compared to non-abused children (6%). Moreover, 30% of children experienc-
ing extreme physical abuse reported that their mother away, compared to only










Wife/husband Son/daughter In Law
Grandson/daughter Step Father/mother
Brother/sister Brother/sister In Law
Uncle/aunt Niece/nephew
Other (related) Adopted/foster
Domestic (not related) Other (not related)
Figure 3.3: Relationship to Head of Household for Independent Children
3.3.2 Limitations of the data
One limitation of the data is the underreporting bias. This is because respon-
dents in an interview tend to underreport the prevalence of child mistreatment
due to stigmatization or fear of disclosing incidents of violence, the prevalence
of child abuse and neglect is likely to be higher than what is reported (Ed-
monds, 2010). While there is a concern for the underreporting issue, especially
in child abuse and neglect, there are a significant number of cases of child abuse
and children involved in hazardous forms of child labour in this paper.
3.4 Methodology
In this section, I outline the methodology used to identify the determinants of
child abuse and I present the empirical results.
To examine the determinants of child abuse, I conduct a logistic regression
analysis. The model studies three outcomes; emotional abuse, mild physical
abuse, extreme physical abuse. Figure 3.4 presents the logit model. I run mul-
tiple specifications of the model: the first specification in column (1) includes
3.4. Methodology 106
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
MEAN DIFF
Total No Abuse Any Abuse (3) vs (2) Min-Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Child Abuse 0.33 0-1
Enrolled 0.73 (0.44) 0.74 (0.44) 0.73 (0.45) 0.02 (0.01) 0-1
Wealth Index 2.78 (1.35) 2.83 (1.34) 2.55 (1.30) 0.28 (0.02)*** 1-5
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.49(0.50) 0.00 (0.01) 0-1
Age 9.66 (2.57) 9.89 (2.63) 9.60 (2.55) 0.29 (0.05)*** 6-14
Rural 0.69 (0.46) 0.64 (0.48) 0.71 (0.45) -0.08 (0.01)*** 0-1
Household size 7.97 (3.98) 8.49 (4.64) 7.84 (3.78) 0.67 (0.08)*** 2-45
<5 years (#) 1.51 (1.37) 1.46 (1.41) 1.29 (1.14) 1.50 (0.01)** 0-8
6-14 years (#) 3.17 (1.89) 3.17 (2.12) 3.18 (1.83) -0.01 (0.04) 1-11
>60years (#) 0.33 (0.64) 0.35 (0.66) 0.32 (0.63) 0.02 (0.01) 0-5
Head (Female) 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.35) 0.17 (0.37) -0.02 (0.01)** 0-1
Head (age) 48.65 (12.91) 49.60 (13.48) 48.41 (12.75) 1.19 (0.23)*** 17-98
Land(hectares) 8.23 (18.86) 7.89 (17.42) 8.31 (19.21) -0.42 (0.39) 0-99
Livestock 2.17 (10.68) 2.62 (12.43) 2.06 (10.18) 0.60 (0.22)** 0-99
Horse/Donkey 0.15 (3.47) 0.11 (2.38) 0.16 (3.70) -0.05 (0.07) 0-99
Chicken 6.87(14.96) 6.39 (13.76) 6.99 (15.25) -0.60 (0.33) 0-99
Has electricity 0.55 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) 0.08 (0.01)*** 0-1
Has access to water 0.16 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15(0.36) 0.04 (0.01)*** 0-1
Independent child 0.19 (0.39) 0.05 (0.07) 0.48 (0.27) -0.43(0.32)** 0-1
Father away 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.00 (0.00) 0-1
Father dead 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25) -0.01 (0.00) 0-1
Mother away 0.28 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45) -0.01 (0.00)* 0-1
Mother dead 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.16) 0.04 (0.19) -0.01 (0.00)** 0-1
N 14347 9629 4718
age6 and region fixed controls (µ). Column (2) controls for the household liv-
6The regressions include a vector of dummy variables (γ) for age in all specification. The
tables do not display the coefficients for the age dummies. However, the results show that
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Table 3.3: Abuse among Independent Children
Any Abuse No Abuse Total
Independent 2274 500 2774
Non Independent 2444 9129 11573








Figure 3.4: Logit model for child abuse
ing standard, by adding the wealth index (W). Column (3) controls for some
household characteristics (H); i.e. the number of children and dependent mem-
bers, and column (4) includes home production assets (L); for e.g. hectares
of land and livestock ownership. Column (5) introduces an interaction term
for households in which the child’s biological grandparents take the role of
the household head (INT1). The baseline group is boys with both father and
mother present. Column (6) adds interactions for girls to study gender dif-
ferences in the effect of parents’ absence (INTS). The full list of explanatory
variables is presented in Table C.2. The full logit model is described by:
ln
p
(1−p) = β0 +β1X+β2W +β3H+β4L+β5INT1 +β6INTS+γ+µ+ ε
(3.1)
where p is the probability of the outcome of interest (see Figure 3.4). All
regressions include region fixed effects, controlling for common regional factors
such as regional labour market conditions. Standard errors are clustered at
the household level to account for correlation in errors at this level. Note that
the result tables show the marginal effects and represent the percentage points
increase or decrease in the probability of falling in each category. The discrete
the likelihood of children experiencing abuse increases with age. When the age is controlled
by a linear relationship, a 1-year increase in age increases child abuse by approximately 2
percentage points.
3.5. Empirical Results 108
variables demonstrate a change from zero to one, and I estimate the continuous
variables at the mean value.
3.5 Empirical Results
Table 3.4 presents the results from the logistic regression analysis on child
abuse. First, an increase in the wealth score decreases the likelihood of experi-
encing any form of abuse. This finding supports the hypothesis of Brooks-Gunn
and Duncan (1997) that household wealth is an important protective factor
against child abuse. Children with a higher economic status are on average 12
percentage points less likely to experience emotional abuse than children from
poorer households. Table 3.5 looks closely at the type of abuse children expe-
rience and displays two specifications per abuse type. Table 3.5 reveals that
children from poorer households are 16% more likely to experience emotional
abuse and 12% mild and extreme physical abuse compared to children from
wealthier households. The results confirm that poverty is a chronic problem in
Ivory Coast and permeates several aspect of the society and family, including
children’s welfare.
I also find gender differences in that females are more at risk to be abused.
For example, Table 3.5 reveals that females are on average 14% more likely to
experience emotional and extreme physical abuse compared to male children.
This result contrasts that of Atteraya et al. (2018), who finds that males in
Nepal are more at risk of acts of physical abuse. This could be explained by
the fact that Ivory Coast is a very patriarchal society in which females hold a
subordinate position within their households and often find themselves at the
mercy of men (Stichter and Parpart, 1988). The coefficient signs for indepen-
dent children is positive and statistically significant. In terms of percentage
change, the full model shows that the probability for independent children
versus other children to experience abuse is 17%. Table 3.5 shows that the
coefficients on emotional, mild and extreme physical abuse are positive and
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. In terms of percentage change,
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the probabilities for independent children versus non-independent children to
experience emotional, mild and extreme physical abuse are 14%, 29% and 7%,
respectively. These results corroborate that of Case et al. (2004) who shows
that children who are not living with their biological parents are treated un-
favourably. They argue that the closeness of biological ties governs altruistic
behaviour.
Finally, Table C.4, the full table in the Appendix, shows that house-
holds with more children and dependent members (less than 5 years old and
more than 65 years old) are associated with higher risk of child abuse. This
may reflect the fact that more dependent members may lead to more parental
(household head) role stress and depression, more authoritarian parent-to-child
interactions and greater use of physical punishment. I also find that the ab-
sence of the father is not a significant determinant of child abuse in Ivory
Coast. However, children with their biological mother absent because of death
have a higher risk of experiencing abuse. One explanation for this result may
be because mothers are considered to be the persons with the greatest interest
in children’s health and survival, and with the greatest willingness to devote
time to their protection and to care for them in sickness (Caldwell and Cald-
well, 1993). A mother’s death could thus leave the child to be more vulnerable
to abuse. Even though the interaction of independent children living with
grandparents is not statistically significant, the results show that including
the interaction term in the model slightly increases the coefficient for indepen-
dent children from approximately 15.5 percentage points to 16.1 percentage
points. The observation that children who live with distant families are more
prone to experience abuse is in line with the assumption that the disutility of
agent is relevant to the selection into child abuse. Finally, I observe a higher
risk of each type of abuse among children living in rural areas and no significant
effect of household productive assets.
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Table 3.4: Logit Regression Analysis on Child Abuse
Child abuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0855∗∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0106∗∗ 0.0104∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0449) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0423) (0.0420) (0.0419)
Rural 0.219∗∗∗ 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0524∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗ 0.0515∗∗∗
(0.0569) (0.0623) (0.0630) (0.0636) (0.0636) (0.0636)
Household size 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.00483) (0.00490) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)
Independent 0.145∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.167∗
(0.0813) (0.0813) (0.0826) (0.0827) (0.0828) (0.0843)
Wealth Index -0.149∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.0300) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Column (1) includes age and region fixed controls (µ). Column (2) controls for the
household living standard by adding the wealth index (W). Column (3) controls for
some household characteristics (H), i.e. the number of children and dependent members,
and column (4)includes home production assets (L), e.g. hectares of land and livestock
ownership. Column (5) introduces an interaction term for households in which the
child’s biological grandparents take the role of the household head (INT1). The baseline
group is boys with both father and mother present. Column (6) adds interactions for
girls to study gender differences in the effect of parents’ absence (INTS). The full list of
explanatory variables is presented in Table C.2.
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Table 3.5: Logit Regression Analysis on Child Abuse by the type of Abuse
Emotional Abuse Mild Physical Abuse Extreme Physical Abuse
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Female 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0563 0.0066 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0404) (0.0428) (0.0347) (0.0368) (0.0401) (0.0423)
Rural 0.0402∗∗ 0.0386∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.0533∗∗ 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗
(0.0609) (0.0609) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0626) (0.0627)
Household size 0.133∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.0879∗∗∗ 0.0881 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.00871) (0.00871) (0.00966) (0.00967)
Independent 0.140∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(0.0798) (0.0814) (0.0682) (0.0690) (0.0808) (0.0819)
Wealth Index -0.159∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0280) (0.0280)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Column (1) includes age and region fixed controls (µ), wealth index (W), household
characteristics, home production assets (L) and an interaction term for households in
which the child’s biological grandparents take the role of the household head (INT1).
The baseline group is boys with both father and mother present. Column (2) adds
interactions for girls to study gender differences in the effect of parents’ absence (INTS).
The complete list of explanatory variables is presented in Table C.2.
3.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, I perform two robustness checks of the results. I first conduct
the analysis using a distinct estimation technique. That is, I use a Linear Prob-
ability Model (LPM) to estimate child abuse. I then consider the participation
in hazardous child labour as another form of child abuse.
3.6.1 Linear Probability Model
The results on the LPM estimation of child abuse are displayed in Table 3.6.
Table 3.7 shows the results focusing on each form of child abuse, i.e., emotional,
mild and extreme physical child abuse. The results confirm the findings from
the main analysis as all coefficients have the same sign and are similar in
magnitude.
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3.6.2 Hazardous Child Labour
Child abuse is defined as “the intentional, non-accidental injury, maltreat-
ment of children by parents, caretakers, employers or others including those
individuals representing governmental or non-governmental bodies which may
lead to temporary or permanent impairment of their physical, mental and
psycho-social development, disability or death” (NIPCCD, 1988). Therefore,
Caeser-Leo (1999) argues that forced hazardous child labour by caregivers or
employers, which leads to intentional, accidental or non-accidental long-term
injury, and which results in impairment of the child’s health, safety, or morals,
can thus be considered a serious form of child abuse and neglect. In this sec-
tion, I check the robustness of the results using the participation in hazardous
child abuse as an alternative definition of child abuse. I use data from the
module on child labour in MICS5.
Table C.9 presents the first stage of the sequential logit model on child
labour. At this stage, households choose between child labour or not; Child
labour is defined as 1 if the child is working at least one hour in market
activity and 0 otherwise. Table C.10 presents the key results focusing on the
second stage of the sequential logit model, the selection into hazardous forms
of child labour among working children. Amongst children engaged in child
labour, independent children have a higher probability of working in hazardous
work by around sixty percentage points across all specifications. The mean
prevalence of hazardous child labour is 20 per cent (see Table C.1, column 1
in the Appendix C), therefore the sixty percentage points increase to 80 per
cent in hazardous forms of child labour, ultimately a rise of 75 per cent.
The interaction of children living with their grandparents remains insignif-
icant.All other coefficients show a similar trend with the main analysis, except
for female which is negatively related to the incidence of child labour and
hazardous child labour. Moreover, the number of hectares of land owned by
the household is now statistically significant, and the effect of the ownership
of livestock negatively impacts the participation in hazardous child labour.
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A summary statistics of this data and additional results on hazardous child
labour are presented in Appendix C.
Table 3.6: Robustness Checks: LPM Regression Analysis on Child Abuse
Child Abuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0668) (0.0657) (0.0638) (0.00635)
Rural 0.374∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0207)
Household size 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.0910) (0.0092) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173)
Independent 0.0242∗∗ 0.0246∗∗ 0.0259∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0258∗∗ 0.0268∗
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0135)
Wealth Index -0.0241∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗
(0.00492) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00491)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Column (1) includes age and region fixed controls (µ). Column (2) controls for the
household living standard by adding the wealth index (W). Column (3) controls for
some household characteristics (H), i.e. the number of children and dependent members,
and column (4)includes home production assets (L), e.g. hectares of land and livestock
ownership. Column (5) introduces an interaction term for households in which the
child’s biological grandparents take the role of the household head (INT1). The baseline
group is boys with both father and mother present. Column (6) adds interactions for
girls to study gender differences in the effect of parents’ absence (INTS). The complete
list of explanatory variables is presented in Table C.2.
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Table 3.7: Robustness Checks: LPM Regression Analysis on Child Abuse by type
Emotional Abuse Mild Physical Abuse Extreme Physical Abuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.00225 0.00484 0.0136 0.0141 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗
(0.00700) (0.00739) (0.00816) (0.00864) (0.00705) (0.00751)
Rural 0.839 0.00811∗ 0.0119 0.0115 0.0487∗∗ 0.0101∗∗
(0.111) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Household size 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.00595∗∗∗ 0.00601∗∗∗
(0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00157) (0.00157)
Independent 0.0389∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0243∗∗ 0.0212∗∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.0334∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0138) (0.0140)
Wealth Index -0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0280∗∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗
(0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.00477) (0.00477)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Column (1) includes age and region fixed controls (µ). Column (2) controls for the
household living standard by adding the wealth index (W). Column (3) controls for
some household characteristics (H), i.e. the number of children and dependent members,
and column (4)includes home production assets (L), e.g. hectares of land and livestock
ownership. Column (5) introduces an interaction term for households in which the
child’s biological grandparents take the role of the household head (INT1). The baseline
group is boys with both father and mother present. Column (6) adds interactions for
girls to study gender differences in the effect of parents’ absence (INTS). The complete
list of explanatory variables is presented in Table C.2.
3.7 Conclusion
This research examines the determinants that drive child abuse, using the fifth
round of the Ivory Coast Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS5).
The empirical results reveal that household wealth is an important pro-
tective factor against child abuse in Ivory Coast. Children from wealthier
households are less likely to experience emotional abuse compared to children
of lower economic status families. Females have a higher risk of experienc-
ing extreme physical abuse and I observe a higher risk of child mistreatment
among children living in rural areas. Moreover, the results tend to suggest that
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Table 3.8: Sequential Logit Model on Child Labour and Hazardous Forms of
Labour
First Stage Sequential Logit
Child Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.116** -0.115** -0.102* -0.0965* -0.0974* -0.126**
(0.0399) (0.0401) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0423)
Rural 0.634*** 0.610*** 0.625*** 0.564*** 0.564*** 0.564***
(0.123) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)
Household size 0.00669 0.0141 0.0355 0.0270 0.0268 0.0269
(0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0209)
Independent 0.0361 0.102 -0.0043 -0.0032 -0.00042 -0.0002
(0.0684) (0.0687) (0.0708) (0.0710) (0.0709) (0.0715)
Wealth Index -0.281*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.302***
(0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0401)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Column (1) includes age and region fixed controls (µ). Column (2) controls for the
household living standard by adding the wealth index (W). Column (3) controls for
some household characteristics (H), i.e. the number of children and dependent members,
and column (4)includes home production assets (L), e.g. hectares of land and livestock
ownership. Column (5) introduces an interaction term for households in which the
child’s biological grandparents take the role of the household head (INT1). The baseline
group is boys with both father and mother present. Column (6) adds interactions for
girls to study gender differences in the effect of parents’ absence (INTS). The complete
list of explanatory variables is presented in Table C.2.
children who are not living with their biological parents receive unfavourable
treatment. Indeed, I find evidence that independent children have higher risks
of experiencing emotional and mild physical abuse.
Furthermore, the results show that the inclusion of an interaction for
children living with their grandparents, increases slightly the coefficient for
independent children. This is in line with the assumption that the disutility
of agent is relevant to child abuse.
Most child mistreatment programmes focus on victims or perpetrators
of child abuse and neglect. Only a few stress prevention approaches that
aim at preventing child abuse and neglect from happening in the first place.
In terms of preventive policy recommendation, policies aiming at identifying,
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supporting and monitoring children who cannot be cared for by biological
parents or discouraging unnecessary foster placement of children should help
reduce risk for exposure to violence, abuse, neglect, and exploitation.
The findings of the study are robust and generalizable to the population.
Nonetheless, the study has some limitations related to the underreporting of
child mistreatment due to stigmatization or fear of disclosing incidents of vi-





Table A.1: Gold Boom effect on Children Outcome by gender: Participation
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Economic Domestic Not School School Economic Domestic Not School School
Chores attending Attainment Lag Chores attending Attainment Lag
Price 0.00873 -0.0333 0.00192 0.00974 -0.00262 0.213∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.00326 0.0470∗∗∗ -0.0254∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0245) (0.00232) (0.0103) (0.00473) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.00863) (0.00800) (0.00612)
Price× ASM Area 0.168∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.0255 0.0367∗ -0.0603 -0.0126 0.0435 -0.0290 -0.0642∗ 0.0342∗∗
(0.0205) (0.0458) (0.0456) (0.0148) (0.00754) (0.0356) (0.0297) (0.0150) (0.0321) (0.0130)
Price× LSM Area -0.109 0.0152 0.0205 0.0460 -0.0115 -0.0294 0.00438 0.00507 0.0321 -0.0110
(0.0700) (0.0519) (0.0194) (0.0268) (0.0204) (0.0636) (0.0266) (0.0280) (0.0166) (0.0158)
ASM Area -1.150∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗ 0.266 -0.226∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.0147 -0.367 0.162 0.335 0.256∗∗
(0.143) (0.266) (0.257) (0.0931) (0.0491) (0.219) (0.190) (0.0895) (0.183) (0.0778)
LSM Area 0.793 -0.143 -0.162 -0.309 0.0940 0.276 0.0385 -0.0459 -0.197 0.0706
(0.475) (0.365) (0.127) (0.177) (0.126) (0.433) (0.169) (0.164) (0.104) (0.102)
N 5249 5249 5249 5249 5249 5125 5125 5125 5125 5125
R2 0.113 0.084 0.641 0.442 0.434 0.221 0.142 0.657 0.473 0.379
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at district level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All
regressions include district and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls, which include: individual’s age and gender,
household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset, size, access to water and electricity; as well as an indicator of the household area.
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Table A.2: Gold Boom effect on Child Labour by gender: Hours
All Female Male
Economic Domestic Economic Domestic Economic Domestic
Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price 0.953 -1.805 4.367∗∗∗ -6.559∗∗∗ 0.287 -0.891
(0.666) (1.161) (0.654) (0.533) (0.278) (0.632)
Price × ASM Area 0.759 -2.097 1.888 2.385 1.610∗∗ -3.811∗∗∗
(0.631) (1.189) (0.776) (1.538) (0.551) (0.537)
Price × LSM Area -2.060 -4.284 -3.386 -3.801 -3.148 -1.282
(1.963) (1.386) (1.776) (1.326) (2.376) (1.240)
ASM Area -9.195∗ 13.34 8.518 -18.50∗ -14.79∗∗∗ 26.75∗∗∗
(4.087) (7.378) (4.901) (9.304) (3.602) (3.521)
LSM Area 15.77 27.94∗∗ 23.46∗ 25.86∗∗ 23.66 7.481
(13.10) (8.795) (11.57) (8.547) (16.23) (8.079)
N 10374 10374 5125 5125 5249 5249
R2 0.088 0.157 0.098 0.209 0.102 0.110
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at district level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The Gold
Boom measure is the interaction between the presence of (large-scale) artisanal in the (20 km) 10km vicinity of the households and the
logarithm of international gold prices. All regressions include district and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls,
which include: individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset, size, access to water and electricity; as
well as an indicator of the household area.
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Table A.3: Spreading the labour: interaction with having Siblings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic Domestic Not School School
Work Chores attending Attainment Lag
No sibling -0.00849 0.0000332 0.0128 0.0223 -0.0166
(0.0156) (0.0152) (0.0140) (0.0154) (0.00972)
No sibling × ASM Gold Boom -0.0154 -0.00809 0.00601 -0.00205 0.000505
(0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0110) (0.0128) (0.00803)
No sibling × LSM Gold Boom 0.00869 0.0121 0.00648 -0.00947 0.000761
(0.00944) (0.00902) (0.00711) (0.00868) (0.00523)
N 10374 10374 10374 10374 10374
R2 0.128 0.187 0.111 0.181 0.187
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
district level. ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. All regressions include district
and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls, which include:
individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset,
size, access to water and electricity; as well as an indicator of the household
area. ASM Gold Boom is the measure of Price × ASM Area. LSM Gold Boom
corresponds to Price × LSM Area.
Table A.4: Spreading the labour: interaction with being the Eldest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic Domestic Not School School
Work Chores attending Attainment Lag
Being the eldest 0.0246 0.0270 0.0122 0.00925 -0.0142
(0.0129) (0.0122) (0.0114) (0.0124) (0.00857)
Being the eldest × ASM Gold Boom 0.00525 -0.00714 -0.00405 -0.00489 -0.00105
(0.00879) (0.00864) (0.00825) (0.00885) (0.00657)
Being the eldest × LSM Gold Boom -0.0112 0.00396 0.00922 0.0144 0.000606
(0.00653) (0.00603) (0.00573) (0.00638) (0.00449)
N 10374 10374 10374 10374 10374
R2 0.129 0.188 0.109 0.177 0.187
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
district level. ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. The Gold Boom measure is the
interaction between the presence of (large-scale) artisanal in the (20 km) 10km
vicinity of the households and the logarithm of international gold prices. All
regressions include district and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’
controls, which include: individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and
gender, literacy, asset, size, access to water and electricity; as well as an indicator
of the household area. ASM Gold Boom is the measure of Price × ASM Area.
LSM Gold Boom corresponds to Price × LSM Area.
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Table A.5: Spreading the labour: interaction with having a Sister(s)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic Domestic Not School School
Work Chores attending Attainment Lag
Female
Have sister(s) -0.00146 0.000404 0.000802 0.000668 -0.000552
(0.000564) (0.000521) (0.000514) (0.000563) (0.000364)
Have sister(s) × ASM Gold Boom -0.0316 0.00242 -0.0339 -0.0771 0.0149
(0.00580) (0.00601) (0.00638) (0.00635) (0.00495)
Have sister(s) × LSM Gold Boom -0.000225 0.00876 -0.00140 -0.00377 0.00254
(0.00456) (0.00396) (0.00411) (0.00472) (0.00307)
N 5125 5125 5125 5125 5125
R2 0.192 0.155 0.088 0.155 0.154
Male
Have sister(s) -0.00924 -0.00552 -0.0113 -0.0000138 -0.00598
(0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0146) (0.0158) (0.0106)
Have sister(s) × ASM Gold Boom 0.00940 -0.00732∗∗ -0.00359 0.00416∗∗ -0.00149
(0.0131) (0.0137) (0.0115) (0.0135) (0.00895)
Have sister(s) × LSM Gold Boom 0.0303 -0.0299 -0.000604 -0.00132 -0.00373
(0.00922) (0.00941) (0.00824) (0.00940) (0.00612)
N 5249 5249 5249 5249 5249
R2 0.107 0.128 0.105 0.148 0.206
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
district level. ∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. All regressions include district
and year fixed effects, and individuals and households’ controls, which include:
individual’s age and gender, household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset,
size, access to water and electricity; as well as an indicator of the household
area. ASM Gold Boom is the measure of Price × ASM Area. LSM Gold Boom
corresponds to Price × LSM Area.
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Table A.6: Education of Head of household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic Domestic Not School School
Work Chores attending Attainment Lag
ASM Boom × Years of 0.00786 -0.00142 -0.00356∗ 0.00244 -0.00380
Head Education (0.00623) (0.00597) (0.00731) (0.00618) (0.00526)
LSM Boom × Years of -0.00183 0.00840 0.00180 -0.00426 -0.000416
Head education (0.00417) (0.00373) (0.00412) (0.00343) (0.00302)
Years of -0.0280∗∗∗ -0.000578 -0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗ -0.0142∗∗∗
Head education (0.00446) (0.00445) (0.00438) (0.00420) (0.00347)
Artisanal Boom 0.0560∗∗∗ 0.0676 0.00246∗ -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.00130
(0.00483) (0.00479) (0.00448) (0.00486) (0.00330)
LSM Boom -0.0878 0.00197 -0.00244 -0.00284 0.00416
(0.00349) (0.00328) (0.00308) (0.00351) (0.00230)
N 10246 10246 10246 10236 10246
R2 0.128 0.187 0.111 0.180 0.186
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clus-
tered at district level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The measure
of artisanal Boom is the interaction between ln(gold price) and ASM area.
The LSM boom measure is the interaction between ln(gold price) and LSM
area. All regressions include district and year fixed effects, and individu-
als and households’ controls, which include: individual’s age and gender,
household head’s age and gender, literacy, asset, size, access to water and
electricity; as well as an indicator of the household area.
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A.1 Mining Communes Population Growth
Figure A.1: Population growth rate for mining
communes. 1998-2009. Sanoh and
Massaoly (2015).
Figure A.2: Population growth rate by group of




B.1 Effect of Precipitation Shocks on Time














Table B.1: Precipitation Shocks on Time Allocation to Labour Activities: by shock severity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Work for wage Unpaid
chores work work work Salary Traineeship
PANEL A: WOMEN
z <−3.5 -0.156 3.874 1.067 -0.179 0.569 -1.176∗∗∗
(0.146) (4.081) (2.537) (0.121) (2.006) (0.206)
−3.5< z <−3 -0.156 3.859 1.049 -0.184 0.572 -1.155∗∗∗
(0.247) (6.940) (4.325) (0.182) (3.415) (0.314)
−3< z <−2.5 -0.108 3.695 0.890 -0.188 0.547 -0.975∗∗
(0.175) (4.735) (2.950) (0.134) (2.327) (0.306)
−2.5< z <−2 0.224 0.574 0.229 0.200 0.0389 0.0357
(0.267) (1.282) (0.881) (0.368) (0.283) (0.635)
−2< z <−1.5 0.0225 0.1000 -0.0390 -0.0109∗∗ 0.0178 -0.517∗∗
(0.110) (0.555) (0.421) (0.122) (0.171) (0.191)
−1.5< z <−1 0.000353 0.0923 0.0594 0.0356 0.00491 0.0419
(0.0339) (0.238) (0.206) (0.0607) (0.0689) (0.130)
1< z < 1.5 -0.0346 0.0260 0.150 -0.0788 -0.0288 -0.444
(0.0381) (0.274) (0.263) (0.0669) (0.0879) (0.138)
1.5< z < 2 -0.0616 -0.00150 0.233 0.137 -0.0922 0.102∗∗
(0.0530) (0.343) (0.382) (0.148) (0.0819) (0.219)
2< z < 2.5 -0.0614 -0.0859 -0.110 -0.0338 -0.0450 -0.329
(0.0664) (0.632) (0.699) (0.166) (0.165) (0.341)
Standard errors in parentheses













Effect of Precipitation Shocks on Time Allocation to Labour Activities: by shock severity (continued II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Work for wage Unpaid
chores work work work Salary Traineeship
2.5< z < 3 -0.448∗∗∗ -2.993 2.828 1.438 -0.100 -0.928∗∗∗
(0.101) (1.917) (4.323) (1.670) (0.295) (0.175)
z > 3 -0.162 -0.667 -0.341 0.0839 -0.0301 -1.031∗
(0.135) (0.914) (1.454) (0.155) (0.0683) (0.471)
Mean hours in Regular Month 1.33 9.48 11.35 0.56 0.52 1.95
N 38714 38654 38558 38858 38870 38870
R2 0.180 0.317 0.569 0.114 0.164 0.398
PANEL B: MEN
z <−3.5 -0.0222 -0.402 -0.769 -2.117∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗ -2.089∗∗∗
(0.0282) (2.959) (1.318) (0.413) (0.149) (0.248)
−3.5< z <−3 -0.0216 -0.388 -0.795 -2.118∗∗∗ -0.403 -2.055∗∗∗
(0.0443) (5.016) (2.225) (0.426) (0.221) (0.372)
−3< z <−2.5 -0.0217 -0.397 -0.789 -2.120∗∗∗ -0.406∗ -2.083∗∗∗
(0.0327) (3.586) (1.593) (0.416) (0.170) (0.283)
−2.5< z <−2 0.0101 0.0813 0.331 0.0503 -0.173 -0.119
(0.121) (1.132) (0.882) (0.338) (0.441) (0.754)
Standard errors in parentheses













Effect of Precipitation Shocks on Time Allocation to Labour Activities: by shock severity (continued III)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Work for wage Unpaid
chores work work work Salary Traineeship
−2< z <−1.5 -0.00603 -0.488 0.265 -0.121 -0.0373 -0.518
(0.0304) (0.643) (0.430) (0.181) (0.191) (0.294)
−1.5< z <−1 -0.0151 0.0346 0.110 0.0702 -0.00885 -0.0154
(0.0154) (0.266) (0.211) (0.0963) (0.115) (0.140)
1< z < 1.5 -0.00392 -0.0375 0.0442 -0.0695 -0.0453 -0.447∗∗
(0.0152) (0.314) (0.243) (0.107) (0.133) (0.157)
1.5< z < 2 -0.0336 -7.976 -5.382 -0.610 -0.961 -1.837∗
(0.0556) (4.599) (5.375) (1.075) (1.162) (0.931)
2.5< z < 3 -0.0105 -0.733 0.704 0.000411 -0.449∗ -0.462
(0.0550) (1.368) (1.536) (0.147) (0.207) (0.848)
z > 3 -0.0428 -1.526 -4.466∗∗ -0.203 -0.789∗∗ -1.124∗∗∗
(0.206) (3.432) (1.429) (0.196) (0.298) (0.310)
Mean hours in Regular Month 0.30 21.11 6.34 0.83 1.61 2.68
N 38936 39656 39188 39608 39596 39644
R2 0.156 0.410 0.310 0.113 0.170 0.332
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure B.1: Effect of any Precipitation Shock by Sex, Activity and Survey Month
Note: Regression specifications are given by equation (2.9). Coefficient estimates
and 95% C.I of the difference estimate α2 +α3m presented. The regressions includes
controls for a set of individual and household characteristics(religion, marital status,
household size and monthly per capita household expenditure) and is restricted
to individuals aged 15-60. Regressions also control for village and year dummies.











Table B.2: Heterogeneous effects: Rainfed vs Irrigated districts (Lagged versus contemporaneous Precipitation)
Household chores Agricult. Non Agricult. Casual Public Wage/Salary Unpaid Traineeship
Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PANEL A: WOMEN
Negative -0.11 -0.0354 0.284 0.405 -0.201 0.240 0.103 0.251 0.219 0.23 0.208 -0.28
(0.09) (0.071) (0.535) (0.673) (0.443) (0.608) (0.136) (0.19) (0.179) (0.27) (0.145) (0.51)
Lag (2months) 0.14 0.174 -0.475 -0.09 0.711 0.239 -0.157 -0.368 -0.412 -0.203 -0.189 -0.09
(0.11) (0.099) (0.636) (0.881) (0.596) (0.807) (0.143) (0.283) (0.255) (0.281) (0.158) (0.70)
Lag (4months) -0.02 -0.121 0.692 -0.785 -0.482 -0.492 0.093 0.150 0.207 -0.0551 -0.018 0.67
(0.08) (0.079) (0.467) (0.688) (0.454) (0.612) (0.098) (0.246) (0.181) (0.169) (0.112) (0.56)
Positive -0.06 0.065 -0.084 0.04 0.382 -0.034 0.083 -0.421 -0.175 0.414 0.0180 0.96
(0.07) (0.0832) (0.492) (0.760) (0.452) (0.672) (0.098) (0.308) (0.137) (0.27) (0.143) (0.66)
Lag (2months) 0.0007 -0.031 -0.228 0.106 -0.152 -0.611 0.0294 0.200 0.354 -0.519∗ -0.0710 -1.57
(0.09) (0.110) (0.602) (1.008) (0.605) (0.844) (0.119) (0.332) (0.196) (0.233) (0.147) (0.83)
Lag (4months) 0.007 -0.083 0.216 -0.214 -0.093 0.835 -0.118 0.354 -0.253 -0.0205 -0.0006 -0.29
(0.07) (0.082) (0.433) (0.797) (0.454) (0.669) (0.098) (0.211) (0.144) (0.096) (0.077) (0.64)
Standard errors in parentheses











Table B.3: Heterogeneous effects: Rainfed vs Irrigated districts (Lagged versus contemporaneous Precipitation)
Household chores Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Wage/Salary Unpaid Traineeship
Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PANEL B: MEN
Negative 0.0585∗ -0.0167 0.120 -0.678 0.0568 0.132 0.0967 -0.190 0.160 -0.158 -0.0871 0.345
(0.0288) (0.0432) (0.669) (0.733) (0.487) (0.608) (0.241) (0.248) (0.246) (0.350) (0.290) (0.456)
Lag (2months) -0.0884 0.00235 1.270 0.448 -0.0968 0.0928 0.147 -0.0715 -0.201 0.0767 0.621 0.106
(0.0565) (0.0565) (0.814) (0.970) (0.637) (0.766) (0.304) (0.329) (0.344) (0.455) (0.332) (0.568)
Lag (4months) 0.0156 -0.00485 -1.514∗ 0.0147 0.281 -0.167 -0.212 0.305 0.0161 0.0780 -0.353 -0.885∗
(0.0556) (0.0438) (0.589) (0.789) (0.507) (0.600) (0.230) (0.282) (0.299) (0.360) (0.233) (0.432)
Positive -0.0443 -0.0295 -0.342 -0.752 0.263 -0.832 0.0758 0.0689 -0.126 -0.293 0.0181 -0.267
(0.0302) (0.0420) (0.590) (0.790) (0.471) (0.635) (0.142) (0.275) (0.194) (0.344) (0.229) (0.471)
Lag (2months) 0.0637 0.0426 -0.903 1.015 -0.590 0.786 -0.196 0.0845 -0.0901 -0.122 0.115 0.00759
(0.0374) (0.0639) (0.764) (1.101) (0.623) (0.857) (0.180) (0.378) (0.284) (0.495) (0.286) (0.621)
Lag (4months) -0.0125 -0.0134 1.414∗ -0.214 0.379 0.226 0.126 -0.0729 0.124 0.589 -0.290 -0.720
(0.0287) (0.0536) (0.577) (0.923) (0.486) (0.684) (0.150) (0.338) (0.249) (0.444) (0.222) (0.505)
Standard errors in parentheses











Table B.4: Heterogeneous effects: Rainfed vs Irrigated districts (by the severity of the shock)
Household chores Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Wage/Salary Unpaid Traineeship
Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PANEL B: WOMEN
z <−3.5 0.249 0.209 1.010 -1.632 0.222 -0.0611 0.286 0.0210 0.0472 0.0278 0.389 -1.105
(0.366) (0.261) (1.464) (2.539) (1.161) (1.132) (0.522) (0.192) (0.400) (0.144) (0.662) (1.385)
−3.5< z <−3 -0.004 0.065 0.353 -0.469 -0.065 -0.001 0.0128 -0.0524 0.128 -0.258 -0.225 -0.454
(0.142) (0.163) (0.621) (1.102) (0.516) (0.716) (0.170) (0.112) (0.191) (0.352) (0.139) (0.506)
−3< z <−2.5 -0.013 0.006 0.268 -0.179 0.053 0.0937 0.034 0.057 -0.027 0.0464 0.061 0.257
(0.049) (0.045) (0.289) (0.393) (0.252) (0.349) (0.065) (0.114) (0.092) (0.102) (0.07) (0.304)
−2.5< z <−2 -0.021 -0.0723 0.0652 0.0297 0.216 0.0741 0.001 -0.209 -0.0408 -0.0332 -0.048 -0.893∗
(0.047) (0.0604) (0.304) (0.543) (0.296) (0.535) (0.0790) (0.135) (0.088) (0.217) (0.073) (0.434)
−2< z <−1.5 -0.128 0.136 0.0923 -0.271 0.280 0.166 0.0605 0.337 -0.125 0.006 -0.0002 -0.249
(0.065) (0.0877) (0.359) (0.809) (0.453) (0.694) (0.149) (0.370) (0.112) (0.067) (0.099) (0.745)
−1.5< z <−1 -0.0478 -0.0756 0.0246 0.211 0.069 -0.132 -0.057 0.222 -0.0024 -0.24 -0.151 0.283
(0.075) (0.149) (0.679) (1.418) (0.832) (1.237) (0.157) (0.49) (0.214) (0.106) (0.246) (1.155)
1< z < 1.5 0.012 -0.216 -0.194 -0.474 -0.280 -0.055 0.135 0.307 0.137 0.0448 -0.007 4.735
(0.110) (0.199) (0.595) (1.931) (0.906) (2.030) (0.316) (2.78) (0.287) (0.134) (0.154) (5.267)
1.5< z < 2 -0.471∗∗ -0.099 0.068 -3.118 6.392 -10.44 -0.702∗∗∗ 0.346 0.275∗∗∗ -0.822 -0.256∗∗ -3.726∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.07) (0.372) (0.783) (4.091) (0.700) (0.491) (0.257) (0.215) (0.189) (0.099) (0.520)
2< z < 2.5 -0.182∗∗ -0.096 -0.644 -3.146 -0.119 -10.43 -0.0615∗∗∗ 4.359 -0.0279∗∗∗ -0.817 -0.231∗∗ -3.673∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.07) (0.834) (0.786) (1.479) (0.703) (0.143) (0.257) (0.083) (0.191) (0.471) (0.522)
z > 3 -0.246∗∗ -0.095 -6.496 -3.144 0.113 -0.43 -0.366∗∗∗ 0.362 0.643∗ -0.828 -0.246∗ -0.752∗∗∗
(0.323) (0.063) (0.079) (0.731) (1.618) (0.657) (0.104) (0.240) (0.327) (0.172) (0.105) (0.469)
Standard errors in parentheses











Heterogeneous effects: Rainfed vs Irrigated districts (by the severity of the shock)) II
Household chores Agricultural Non Agriculture Casual Public Wage/Salary Unpaid Traineeship
Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig. Rain Irrig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PANEL B: MEN
z <−3.5 0.0345 -0.0543 0.102 0.110 0.230 0.243 0.153 -0.161 0.0172 -0.655 0.0624 -0.572
(0.180) (0.0376) (1.538) (1.400) (1.114) (1.381) (0.489) (0.261) (0.632) (0.370) (0.803) (1.569)
−3.5< z <−3 -0.0195 0.0254 -0.345 -1.021 0.297 0.401 -0.0568 -0.165 -0.0914 0.111 -0.0319 -0.955
(0.0306) (0.0674) (0.727) (1.273) (0.514) (0.771) (0.197) (0.371) (0.189) (0.450) (0.310) (0.594)
−3< z <−2.5 -0.00768 -0.0250 0.147 -0.187 0.190 0.0244 0.140 0.0175 0.00361 -0.0178 0.266 -0.186
(0.0192) (0.0258) (0.351) (0.408) (0.276) (0.332) (0.111) (0.171) (0.144) (0.188) (0.146) (0.255)
−2.5< z <−2 0.00327 -0.0223 0.0624 -0.264 0.0828 -0.0266 -0.0424 0.0121 -0.131 0.174 -0.0865∗ -0.803
(0.0174) (0.0308) (0.369) (0.593) (0.291) (0.432) (0.117) (0.240) (0.111) (0.366) (0.154) (0.352)
−1.5< z <−1 -0.00195 0.0419 -0.261 -0.0146 0.0678 0.239 0.0180 0.277 -0.0476 -0.245 -0.207∗∗ -0.993
(0.0262) (0.0547) (0.466) (0.956) (0.441) (0.657) (0.150) (0.465) (0.182) (0.190) (0.191) (0.496)
1< z < 1.5 0.00594 -0.0445 0.275 0.715 0.0151 -0.827 0.004 0.0453 -0.172 -0.421 -0.112 0.309
(0.0551) (0.0607) (0.765) (1.408) (0.722) (1.498) (0.224) (1.002) (0.124) (0.605) (0.300) (1.120)
1.5< z < 2 0.00102 -0.00390 -0.103 1.475 -0.0814 -0.111 0.166 -0.233 0.0553 -0.103 0.00129 -2.155∗
(0.0522) (0.160) (0.885) (3.815) (1.056) (0.713) (0.238) (0.323) (0.216) (0.342) (0.376) (1.014)
2< z < 2.5 -0.00906 0.0572 -0.43∗∗∗ -2.674 0.73∗∗∗ 1.806 -0.989∗∗∗ -0.429 -0.884∗∗∗ 1.283 -0.034∗∗∗ -6.875
(0.0344) (0.0378) (0.836) (0.746) (1.342) (0.656) (0.225) (0.296) (0.420) (0.441) (0.290) (0.553)
z > 3 -0.00369 0.0595 -0.007∗∗∗ -2.653 0.927∗∗∗ 1.806 -0.136∗∗∗ -0.457 -0.380 1.305 0.280∗∗∗ -6.718
(0.0557) (0.0380) (1.403) (0.733) (1.543) (0.636) (0.153) (0.286) (0.205) (0.440) (0.817) (0.546)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Appendix C
Chapter 3
C.1 Data on Hazardous Forms of Child
Labour
The concept of child labour varies in the academic literature, as there is no
official agreed upon definition (Edmonds, 2008). While some authors use the
ILO definition (Grootaert, 1998; Diallo, 2001), others employ the economic
and labour intensity of the task(Ray, 2002). More and more studies use the
economic activities and household chores (Guarcello et al., 2010) and the haz-
ardous nature (Abou, 2019) to define child labour. A widely used definition of
child labour is “children aged under 15 years old who engage in market activity
at least one hour in a week”. This being said, the term hazardous forms of child
labour is defined for children under 18 years old. There is thus a difference in
the age definition between that of child labour and that of hazardous forms of
child labour. Following DeGraff et al. (2014) and Kamei (2018) this research
examines the decision-making processes of both child labour and hazardous
forms of child labour. In order to provide continuity with definitions in the
child labour literature, the analytical sample focuses on children who are under
the age of 15 years old.
In the child neglect module, household heads are initially asked to report
whether a child is engaged in labour; they then give details on the child’s
working environment. Hazardous factors considered in the survey are activ-
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ities that involve (i) carrying heavy loads; (ii) working with dangerous tools
or operating heavy machinery; (iii) working at heights; (iv) working with or
exposed to chemicals (e.g. pesticide, glues) or explosives; (v) working in dust,
fumes or gas; (vi)working in extreme cold, heat or humidity, (vii) working in
loud noise or vibration or (viii) working in other things, processes or condi-
tions bad for health or safety. The ILO considers children to be involved in
hazardous labour if they work in one of those hazardous factors for at least
one hour during a reference week.
In Table C.1, column (1) shows that 27 per cent of children are engaged in
economic activity (child labour) at least 1 hour in the reference week. Children
work on average 7 hours a week. While there is a generally recognized con-
sensus that census data underestimate child labour, particularly in hazardous
forms of child labour, 20% of children are reported to be working in hazardous
environments. These children work for around 30 hours a week (column 4),
compared to 22 hours for children involved in non-hazardous jobs (column 3).
Figure ?? presents the rate of hazardous factors among working children, (a)
compares the data by gender, while (b) shows an urban and rural comparison.
The data show that for boys and girls, 14 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively
report that their work involved being underground or at dangerous heights, the
next most prevalent hazardous factor involves being exposed to high noise lev-
els or vibrations and operating dangerous machinery. Other hazardous factors
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics by work status
MEAN DIFF
Total No work Non-Hazardous Hazardous (3) vs (2) (4) vs (2) Min-Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Child Labour 0.27 (0.44) 0-1
Hazardous 0.20 (0.40) 0-1
Hours of work (week) 7.47 (19.06) 21.51 (25.98) 29.70 (28.47) -0.71 (0.16)*** -29.70 (0.53)*** 0-99
Enrolled 0.73 (0.44) 0.75 (0.43) 0.72 (0.45) 0.64 (0.48) 0.04 (0.01)** 0.12 (0.01)*** 0-1
Wealth Index 2.78 (1.35) 2.60 (1.32) 2.47 (1.21) 2.02 (1.01) 0.13(0.04)*** 0.58 (0.02)*** 1-5
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) -0.01 (0.02) 0.05 (0.01)*** 0-1
Age 9.66 (2.57) 9.54 (2.56) 9.93 (2.82) 9.98 (2.53) -0.39 (0.08)*** -0.44 (0.05)*** 6-14
Rural 0.69 (0.46) 0.68 (0.48) 0.75 (0.43) 0.88 (0.33) -0.11 (0.01)*** -0.24 (0.01)*** 0-1
Household size 7.97 (3.98) 7.87 (3.90) 8.58 (4.99) 8.10 (3.81) -0.71(0.16)*** -0.23 (0.08)** 2-45
<5years (#) 1.51 (1.37) 1.55 (1.35) 1.40 (1.42) 1.43 (1.39) 0.14 (0.05)** 0.12 (0.03)*** 0-9
6-14 years (#) 3.17 (1.89) 3.07 (1.82) 3.68 (2.56) 3.37 (1.79) -0.61 (0.08)*** -0.30 (0.04)*** 1-16
>60years (#) 0.33 (0.64) 0.32 (0.63) 0.38 (0.68) 0.35 (0.65) -0.06 (0.02)** -0.04 (0.01)** 0-5
Head(female) 0.16 (0.37) 0.17 (0.37) 0.11 (0.32) 0.16 (0.36) 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.00) 0-1
Head(age) 48.65 (12.91) 48.10 (12.92) 50.69 (13.30) 49.90 (12.56) -2.58 (0.43)*** -1.80 (0.27)*** 17-99
Agricultural Land 8.23 (18.86) 7.43 (17.83) 9.04 (20.83) 10.86 (21.36) -1.61 (0.66)** -3.43 (0.44)*** 0-99
Livestock 2.17 (10.68) 1.99 (10.71) 3.08 (13.71) 2.53 (9.17) -1.09 (0.43)** -0.54 (0.20)** 0-99
Horse/Donkey 0.15 (3.47) 0.19 (4.06) 0.08 (0.60) 0.02 (0.21) 0.11 (0.04)** 0.17 (0.04)*** 0-99
Chicken 6.87(14.96) 5.97 (13.82) 9.90 (16.47) 9.03 (17.75) -3.92 (0.52)*** -3.05 (0.36)*** 0-99
Has electricity 0.55 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.54 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.05 (0.02)*** 0.19 (0.01)*** 0-1
Has access to water 0.16 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39) 0.09 (0.29) 0.05 (0.23) 0.10 (0.01)*** 0.13 (0.01)*** 0-1
Independent child 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) 0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)*** 0-1
Father away 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)* 0-1
Father dead 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) -0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0-1
Mother away 0.28 (0.45) 0.26 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45) 0.30 (0.44) -0.03 (0.01) -0.04 (0.08)* 0-1
Mother dead 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0-1
N 14347 10447 1060 2840
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Table C.2: Data Description for Selected Variables
Variables Description
Household Characteristics
Household size (#) Total number of household members
Head (Female) 1 if the head is a female, 0 otherwise
Head (Age) Age of the head of household in years
Rural 1 if the household lives in a rural area, 0 otherwise
<5 years old (#) Number of individual aged 0-4 in the household
6-14 years old (#) Number of individual aged 6-14 in the household
>60 years old (#) Number of individual aged 60 and above in the household
Male (#) Number of males in the household
Wealth index index Asset based wealth calculated using
https://dhsprogram.com/topics/wealth-index/Wealth-Index-Construction.cfm
Household assets
Agricultural land Hectares of agricultural land owned by the household
Livestock (#) Number of livestock owned by the household
Horse/donkey Number of Horse/donkey owned by the household
Chicken Number of Chicken owned by the household
Has electrictity 1 if the household has electricity, 0 otherwise
Has access to water 1 if the household has access to drinking water, 0 otherwise
Child characteristics
Child labour 1 if the child participates in economic activity at least 1 hour in a reference week,0 otherwise
Hazardous child labour 1 if the child is exposed to any of the hazardous factorsat their working site, otherwise 0
Hours of work Number of hours of work in economic activity
Enrolled school 1 if the child is enrolled in school in the year of survey,otherwise 0
Female 1 if the child is female, 0 otherwise
Age Age of the child in years
Independent child 1 if both biological parents are absent in the household,otherwise 0
Father away 1 if biological father is still alive but absent in the household,otherwise 0
Father dead 1 if biological father is dead, otherwise 0
Mother away 1 if biological mother is still alive but absent in the household,otherwise 0
Mother dead 1 if biological mother is dead, otherwise 0
Violence Against Children
Emotional Abuse 1 if the caregiver Screamed, shouted at him/her
and/or called him/her stupid, lazy or another name, otherwise 0
Mild Physical Abuse 1 if the caregiver shook him/her. and/or Spanked, hit or slapped him/her on the bottom with bare hand
hit and/or slapped him/her on the hand, arm or leg?, otherwise 0
Extreme Physical Abuse 1 if the caregiver hit or slapped him/her on the face, head or ears
and/or hit him/her on the bottom or elsewhere on the body with a hard object like a belt
and/or beat him/her up with a device (repeatedly hit as hard as possible), otherwise 0
Region (31 geographical regions)
Agnéby-Tiassa, Bafing, Bagoué, Bélier Region, Béré, Bounkani, Cavally, Folon, Gbêkê, Gbôklé, Gôh, Gontougo,
Grands-Ponts, Guémon, Hambol, Haut-Sassandra, Iffou, Indénié-Djuablin, Kabadougou, La Mé,
Lôh-Djiboua, Marahoué, Moronou, Nawa, N’Zi, Poro, San-Pédro, Sud-Comoé, Tchologo, Tonkpi, Worodougou
C.1.1 Data Description for Selected Variables
C.1.2 Descriptive Statistics by the different types of
abuse
C.2 Methodology: Hazardous child forms of
child labour
To examine the determinants of hazardous child forms of child labour I follow
Kamei (2018), who employs a two-stage decision process in which households
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Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics by the different types of abuse
MEAN DIFF
Total No Abuse Emotional Abuse Mild PhysicalAbuse
Extreme Physical
Abuse (3) vs (2) (4) vs (2) (5) vs (2) Min-Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Emotional Abuse 0.77 (0.42) 0-1
Mild Physical Abuse 0.57 (0.50) 0-1
Extreme Physical Abuse 0.24 (0.43) 0-1
Enrolled 0.73 (0.44) 0.74 (0.44) 0.72 (0.45) 0.71 (0.45) 0.68 (0.46) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)** 0.05 (0.01)*** 0-1
Wealth Index 2.78 (1.35) 2.83 (1.34) 2.53 (1.30) 2.52 (1.30) 2.45 (1.28) 0.29 (0.03)*** 0.30 (0.03)*** 0.37 (0.03)*** 1-5
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)** 0-1
Age 9.66 (2.57) 9.89 (2.63) 9.60 (2.55) 9.44 (2.53) 9.45 (2.51) (0.29) (0.05)*** 0.45 (0.06)*** 0.44 (0.06)*** 6-14
Rural 0.69 (0.46) 0.64 (0.48) 0.71 (0.45) 0.71 (0.45) 0.73 (0.44) -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.09 (0.01)*** 0-1
Household size 7.97 (3.98) 8.49 (4.64) 7.82 (3.77) 7.89 (3.70) 7.79 (3.43) 0.66 (0.08)*** 0.60 (0.09)*** 0.70 (0.10)*** 2-45
<5 years (#) 1.51 (1.37) 1.46 (1.41) 1.52 (1.35) 1.61 (1.35) 1.57 (1.38) 1.50 (0.01)** -0.15 (0.03)*** -0.12 (0.04)*** 0-8
6-14 years (#) 3.17 (1.89) 3.17 (2.12) 3.18 (1.82) 3.17 (1.83) 3.13 (1.74) -0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.04 (0.05) 1-11
>60years (#) 0.33 (0.64) 0.35 (0.66) 0.33 (0.63) 0.31 (0.63) 0.31 (0.63) 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)** 0.04 (0.02)** 0-5
Head (Female) 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.35) 0.17 (0.37) 0.17(0.37) 0.19 (0.39) -0.02 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)** -0.04 (0.01)*** 0-1
Head (age) 48.65 (12.91) 49.60 (13.48) 48.49 (12.79) 48.00 (12.72) 48.26 (12.98) 1.11 (0.27)*** 1.59 (0.30)*** 1.34 (0.33)*** 17-98
Land(hectares) 8.23 (18.86) 7.89 (17.42) 8.32 (19.25) 8.10 (18.72) 8.20 (18.59) -0.43 (0.39) -0.21 (0.39) -0.32 (0.46) 0-99
Livestock 2.17 (10.68) 2.62 (12.43) 2.02 (9.97) 2.03 (10.05) 1.68 (8.54) 0.60 (0.22)** 0.58 (0.23)** 0.93 (0.27)*** 0-99
Horse/Donkey 0.15 (3.47) 0.11 (2.38) 0.15 (3.53) 0.19 (4.09) 0.15 (3.53) -0.04 (0.07) -0.08 (0.08) -0.04 (0.08) 0-99
Chicken 6.87(14.96) 6.39 (13.76) 6.95 (15.03) 7.06 (15.13) 6.52 (13.65) -0.55 (0.31) -0.67 (0.31)** -0.13 (0.35) 0-99
Has electricity 0.55 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.08 (0.01)*** 0.08 (0.01)*** 0.10 (0.01)*** 0-1
Has access to water 0.16 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.35) 0.15 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 0-1
Independent child 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 0-1
Father away 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.12) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0-1
Father dead 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.01) 0-1
Mother away 0.28 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44) 0.30 (0.46) -0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.04)*** -0.03 (0.01)** 0-1
Mother dead 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.16) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.17) 0.05 (0.21) -0.01 (0.00)** -0.00 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** 0-1
N 14347 2944 11003 8196 3377
first decide whether to send children to work or not. Thereafter, if they send
the children to work, they choose between two types of children’s working
environment. The first is an environment with hazardous conditions, and
the second is a non-hazardous work. Figure C.1 presents the sequential logit
model. Therefore, the results from the second stage indicate the probability
of choosing hazardous forms of child labour, given that the child is working.







1st Stage 2nd Stage
Figure C.1: Sequential logit model for hazardous child labour, (Kamei, 2018)
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C.2.1 Additional Results
Table C.4: Logit Regression Analysis on Child Abuse
Child abuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0855∗∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0106∗∗ 0.0104∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0449) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0423) (0.0420) (0.0419)
Rural 0.219∗∗∗ 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0524∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗ 0.0515∗∗∗
(0.0569) (0.0623) (0.0630) (0.0636) (0.0636) (0.0636)
Household size 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.00483) (0.00490) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)
Independent 0.145∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.167∗
(0.0813) (0.0813) (0.0826) (0.0827) (0.0828) (0.0843)
Father away 0.0245 0.0365 0.0180 0.00879 0.0123 -0.189
(0.162) (0.162) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.251)
Father dead 0.0535 0.0474 0.0574 0.0847 0.0565 -0.0210
(0.0891) (0.0891) (0.0895) (0.0920) (0.0922) (0.124)
Mother away -0.0141 0.00725 0.0171 0.00848 0.0141 0.0208
(0.0715) (0.0716) (0.0726) (0.0728) (0.0729) (0.0742)
Mother dead 0.233∗ 0.219∗ 0.192∗ 0.153∗ 0.196∗ 0.1086∗
(0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.111) (0.112) (0.152)
Has electricity -0.152∗∗ 0.0258 0.00673 0.0141 0.0143 0.0143
(0.0504) (0.0621) (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0626)
Has water -0.0937 0.0338 0.0632 0.0726 0.0709 0.0709
(0.0656) (0.0704) (0.0712) (0.0715) (0.0716) (0.0716)
Wealth Index -0.149∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.0300) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303)
<5years 0.210∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0223)
6-14 years 0.203∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197)
>60years 0.0697∗ 0.0771∗ 0.0731∗ 0.0731∗
(0.0369) (0.0371) (0.0370) (0.0370)
Land(hectares) 0.00189 0.00188 0.00185
(0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116)
(#) Livestock -0.00449 -0.00453 -0.00459
(0.00212) (0.00211) (0.00212)
(#) Horse & Donkey 0.00969 0.00977 0.00931
(0.00686) (0.00684) (0.00689)
(#) Chicken 0.00369 0.00367 0.00369
(0.00154) (0.00153) (0.00153)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.0220
(0.332)
Independent Child × Female -0.0799
(0.345)
Father away × Female 0.286
(0.338)
Father dead × Female 0.164
(0.183)
Mother away × Female 0.124
(0.247)
Mother dead × Female -0.167
(0.227)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.5: Logit Regression Analysis on Child Abuse by the type of Abuse
Emotional Abuse Mild Physical Abuse Extreme Physical Abuse
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Female 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0563 0.0066 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0404) (0.0428) (0.0347) (0.0368) (0.0401) (0.0423)
Rural 0.0402∗∗ 0.0386∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.0533∗∗ 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗
(0.0609) (0.0609) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0626) (0.0627)
Household size 0.133∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.0879∗∗∗ 0.0881 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.00871) (0.00871) (0.00966) (0.00967)
Independent 0.140∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(0.0798) (0.0814) (0.0682) (0.0690) (0.0808) (0.0819)
Father away 0.0512 -0.0740 -0.0590 -0.304 -0.198 -0.574∗
(0.158) (0.244) (0.132) (0.215) (0.171) (0.295)
Father dead 0.0322 -0.0609 -0.107 -0.0772 -0.0383 -0.271
(0.0884) (0.119) (0.0735) (0.100) (0.0892) (0.126)
Has electricity 0.0384 0.0384 0.0748 0.0725 0.0573 0.0516
(0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0575) (0.0575)
Has water -0.138∗ -0.137∗ 0.107 0.105 0.0543 0.0514
(0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0720) (0.0720)
Wealth Index -0.159∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0280) (0.0280)
<5years 0.156∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.0860∗∗∗ 0.0844∗∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0199) (0.0199)
6-14years 0.183∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0922∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗
(0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0165) (0.0165)
>60years 0.0908∗ 0.0928∗∗ 0.0123 0.0145 0.00115 0.00464
(0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0291) (0.0290) (0.0341) (0.0341)
Land(hectares) 0.00191 0.00188 -0.000926 -0.000913 -0.000279 -0.000313
(0.00111) (0.00111) (0.000938) (0.000938) (0.00110) (0.00110)
(#) Livestock -0.00218 -0.00239 -0.00451 -0.00449 -0.00453 -0.00459
(0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00248) (0.00247)
(#) Horse & Donkey 0.000936 0.000488 0.0108 0.0108 0.00419 0.00434
(0.00596) (0.00595) (0.00586) (0.00587) (0.00600) (0.00602)
(#) Chicken 0.00117 0.00118 0.00165 0.00165 -0.00402 -0.00397
(0.00141) (0.00141) (0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00154) (0.00153)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.724 -0.976 -1.005
(0.320) (0.289) (0.462)
Independent Child × Female -0.0489 -0.0226 -0.686
(0.337) (0.294) (0.446)
Father away × Female 0.135 0.501 0.738
(0.324) (0.277) (0.365)
Father dead × Female 0.192 -0.00659 0.509
(0.175) (0.144) (0.172)
Mother away × Female 0.188 -0.249 -0.367
(0.235) (0.187) (0.238)
Mother dead × Female -0.205 -0.320 -0.339
(0.219) (0.194) (0.257)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.6: Robustness Checks: LPM Regression Analysis on Child Abuse
Child Abuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0668) (0.0657) (0.0638) (0.00635)
Rural 0.374∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0207)
Household size 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0632∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.0910) (0.0092) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173)
Independent 0.0242∗∗ 0.0246∗∗ 0.0259∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0258∗∗ 0.0268∗
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0135)
Father away 0.00389 0.00595 0.00352 0.00188 0.00246 -0.0319
(0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0456)
Father dead 0.00774 0.00695 0.00934 0.0137 0.00947 -0.00376
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0202)
Mother away -0.00245 0.000883 0.00248 0.00112 0.00197 0.00301
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0116)
Mother dead -0.0398∗ -0.0376∗ -0.0328 -0.0259 -0.0333 -0.0164
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0198) (0.0262)
Electricity -0.0228∗∗ 0.00543 0.00322 0.00455 0.00458 0.00459
(0.00791) (0.00966) (0.00960) (0.00961) (0.00961) (0.00962)
Has water -0.0168 0.00412 0.00826 0.00971 0.00946 0.00948
(0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125)
Wealth Index -0.0241∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗
(0.00492) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00491)
<5years 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗
(0.00329) (0.00329) (0.00329) (0.00329)
6-14years 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗
(0.00289) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288)
>60years 0.00911 0.0100 0.00944 0.00946
(0.00567) (0.00567) (0.00567) (0.00567)
Land(hectares) 0.000283 0.000282 0.000278
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017)
Livestock -0.000737 -0.000743 -0.000753
(0.000397) (0.000396) (0.000396)
(#) Horse donkey 0.00158 0.00159 0.00152
(0.000889) (0.000884) (0.000894)
(#) Chicken 0.000560∗ 0.000557∗ 0.000559∗
(0.000228) (0.000228) (0.000228)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.113
(0.0604)
Independent Child × Female -0.0119
(0.0624)
Father away × Female 0.0484
(0.0571)
Father dead × Female 0.0272
(0.0284)
Mother away × Female 0.0183
(0.0353)
Mother dead × Female -0.0303
(0.0407)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.7: Robustness Checks: LPM Regression Analysis on Child Abuse by type
Emotional Abuse Mild Physical Abuse Extreme Physical Abuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.00225 0.00484 0.0136 0.0141 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗
(0.00700) (0.00739) (0.00816) (0.00864) (0.00705) (0.00751)
Rural 0.839 0.00811∗ 0.0119 0.0115 0.0487∗∗ 0.0101∗∗
(0.111) (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Household size 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.00595∗∗∗ 0.00601∗∗∗
(0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00157) (0.00157)
Independent 0.0389∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0243∗∗ 0.0212∗∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.0334∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0138) (0.0140)
Mother away 0.0144 0.0174 -0.0299 -0.0323 -0.00155 -0.00475
(0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0121) (0.0123)
Mother dead -0.0250 -0.0263 -0.0838∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0559∗∗ -0.0508∗
(0.0201) (0.0276) (0.0225) (0.0304) (0.0173) (0.0238)
Father away 0.0169 -0.00456 -0.0237 -0.0805 -0.0289 -0.0857
(0.0279) (0.0460) (0.0316) (0.0518) (0.0255) (0.0371)
Father dead 0.00724 -0.0129 -0.00106 0.00218 -0.00261 -0.0385
(0.0152) (0.0213) (0.0175) (0.0239) (0.0149) (0.0199)
Has electricity 0.00863 0.00881 0.0171 0.0165 0.00893 0.00793
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Has water 0.0231 0.0229 0.0250 0.0245 0.00974 0.00981
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0117) (0.0117)
Wealth Index -0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0280∗∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗
(0.00513) (0.00513) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.00477) (0.00477)
<5years 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗
(0.00350) (0.00350) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00353) (0.00353)
6-14 years 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.00490 0.00498
(0.00305) (0.00305) (0.00340) (0.00340) (0.00285) (0.00285)
>60years 0.0152∗ 0.0146∗ 0.00486 0.00402 0.00162 0.00122
(0.00592) (0.00592) (0.00681) (0.00679) (0.00590) (0.00586)
Land (hectares) 0.000315 0.000307 -0.000214 -0.000212 -0.0000458 -0.0000540
(0.000179) (0.000179) (0.000222) (0.000222) (0.000191) (0.000191)
(#) Horse & donkey 0.000295 0.000220 0.00239∗ 0.00246∗ 0.000771 0.000792
(0.00101) (0.00101) (0.000972) (0.000967) (0.000990) (0.000990)
(#)Chicken 0.000199 0.000195 0.000388 0.000387 -0.000660∗∗ -0.000652∗∗
(0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000284) (0.000284) (0.000239) (0.000239)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.116 -0.165∗ -0.0816
(0.0792) (0.0743) (0.0512)
Independent Child × Female -0.000762 -0.0164 -0.0949
(0.0641) (0.0706) (0.0511)
Father away × Female 0.0211 0.119 0.112∗
(0.0584) (0.0659) (0.0509)
Father dead × Female 0.0298 -0.0125 0.0816∗∗
(0.0300) (0.0344) (0.0294)
Mother away × Female 0.0396 -0.0756 -0.0595
(0.0361) (0.0450) (0.0340)
Mother dead × Female -0.0104 0.0239 -0.000143
(0.0421) (0.0465) (0.0358)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
C.3. Robustness checks 144
Table C.8: Logit Regression Analysis on Child Abuse by the type of Abuse: Emo-
tional and Physical Child Abuse
Emotional Abuse Mild Physical Abuse Extreme Physical Abuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0143 0.0136 0.0157 0.0142 0.0141 0.0235 0.0475 0.0468 0.0554 0.0564 0.0563 0.0466 0.131∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.34) (0.39) (0.35) (0.35) (0.55) (1.39) (1.36) (1.60) (1.63) (1.63) (1.27) (3.27) (3.27) (3.34) (3.38) (3.39) (3.69)
Rural 0.225∗∗∗ 0.0823∗∗∗ 0.0544∗∗ 0.0400∗∗ 0.0402∗∗ 0.0386∗∗ 0.0833∗∗ 0.0321∗∗ 0.0542∗∗ 0.0531∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.0533∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.0547∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗
(4.11) (1.38) (0.90) (0.66) (0.66) (0.63) (1.75) (0.62) (1.04) (1.01) (1.01) (1.01) (2.72) (0.88) (0.75) (1.02) (1.01) (1.01)
Household size 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.00899∗ 0.00644 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0879∗∗∗ 0.0879∗∗∗ 0.0881∗∗∗ 0.0119∗? 0.00934 0.0399∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗∗
(7.68) (7.00) (12.80) (12.83) (12.83) (12.82) (2.07) (1.47) (9.99) (10.09) (10.10) 10.12) (2.34) (1.84) (4.16) (3.78) (3.78) (3.83)
Independent 0.115∗∗ 0.117∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.0769∗∗∗ 0.0588∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(2.25) (2.28) (2.64) (2.68) (2.69) (2.77) (5.51) (5.18) (4.18) (4.22) (4.18) (4.27) (1.65) (1.45) (1.07) (1.14) (1.11) (1.13)
Father away 0.0660 0.0702 0.0493 0.0518 0.0512 -0.0740 -0.0425 -0.0383 -0.0440 -0.0583 -0.0590 -0.304 -0.199 -0.195 -0.198 -0.197 -0.198 -0.574∗
(0.43) (0.46) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33) (-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.34) (-0.45) (-0.46) (-1.41) (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.19) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.96)
Father dead 0.0128 0.0143 0.0176 0.0553 0.0322 -0.0609 -0.145 -0.143 -0.105 -0.0634 -0.107 -0.0772 -0.0888 -0.0868 -0.0688 -0.0410 -0.0383 -0.271
(0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.64) (0.37) (-0.53) (-2.10) (-2.07) (-1.52) (-0.90) (-1.50) (-0.79) (-1.05) (-1.03) (-0.81) (-0.48) (-0.44) (-2.20)
Has electricity -0.161∗∗∗ 0.0507 0.0344 0.0382 0.0384 0.0384 -0.0886∗ 0.0778 0.0714 0.0741 0.0748 0.0725 -0.0724 0.0705 0.0689 0.0569 0.0573 0.0516
(-3.35) (0.85) (0.57) (0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (-2.16) (1.54) (1.40) (1.45) (1.47) (1.42) (-1.50) (1.23) (1.20) (0.99) (1.00) (0.90)
Has water -0.0436 0.108 0.131 -0.139∗ -0.138∗ -0.137∗ -0.0462 0.0769 0.103 0.109 0.107 0.105 -0.0608 0.0470 0.0560 0.0528 0.0543 0.0514
(-0.69) (1.60) (1.92) (-2.03) (-2.02) (-2.01) (-0.84) (1.30) (1.73) (1.82) (1.79) (1.76) (-0.91) (0.65) (0.78) (0.73) (0.75) (0.71)
Wealth Index -0.178∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(-6.21) (-5.45) (-5.52) (-5.51) (-5.50) (-5.82) (-4.97) (-4.95) (-4.94) (-4.90) (-4.47) (-4.20) (-4.18) (-4.16) (-4.11)
<5years 0.154∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0856∗∗∗ 0.0860∗∗∗ 0.0844∗∗∗
(7.31) (7.35) (7.37) (7.32) (12.83) (12.83) (12.87) (12.83) (4.48) (4.31) (4.33) (4.25)
6-14years 0.183∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0917∗∗∗ 0.0915∗∗∗ 0.0922∗∗∗ 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗
(9.75) (9.68) (9.71) (9.69) (6.12) (6.10) (6.15) (6.17) (1.88) (1.85) (1.88) (1.90)
>60years 0.0903∗ 0.0964∗∗ 0.0908∗ 0.0928∗∗ 0.0117 0.0179 0.0123 0.0145 0.00333 0.00632 0.00115 0.00464
(2.51) (2.67) (2.53) (2.58) (0.40) (0.61) (0.42) (0.50) (0.10) (0.18) (0.03) (0.14)
Land(hectares) 0.00193 0.00191 0.00188 -0.000926 -0.000926 -0.000913 -0.000268 -0.000279 -0.000313
(1.75) (1.73) (1.71) (-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.98) (-0.24) (-0.25) (-0.28)
(#) Horse & Donkey 0.000920 0.000936 0.000488 0.0107 0.0108 0.0108 0.00419 0.00419 0.00434
(0.16) (0.17) (0.09) (1.93) (1.93) (1.93) (0.76) (0.76) (0.79)
(#) Chicken 0.00120 0.00117 0.00118 0.00167 0.00165 0.00165 -0.00400 -0.00402 -0.00397
(0.86) (0.84) (0.85) (1.36) (1.34) (1.35) (-2.64) (-2.65) (-2.62)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.724 -0.976 -1.005
(-2.11) (-2.83) (-1.90)
Independent Child × Female -0.0489 -0.0226 -0.686
(-0.15) (-0.08) (-1.54)
Father away × Female 0.135 0.501 0.738
(0.42) (1.81) (2.03)
Father dead × Female 0.192 -0.00659 0.509
(1.11) (-0.05) (2.97)
Mother away × Female 0.188 -0.249 -0.367
(0.82) (-1.35) (-1.56)
Mother dead × Female -0.205 -0.320 -0.339
(-1.25) (-2.17) (-1.70)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
C.3 Robustness checks
Table C.11 presents the estimation results from a Linear Probability Model
on child neglect, that is child labour and its hazardous forms. While the first
stage estimation is OLS regression on child labour using the whole sample,
the second stage estimates OLS regression on hazardous child labour, with the
sample restricted to working children. All coefficients show a similar trend
with the main analysis. However, the number of hectares of land owned by the
household is no longer statistically significant, and even though the effect of the
ownership of livestock is still negatively related to the incidence of hazardous
child labour, it is diminished.
C.3. Robustness checks 145
The Multinomial logit model in Table C.12 considers a specific two-stage
decision process in which three labour outcomes are compared; “No Work”,
“Non-Hazardous Work” and “Hazardous Work”. The marginal effects in the
Table represent the probability of each determinant to increase the choice of
“Non-Hazardous Work”, and “Hazardous Work”. The comparison group is
“No Work”. The coefficients from the multinomial logit model are in line
with the results of the sequential logit model. As the interest of this study is
hazardous forms of child labour, this section only focuses on the results from
Columns (6)-(12). Compared with non-working children, an increase in the
wealth index reduces the probability of engaging in hazardous forms of child
labour. Besides, The results from Table C.12 support the finding that being
a child who lives with distant relatives increases the probability of working
in hazardous environments, while it does not present any impact for non-
hazardous child labour. Furthermore, the coefficient signs for father away or
dead remain insignificant.
C.3. Robustness checks 146
Table C.9: Sequential Logit Model on Child Labour and Hazardous Forms of
Labour
First Stage Sequential Logit
Child Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.116** -0.115** -0.102* -0.0965* -0.0974* -0.126**
(0.0399) (0.0401) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0423)
Rural 0.634*** 0.610*** 0.625*** 0.564*** 0.564*** 0.564***
(0.123) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)
Household size 0.00669 0.0141 0.0355 0.0270 0.0268 0.0269
(0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0209)
Independent 0.0361 0.102 -0.0043 -0.0032 -0.00042 -0.0002
(0.0684) (0.0687) (0.0708) (0.0710) (0.0709) (0.0715)
Father away -0.00774 -0.0170 -0.0229 -0.0183 -0.0199 -0.449
(0.192) (0.200) (0.204) (0.206) (0.206) (0.344)
Father dead 0.0564 0.0759 0.00192 0.0632 0.0360 -0.146
(0.116) (0.115) (0.121) (0.123) (0.126) (0.132)
Mother away 0.0375 0.0397 -0.0177 -0.0307 -0.0788 -0.277
(0.207) (0.211) (0.212) (0.213) (0.277) (0.383)
Mother dead 0.00236** 0.0158** 0.0254 0.0169 0.0322 0.476
(0.140) (0.140) (0.143) (0.142) (0.179) (0.273)
Has electricity -0.167* 0.152 0.148 0.176 0.176 -0.195
(0.0831) (0.0990) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.160)
Has water -0.691*** -0.445** -0.474** -0.459** -0.460** -0.0114
(0.141) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.288)
Wealth Index -0.281*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.302***
(0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0401)
<5years -0.253*** -0.247*** -0.246*** -0.247***
(0.0392) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0394)
6-14 years 0.0802* 0.0799* 0.0807* 0.0804*
(0.0328) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0326)
>60years 0.0482 0.0631 0.0550 0.0569
(0.0591) (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0587)
Land(hectares) 0.00479** 0.00477** 0.00472**
(0.00176) (0.00177) (0.00177)
(#) Livestock -0.000814 -0.000836 -0.000913
(0.00382) (0.00382) (0.00382)
(#) Horse & Donkey -0.0339* -0.0339* -0.0344*
(0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0147)
(#) Chicken 0.00720** 0.00718** 0.00722**
(0.00254) (0.00253) (0.00253)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.356
(0.381)
Independent Child × Female -0.527
(0.427)
Father away × Female 0.688
(0.398)
Father dead × Female 0.410*
(0.175)
Mother away × Female -0.0124
(0.254)
Mother dead × Female -0.0743
(0.202)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
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Table C.10: Sequential Logit Model on Child Labour and Hazardous Forms of
Labour
Second Stage Sequential Logit
Hazardous Forms of Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.248** -0.255** -0.260*** -0.260** -0.259** -0.288***
(0.0782) (0.0785) (0.0790) (0.0798) (0.0796) (0.0830)
Rural 0.751*** 0.453* 0.462* 0.510* 0.510* 0.514*
(0.191) (0.223) (0.220) (0.221) (0.221) (0.221)
Household size -0.0293 -0.0193 0.0213 0.0210 0.0215 0.0212
(0.0244) (0.0232) (0.0372) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0365)
Independent 0.014* 0.011* 0.023* 0.025* 0.025* 0.043*
(0.141) (0.138) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139)
Father away 0.0280 0.0897 0.0961 0.184 0.182 -0.331
(0.355) (0.356) (0.359) (0.368) (0.368) (0.547)
Father dead 0.0280 0.0897 0.0961 0.184 0.182 -0.331
(0.208) (0.217) (0.214) (0.221) (0.229) (0.265)
Mother away -0.275 -0.234 -0.184 -0.186 0.187 0.186
(0.380) (0.380) (0.379) (0.468) (0.380) (0.408)
Mother dead 0.467 0.471 0.514 0.452 0.413 0.435
(0.269) (0.272) (0.269) (0.368) (0.269) (0.368)
Has electricity 0.196 0.186 0.175 0.174 0.183 0.184
(0.187) (0.189) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190)
Has water 0.271 0.270 0.254 0.249 0.232 0.244
(0.298) (0.298) (0.299) (0.299) (0.269) (0.296)
Wealth Index -0.248** -0.253** -0.246** -0.246** -0.246**
(0.0827) (0.0821) (0.0810) (0.0810) (0.0810)
<5years 0.0298 0.0413 0.0403 0.0412
(0.0698) (0.0699) (0.0700) (0.0700)
6-14 years -0.117 -0.0863 -0.0874 -0.0878
(0.0679) (0.0628) (0.0628) (0.0627)
>60years 0.00256 0.00908 0.00973 0.00736
(0.109) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)
Land(hectares) -0.00375** -0.00373** -0.00375**
(0.00361) (0.00361) (0.00364)
(#) Livestock -0.0568* -0.0570* -0.0576*
(0.0755) (0.0755) (0.0755)
(#) Horse & Donkey -0.440* -0.440* -0.443*
(0.209) (0.209) (0.210)
(#) Chicken -0.00801 -0.00793 -0.00794
(0.00420) (0.00421) (0.00423)
Independent Child × Grandparents 0.469
(0.535)
Independent Child × Female -0.752
(0.663)
Father away × Female 0.872
(0.724)
Father dead × Female 0.154
(0.328)
Mother away × Female -0.310
(0.469)
Mother dead × Female 0.567
(0.356)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
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Table C.11: Robustness Checks: LPM on Child Labour and Hazardous Forms of
Labour
LPM LPM
Child Labour Hazardous Forms of Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.0218∗∗ -0.0214∗∗ -0.0189∗∗ -0.0178∗ -0.0178∗ -0.0237∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0278∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗ -0.0253∗∗∗ -0.0253∗∗∗ -0.0297∗∗∗
(-3.02) (-2.97) (-2.64) (-2.50) (-2.50) (-3.14) (-4.30) (-4.26) (-4.03) (-3.91) (-3.91) (-4.32)
Rural 0.142∗∗∗ 0.0991∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.0914∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0840∗∗∗ 0.0840∗∗∗
(14.74) (9.44) (9.67) (8.55) (8.56) (8.56) (15.91) (10.00) (10.18) (9.22) (9.26) (9.27)
Household size 0.00159 0.00255∗∗ 0.00649∗∗∗ 0.00485∗∗ 0.00487∗∗ 0.00487∗∗ -0.000541 0.000388 0.00521∗∗∗ 0.00429∗∗ 0.00434∗∗ 0.00435∗∗
(1.64) (2.60) (3.80) (2.80) (2.81) (2.81) (-0.67) (0.47) (3.52) (2.86) (2.90) (2.90)
Independent 0.0148 0.0138 0.00431 0.00823 0.00818 0.00829 0.0112 0.0103 0.00272 0.00579 0.00563 0.00742
(1.06) (1.00) (0.31) (0.60) (0.59) (0.59) (0.91) (0.84) (0.22) (0.47) (0.45) (0.59)
Mother away -0.00446 0.00277 -0.00963 -0.0132 -0.0132 -0.0126 -0.00759 -0.000616 -0.00900 -0.0121 -0.0122 -0.0131
(-0.37) (0.23) (-0.80) (-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.03) (-0.70) (-0.06) (-0.83) (-1.12) (-1.13) (-1.19)
Mother dead -0.0242 -0.0192 -0.0303 -0.0176 -0.0177 -0.0239 -0.00685 -0.00212 -0.0108 0.00102 0.000862 -0.0108
(-1.27) (-1.01) (-1.61) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.40) (-0.12) (-0.62) (0.06) (0.05) (-0.45)
Father away -0.00278 0.00169 -0.00545 -0.00484 -0.00480 -0.0701 -0.00597 -0.00166 -0.00606 -0.00492 -0.00481 -0.0713∗
(-0.11) (0.07) (-0.21) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-1.72) (-0.26) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-2.11)
Father dead 0.0136 0.0118 0.00320 0.0124 0.0123 -0.0238 0.000502 -0.00116 -0.00771 0.000120 -0.000374 -0.0201
(0.88) (0.77) (0.21) (0.79) (0.78) (-1.15) (0.04) (-0.08) (-0.56) (0.01) (-0.03) (-1.07)
Has electricity 0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0247∗ 0.0242∗ 0.0294∗∗ 0.0293∗∗ 0.0288∗∗ -0.0376∗∗∗ 0.0215∗ 0.0213∗ 0.0240∗ 0.0239∗ 0.0233∗
(3.96) (2.23) (2.21) (2.68) (2.67) (2.62) (-4.45) (2.13) (2.12) (2.39) (2.38) (2.32)
Has water -0.0921∗∗∗ -0.0466∗∗∗ -0.0510∗∗∗ -0.0474∗∗∗ -0.0475∗∗∗ -0.0477∗∗∗ -0.0582∗∗∗ -0.0144 -0.0179∗ -0.0152 -0.0155 -0.0158
(-9.40) (-4.40) (-4.84) (-4.48) (-4.48) (-4.50) (-6.96) (-1.59) (-1.98) (-1.68) (-1.71) (-1.74)
Wealth Index -0.0523∗∗∗ -0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0559∗∗∗ -0.0558∗∗∗ -0.0557∗∗∗ -0.0504∗∗∗ -0.0522∗∗∗ -0.0534∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0529∗∗∗
(-10.36) (-10.94) (-11.26) (-11.23) (-11.19) (-11.18) (-11.65) (-11.93) (-11.85) (-11.80)
<5years -0.0470∗∗∗ -0.0457∗∗∗ -0.0457∗∗∗ -0.0458∗∗∗ -0.0338∗∗∗ -0.0331∗∗∗ -0.0331∗∗∗ -0.0332∗∗∗
(-13.41) (-13.02) (-13.02) (-13.05) (-10.54) (-10.31) (-10.31) (-10.33)
6-14years 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.00508 0.0048 0.005 0.005
(5.04) (4.99) (4.99) (5.01) (1.93) (1.83) (1.86) (1.88)
>60years 0.00975 0.0115 0.0115 0.0106 0.0115∗ 0.0128∗ 0.0128∗ 0.0120∗
(1.61) (1.90) (1.90) (1.75) (2.11) (2.34) (2.35) (2.19)
Land(hectares) 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
(4.56) (4.58) (4.50) (4.87) (4.95) (4.89)
Livestock -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
(-0.45) (-0.46) (-0.50) (-1.56) (-1.58) (-1.62)
(#) Horse & Donkey -0.00304∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.00295∗∗∗ -0.00204∗∗∗ -0.00166∗∗∗ -0.00167∗∗∗
(-9.34) (-6.72) (-6.77) (-8.17) (-4.73) (-4.70)
(#) Chicken 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.00156∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.0008∗∗ 0.0008∗∗
(5.68) (5.63) (5.65) (2.82) (3.02) (3.02)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.185∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(-3.00) (-3.53)
Independent Child × Female -0.0871 -0.121∗
(-1.38) (-2.32)
Father away × Female 0.106∗ 0.114∗
(1.98) (2.45)
Father dead × Female 0.0701∗ 0.0439
(2.27) (1.60)
Mother away × Female -0.00147 -0.0211
(-0.04) (-0.62)
Mother dead × Female 0.0103 0.0303
(0.26) (0.81)
N 3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 3900 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840 2840
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Table C.12: Robustness checks: Multinomial Logit on Child Labour and Haz-
ardous Forms of Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non Hazardous Labour Hazardous Labour
No work (base)
Female 0.0564 0.0567 0.0705 0.0731 0.0730 0.0458 -0.184∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗
(0.86) (0.87) (1.07) (1.11) (1.11) (0.66) (-4.15) (-4.13) (-3.86) (-3.71) (-3.70) (-4.20)
Rural 0.381∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.246∗ 0.240∗ 0.238∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗
(4.00) (2.91) (3.04) (2.36) (2.31) (2.29) (14.23) (9.91) (10.05) (9.31) (9.33) (9.34)
Household size 0.0284∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0291∗ 0.0173 0.0175 0.0177 -0.00199 0.00555 0.0393∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗ 0.0316∗∗ 0.0315∗∗
(3.59) (3.82) (2.00) (1.17) (1.18) (1.19) (-0.37) (1.02) (3.56) (2.82) (2.86) (2.83)
Independent 0.0183 0.0171 -0.0376 -0.0202 -0.0193 -0.0421 0.120 0.122 0.0696 0.0902 0.0886 0.101
(0.14) (0.13) (-0.29) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.32) (1.35) (1.37) (0.76) (0.99) (0.97) (1.09)
Mother away 0.109 0.123 0.0401 0.0247 0.0248 0.0476 -0.0762 -0.0293 -0.0875 -0.104 -0.105 -0.110
(0.98) (1.10) (0.36) (0.22) (0.22) (0.43) (-0.98) (-0.37) (-1.10) (-1.31) (-1.32) (-1.36)
Mother dead -0.243 -0.234 -0.305 -0.269 -0.270 -0.306 -0.0826 -0.0440 -0.110 -0.0128 -0.0120 -0.0346
(-1.31) (-1.26) (-1.64) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.16) (-0.68) (-0.36) (-0.89) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.21)
Father away -0.0575 -0.0467 -0.108 -0.130 -0.134 -0.218 -0.00905 0.0343 0.0143 0.0209 0.0221 -0.593
(-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.40) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.05) (0.18) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (-1.67)
Father dead 0.128 0.124 0.0837 0.119 0.126 -0.0762 0.0491 0.0451 -0.00842 0.0566 0.0526 -0.138
(0.98) (0.95) (0.63) (0.88) (0.94) (-0.39) (0.51) (0.47) (-0.09) (0.58) (0.54) (-1.06)
Has electricity -0.0628 0.0524 0.0459 0.0840 0.0841 0.0886 -0.206∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(-0.80) (0.57) (0.49) (0.89) (0.89) (0.94) (-4.02) (3.15) (3.07) (3.50) (3.48) (3.43)
Has water -0.721∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗ -0.664∗∗∗ -0.643∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗ -0.639∗∗∗ -0.684∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
(-5.67) (-4.80) (-4.96) (-4.78) (-4.73) (-4.73) (-6.87) (-3.44) (-3.67) (-3.53) (-3.55) (-3.56)
Wealth Index -0.0985∗ -0.111∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.125∗∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗
(-2.16) (-2.45) (-2.68) (-2.78) (-2.81) (-11.29) (-11.80) (-12.06) (-11.98) (-11.92)
<5years -0.272∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
(-8.46) (-8.22) (-8.25) (-8.28) (-10.52) (-10.21) (-10.23) (-10.26)
6-14 years 0.144∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.0493∗∗ 0.0518∗∗ 0.0519∗∗ 0.0526∗∗
(5.41) (5.53) (5.47) (5.47) (2.64) (2.74) (2.75) (2.78)
>60years 0.0424 0.0522 0.0500 0.0473 0.0545 0.0708 0.0714 0.0628
(0.82) (1.01) (0.97) (0.92) (1.48) (1.92) (1.94) (1.71)
Land(hectares) 0.00188 0.00166 0.00157 0.00576∗∗∗ 0.00583∗∗∗ 0.00577∗∗∗
(1.01) (0.88) (0.83) (5.36) (5.43) (5.37)
(#)Livestock 0.00370 0.00373 0.00367 -0.00290 -0.00292 -0.00297
(1.24) (1.25) (1.23) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.39)
(#) Horse& donkey -0.0264∗∗∗ -0.0303∗∗∗ -0.0303∗∗∗ -0.160∗ -0.137 -0.137
(-5.60) (-6.10) (-6.14) (-2.01) (-1.68) (-1.69)
(#) Chicken 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.00582∗∗∗ 0.00613∗∗∗ 0.00617∗∗∗
(6.43) (5.92) (5.92) (4.01) (4.17) (4.20)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.562 -1.650∗∗
(-0.72) (-2.59)
Independent Child × Female 0.338 -0.969∗
(0.62) (-1.98)
Father away × Female 0.0526 1.019∗
(0.09) (2.36)
Father dead × Female 0.295 0.410∗
(1.11) (2.15)
Mother away × Female 0.251 -0.152
(0.80) (-0.58)
Mother dead × Female -0.103 0.0633
(-0.25) (0.24)
t statistics in parentheses







Table C.13: Robustness Check: LPM on Emotional and Physical Child Abuse
Emotional Abuse Mild Physical Abuse Extreme Physical Abuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.00256 -0.00233 -0.00245 -0.00225 -0.00225 -0.00484 -0.0120 -0.0118 -0.0134 -0.0136 -0.0136 -0.0141 -0.0231∗∗ -0.0230∗∗ -0.0235∗∗∗ -0.0237∗∗∗ -0.0237∗∗∗ -0.0290∗∗∗
(-0.36) (-0.33) (-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.65) (-1.47) (-1.44) (-1.64) (-1.66) (-1.66) (-1.63) (-3.28) (-3.26) (-3.33) (-3.36) (-3.36) (-3.85)
Rural 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0148 0.0107 0.00839 0.00839 0.00811 0.0194 -0.00731 -0.0123 -0.0119 -0.0119 -0.0115 0.0255∗∗ 0.00821 0.00682 0.00987 0.00987 0.0101
(4.02) (1.34) (0.97) (0.75) (0.75) (0.73) (1.69) (-0.59) (-0.99) (-0.95) (-0.95) (-0.92) (2.63) (0.79) (0.66) (0.95) (0.95) (0.97)
Household size 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0230∗ 0.0170 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0198∗ 0.0159∗ 0.0655∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗
(7.28) (6.63) (13.23) (13.30) (13.30) (13.28) (2.20) (1.61) (10.42) (10.54) (10.54) (10.56) (2.48) (1.99) (4.20) (3.79) (3.79) (3.82)
Independent 0.0361∗∗ 0.0366∗∗ 0.0401∗∗ 0.0389∗∗ 0.0389∗∗ 0.0420∗∗ 0.0278∗∗ 0.0284∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗ 0.0243∗ 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗ 0.0125∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.00734∗∗
(2.63) (2.68) (2.92) (2.82) (2.82) (3.01) (1.71) (1.74) (1.54) (1.49) (1.49) (1.28) (0.89) (0.92) (0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (0.52)
Mother away 0.0113 0.0156 0.0156 0.0144 0.0144 0.0174 -0.0410∗∗ -0.0365∗∗ -0.0292∗ -0.0299∗ -0.0299∗ -0.0323∗ -0.00651 -0.00361 -0.00134 -0.00155 -0.00155 -0.00475
(0.96) (1.33) (1.33) (1.22) (1.22) (1.46) (-2.90) (-2.58) (-2.06) (-2.11) (-2.11) (-2.25) (-0.54) (-0.30) (-0.11) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.39)
Mother dead -0.0380 -0.0351 -0.0324 -0.0250 -0.0250 -0.0263 -0.106∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.0937∗∗∗ -0.0838∗∗∗ -0.0838∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0656∗∗∗ -0.0636∗∗∗ -0.0610∗∗∗ -0.0559∗∗ -0.0559∗∗ -0.0508∗
(-1.94) (-1.78) (-1.65) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-0.95) (-4.82) (-4.69) (-4.30) (-3.72) (-3.72) (-3.47) (-3.93) (-3.81) (-3.64) (-3.22) (-3.22) (-2.14)
Father away 0.0180 0.0207 0.0176 0.0169 0.0169 -0.00456 -0.0239 -0.0211 -0.0198 -0.0237 -0.0237 -0.0805 -0.0311 -0.0294 -0.0288 -0.0289 -0.0289 -0.0857∗
(0.64) (0.74) (0.63) (0.60) (0.60) (-0.10) (-0.75) (-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.75) (-0.75) (-1.56) (-1.23) (-1.15) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-2.31)
Father dead 0.00271 0.00166 0.00248 0.00724 0.00724 -0.0129 -0.0128 -0.0139 -0.00768 -0.00106 -0.00106 0.00218 -0.00583 -0.00652 -0.00473 -0.00261 -0.00261 -0.0385
(0.18) (0.11) (0.16) (0.48) (0.48) (-0.61) (-0.74) (-0.80) (-0.45) (-0.06) (-0.06) (0.09) (-0.40) (-0.45) (-0.32) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-1.94)
Has electricity -0.0269∗∗ 0.0102 0.00781 0.00863 0.00863 0.00881 -0.0201∗ 0.0180 0.0163 0.0171 0.0171 0.0165 -0.0133 0.0114 0.0109 0.00893 0.00893 0.00793
(-3.25) (1.00) (0.77) (0.85) (0.85) (0.87) (-2.05) (1.51) (1.36) (1.43) (1.43) (1.38) (-1.54) (1.11) (1.06) (0.87) (0.87) (0.77)
Has water -0.00910 0.0184 0.0217 0.0231 0.0231 0.0229 -0.0104 0.0179 0.0237 0.0250 0.0250 0.0245 -0.00945 0.00880 0.0104 0.00974 0.00974 0.00981
(-0.75) (1.41) (1.68) (1.79) (1.79) (1.77) (-0.78) (1.25) (1.66) (1.75) (1.75) (1.71) (-0.87) (0.75) (0.89) (0.83) (0.83) (0.84)
Wealth Index -0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗ -0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0285∗∗∗ -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0326∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗ -0.0280∗∗∗ -0.0280∗∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0210∗∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗
(-6.16) (-5.49) (-5.56) (-5.56) (-5.57) (-5.60) (-4.83) (-4.81) (-4.81) (-4.76) (-4.42) (-4.14) (-4.10) (-4.10) (-4.05)
<5years 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗
(7.77) (7.82) (7.82) (7.82) (13.24) (13.28) (13.28) (13.29) (4.28) (4.13) (4.13) (4.08)
6-14years 0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.00500 0.00490 0.00490 0.00498
(10.47) (10.42) (10.42) (10.42) (6.27) (6.27) (6.27) (6.33) (1.75) (1.72) (1.72) (1.75)
>60years 0.0145∗ 0.0152∗ 0.0152∗ 0.0146∗ 0.00390 0.00486 0.00486 0.00402 0.00154 0.00162 0.00162 0.00122
(2.45) (2.56) (2.56) (2.47) (0.57) (0.71) (0.71) (0.59) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.21)
Land(hectares) 0.000315 0.000315 0.000307 -0.000214 -0.000214 -0.000212 -0.0000458 -0.0000458 -0.0000540
(1.76) (1.76) (1.72) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.28)
(#) Livestock 0.000254 0.000243 0.000242 0.000122 0.000123 0.000122 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.54) (0.54) (0.52) (1.14) (1.14) (1.15) (-1.36) (-1.36) (-1.33)
(#) Horse & donkey 0.000295 0.000295 0.000220 0.00239∗ 0.00239∗ 0.00246∗ 0.000771 0.000771 0.000792
(0.29) (0.29) (0.22) (2.46) (2.46) (2.55) (0.78) (0.78) (0.80)
(#) Chicken 0.000199 0.000199 0.000195 0.000388 0.000388 0.000387 -0.000660∗∗ -0.000660∗∗ -0.000652∗∗
(0.83) (0.83) (0.82) (1.37) (1.37) (1.37) (-2.76) (-2.76) (-2.73)
Independent Child × Grandparents -0.116 -0.116 -0.165∗ -0.165∗ -0.0816 -0.0816
(-1.46) (-1.46) (-2.23) (-2.23) (-1.59) (-1.59)
Independent Child × Female -0.000762 -0.0164 -0.0949
(-0.01) (-0.23) (-1.86)
Father away × Female 0.0211 0.119 0.112∗
(0.36) (1.81) (2.21)
Father dead × Female 0.0298 -0.0125 0.0816∗∗
(0.99) (-0.36) (2.77)
Mother away × Female 0.0396 -0.0756 -0.0595
(1.10) (-1.68) (-1.75)
Mother dead × Female -0.0104 0.0239 -0.000143
(-0.25) (0.51) (-0.00)
N 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347 14347
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Bureau National au Mali.
Duflo, E. and Pande, R. (2007). Dams. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
122(2):601–646.
Edmonds, E. V. (2008). Defining child labor: A review of the definitions
of child labor used in academic and policy research. In Chenery, H. and
Srinivasan, T. N., editors, Handbook of Development Economics. Elsevier.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 155
Edmonds, E. V. (2010). Selection into worst forms of child labor, volume 31,
pages 1–31.
Edmonds, E. V. and Shrestha, M. (2012). Child labor migrants and children
outside of parental care. Technical report, Working Paper. Available online
at: http://www. iza. org/MigrationHandbook . . . .
Evan, P. and Pankhurst, B. (1994). Ethiopian village studies. Edited &
produced jointly by the Department of Sociology, Addis Ababa University,
Ethiopia & the Centre for the Study of African Economies. Oxford.
Gilbert, R., Widom, C. S., Browne, K., Fergusson, D., Webb, E., and Janson,
S. (2009). Burden and consequences of child maltreatment in high-income
countries. The Lancet, 373(9657):68 – 81.
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